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π Economics

Economics: why Europe is falling behind the USA

Patrick_Artus
Patrick Artus
Economic Advisor to Ossiam and Member of Cercle des Économistes
Key takeaways
  • Between 2010 and 2023, the cumulative GDP growth rate reached 34% in the United States, compared with just 21% in the European Union.
  • This gap can be explained by insufficient investment in new technologies in Europe.
  • Another reason is the low level of spending on research and development.
  • The case of the United States shows that investment in this sector is correlated with an increase in productivity.
  • The risk is that this European deficit will have an impact on tax revenues and on Europe's attractiveness to foreign investors.

Between 2010 and 2023, the cumu­lat­ive growth rate of GDP reached 34% in the United States, com­pared with just 21% in the European Uni­on and 18% in the euro­zone. This meas­ure of GDP in volume does not depend on changes in exchange rates. Over the same peri­od, labour pro­ductiv­ity grew by 22% in the United States and 5% in the euro­zone. Europe’s gap with the United States has there­fore been clear since the early 2010s and can­not be explained by the dif­fer­ence in growth in the work­ing-age population.

Most of this gap is due to the dif­fer­ence in pro­ductiv­ity gains. And this gap is still present in the recent peri­od (labour pro­ductiv­ity rose by 1.7% in the United States and fell by 0.6% in the euro­zone over the four quar­ters to 2023). Under­stand­ing the reas­ons for this dif­fer­ence between the United States and Europe is an import­ant area of research, on which opin­ions differ.

For some, the stag­na­tion and then decline in pro­ductiv­ity in the euro­zone is due to the high level of hir­ing dif­fi­culties, which began to appear in 2017 at the same time as the stag­na­tion in pro­ductiv­ity. Hir­ing dif­fi­culties would have encour­aged com­pan­ies not to make redund­an­cies, even if they had an over­sup­ply of staff. How­ever, it is hard to believe this thes­is, since the United States has also exper­i­enced very sig­ni­fic­ant hir­ing dif­fi­culties, without see­ing any stag­na­tion in productivity.

Oth­ers believe that the stag­na­tion and then decline in pro­ductiv­ity in Europe is due to the rise in the employ­ment rate of the least qual­i­fied. This would have caused the aver­age skill level of the work­ing pop­u­la­tion to fall. But this argu­ment is not con­vin­cing, since the employ­ment rate in Europe has ris­en almost identic­ally at all skill levels, and so the aver­age skill level of those in work has not fallen.

The two rel­ev­ant and fac­tu­al explan­a­tions for Europe’s fall­ing labour pro­ductiv­ity levels are insuf­fi­cient invest­ment in new tech­no­lo­gies (com­puters, arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, soft­ware, etc.) and the low level of spend­ing on research and development.

When we com­pare OECD coun­tries, we see that these two vari­ables have a strong influ­ence on pro­ductiv­ity dif­fer­ences between coun­tries. The eco­no­met­ric estim­ate leads to the fol­low­ing effects: a 1 point increase in the rate of invest­ment in new tech­no­lo­gies leads to a 0.8 point increase per year in pro­ductiv­ity gains. Sim­il­arly, a 1‑point increase in GDP for research and devel­op­ment expendit­ure leads to a 0.9‑point increase per year in pro­ductiv­ity gains.

The fear is that Europe will be drawn into a vicious circle

By 2022, invest­ment in new tech­no­lo­gies will rep­res­ent 5% of GDP in the United States and 2.8% of GDP in the euro­zone. Research and devel­op­ment spend­ing in 2022 will amount to 3.5% of GDP in the United States and 2.3% of GDP in the euro­zone. What’s more, from 2016–2017 onwards, the invest­ment and R&D effort in the United States increased sig­ni­fic­antly com­pared to that of the euro­zone. At the same time, pro­ductiv­ity began to grow much faster in the United States than in Europe. It is there­fore the lag in tech­no­lo­gic­al invest­ment and R&D that explains a large part of Europe’s lag behind the United States in terms of labour pro­ductiv­ity and GDP.

How can Europe hope to catch up with the United States in terms of pro­ductiv­ity and growth? The first step would be to change the nature of busi­ness invest­ment. The rate of busi­ness invest­ment is vir­tu­ally the same at the start of 2024 in the United States and the euro­zone (13.5% of GDP), but the pro­por­tion of this invest­ment in tech­no­logy is much high­er in the United States (5% of GDP com­pared with 2.8% in the euro­zone). We there­fore need to cor­rect the fact that busi­ness invest­ment in the euro­zone is too mundane and not suf­fi­ciently high-end.

The second meas­ure is to increase R&D spend­ing and uni­ver­sity budgets in the euro­zone. The resources avail­able for uni­ver­sity and cor­por­ate research are much high­er in the United States. And, as men­tioned earli­er, these resources are an import­ant and sig­ni­fic­ant determ­in­ant of pro­ductiv­ity gains.

It is to be feared that Europe will be drawn into a vicious circle of low invest­ment in new tech­no­lo­gies and research and devel­op­ment, and hence low pro­ductiv­ity gains and growth. Firstly, these declines could have a neg­at­ive impact on Europe’s attract­ive­ness to for­eign investors. Secondly, they could reduce tax rev­en­ues and the abil­ity of European gov­ern­ments to pur­sue policies to sup­port innov­a­tion and boost Europe’s attractiveness.

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