Geopolitics : “the impact of migration is essentially regional”

At the glo­bal level, this impact is mini­mal, as rela­tions bet­ween the major powers are not affec­ted by migra­tion issues. On the other hand, this impact can be seen on a regio­nal scale, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in Europe and Afri­ca. Let us start with Europe, where two phe­no­me­na can be identified.

The first is the poli­ti­cal sen­si­ti­vi­ty of the sub­ject. The migra­tion phe­no­me­non itself has not got­ten any worse. In France, a coun­try of 67 mil­lion inha­bi­tants, there are about 150,000 addi­tio­nal immi­grants eve­ry year. Apart from in Ger­ma­ny, the situa­tion is simi­lar in other Euro­pean coun­tries. But sou­thern Euro­pean coun­tries had no immi­gra­tion thir­ty years ago, and the novel­ty of the phe­no­me­non is cau­sing poli­ti­cal dis­tur­bances. Among the nor­thern coun­tries, Ger­ma­ny, Swe­den, and Nor­way ope­ned their bor­ders to refu­gees before back­tra­cking. The sen­si­ti­vi­ty of the sub­ject and the emer­gence of popu­list move­ments can have a poli­ti­cal impact and shape the conduct of Euro­pean coun­tries, with inter­na­tio­nal ten­sions as we have seen recent­ly bet­ween Paris, Algiers, and Rabat.

These ten­sions can also be seen within the EU. The hard line taken by Poland or Hun­ga­ry goes hand in hand with a demo­gra­phic para­dox. The coun­tries of the East and the Bal­kans are in a pecu­liar situa­tion : their popu­la­tion is decrea­sing, their fer­ti­li­ty is low, their citi­zens are emi­gra­ting, but these coun­tries are hos­tile to any migra­to­ry influx. For example, Roma­nia has gone from 23 mil­lion inha­bi­tants in 1990 to 19 mil­lion in 2020. They would the­re­fore need immi­gra­tion to main­tain their wor­king popu­la­tion or their level of edu­ca­tion. But the concern regar­ding their cultu­ral iden­ti­ty takes over.

This brings us to the second, much newer phe­no­me­non : the use of migra­tion by some of the EU’s neigh­bours as a way to exert pres­sure. Bela­rus plays on migra­tion flows to put pres­sure on Poland or Lithua­nia, and through them on Brus­sels. Tur­key has an agree­ment with the EU on the mana­ge­ment of refu­gees from the Middle East ; it modu­lates its posi­tion in its tense rela­tion­ship with the EU. One could also men­tion Libya and the flow of sub-Saha­ran migrants. In this par­ti­cu­lar regio­nal context, migra­tion has become a geo­po­li­ti­cal weapon.

There is also the situa­tion regar­ding the bor­der bet­ween Mexi­co and the Uni­ted States, with cara­vans of migrants coming from Cen­tral Ame­ri­ca, but also from Hai­ti and Vene­zue­la. This deve­lop­ment increa­sin­gly impacts US domes­tic politics.

This is an emer­ging issue. What we know at the moment about so-cal­led “cli­mate migra­tion” is that it occurs over short dis­tances. In the Mekong Del­ta and in Ban­gla­desh, far­mers move over short dis­tances : they go to the neigh­bou­ring hil­ls. But if it gets too much, it could lead to some coun­tries beco­ming des­ta­bi­li­sed. This is what India fears, and it has set up elec­tric fences with Bangladesh.

In the Sahel, the advance of the desert – a long-stan­ding and often fluc­tua­ting phe­no­me­non – is main­ly reflec­ted in the rural exo­dus. When the desert retreats, the far­mers stay in the cities. The same phe­no­me­non can be obser­ved in Ban­gla­desh : fol­lo­wing floods, far­mers leave their farms and move to the nea­rest towns. The poo­rest and most indeb­ted stay in the town, those who have some assets return and take back their land.

Yes, this is the last major area of high fer­ti­li­ty. A coun­try like Niger alrea­dy has 22 mil­lion inha­bi­tants and is gro­wing at 4% per year : a dou­bling eve­ry seven­teen years. Nige­riens are moving sou­th­wards, towards Togo, Benin, and Côte d’I­voire. Here, there are geo­po­li­ti­cal risks of des­ta­bi­li­sa­tion. We have alrea­dy seen troubles in Côte d’I­voire, about ten years ago. Mali, Bur­ki­na Faso, and Chad are also uns­table. We ima­gine a risk for Europe. But a poor far­mer in Bur­ki­na Faso will not tra­vel that far. Most of the inter­na­tio­nal migra­tion from Afri­ca takes place bet­ween Afri­can countries.

Yet more than issues of cli­mate migra­tion, the fac­tor to consi­der here is civil war. The two best known examples are Dar­fur, from where bet­ween 500,000 and one mil­lion people have fled to eas­tern Chad, and Soma­lia, from which one mil­lion people have left for Kenya, where the world’s lar­gest camp houses 500,000 people. This creates pro­blems within the coun­try itself. In Chad, on the other hand, I have not heard of any major pro­blems, per­haps because some of the refu­gees from Dar­fur are Zagha­wa, an eth­nic group that straddles the two coun­tries and to which the Cha­dian pre­sident belongs.

Part of Afri­can migra­tion is the­re­fore faci­li­ta­ted by the mis­match bet­ween admi­nis­tra­tive bor­ders and eth­nic dis­tri­bu­tion. Never­the­less, the fact remains that Afri­can states, like others, are see­king to streng­then their bor­ders. This rein­for­ce­ment can have side effects, such as those obser­ved in Europe : by making migra­tion dif­fi­cult, fluid comings and goings, such as “noria”, have been redu­ced in favour of defi­ni­tive emi­gra­tion. This poses pro­blems for host coun­tries, but also for coun­tries of emi­gra­tion, because a large pro­por­tion of today’s migrants are qua­li­fied pro­fes­sio­nals who set­tle in rich countries.