Sunset in Cairo city
π Geopolitics
The Middle East: geopolitical and strategic analysis

Egypt : more than a decade in power and increasingly authoritarian rule

with Sarah Ben Néfissa, Emeritus Research Director at the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development (IRD)
On October 28th, 2025 |
4 min reading time
Sarah Ben Néfissa_VF
Sarah Ben Néfissa
Emeritus Research Director at the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development (IRD)
Key takeaways
  • Since coming to power in 2013, Egyptian President al-Sisi has established a political regime based on intense authoritarianism.
  • The current regime has weakened all countervailing powers, from opposition political parties to Parliament.
  • It is now impossible to rely on official election results to understand Egyptians’ support for the current government.
  • Al-Sisi aims to build state capitalism using tools such as neoliberal austerity policies and the pricing of public goods and services.
  • Reducing water waste is a key national issue, and several measures, such as lining the Nile’s irrigation canals, have been proposed.

Since coming to power in 2013, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been re-elected three times as Egypt’s leader and, barring any surprises, is expected to remain in office until 2029. What can we learn from this decade in power ?

Sarah Ben Nefis­sa. Pre­sident al-Sisi has crea­ted a high­ly intense form of poli­ti­cal autho­ri­ta­ria­nism, much more secu­ri­ty-focu­sed than that of his pre­de­ces­sor, Hos­ni Muba­rak (Pre­sident of the Arab Repu­blic of Egypt from 1981 to 2011), who was over­thrown after the 2011 upri­sings. Under al-Sisi, the demo­cra­tic gains achie­ved by the people have been lar­ge­ly era­sed. Today, the poli­ti­cal regime is based on the cen­tral role of the pre­si­den­cy, the mar­gi­na­li­sa­tion of the govern­ment and par­lia­ment, and, above all, the gro­wing invol­ve­ment of the army in poli­ti­cal and eco­no­mic life, which has been esta­bli­shed as the guar­dian of the Consti­tu­tion and democracy.

Accor­ding to al-Sisi’s vision, it was the laxi­ty and per­mis­si­ve­ness of the Muba­rak regime that was res­pon­sible for the 2011 revo­lu­tion and, by exten­sion, for the poli­ti­cal and eco­no­mic tur­moil that fol­lo­wed. Based on this rea­ding of his­to­ry, a series of res­tric­tive mea­sures led to the esta­blish­ment of state capi­ta­lism1, domi­na­ted by the mili­ta­ry apparatus.

Unchecked power ?

All poli­ti­cal par­ties, with the Mus­lim Bro­the­rhood at the fore­front, have been wea­ke­ned. Contra­ry to expec­ta­tions, the Pre­sident has not filled this poli­ti­cal vacuum by crea­ting a par­ty struc­tu­red around him­self, as is cus­to­ma­ry under autho­ri­ta­rian regimes. Only loya­list poli­ti­cal groups, crea­ted in 2013 by the secu­ri­ty agen­cies, exist and regu­lar­ly mani­pu­late the selec­tion of can­di­dates stan­ding for elec­tion. As for Par­lia­ment, it can­not act as a coun­ter­weight to the exe­cu­tive, as its mem­bers are redu­ced to rub­ber-stam­ping pre­si­den­tial decrees and draft laws without distinction.

This control extends beyond the poli­ti­cal sphere. The regime fears the sym­bo­lic Tah­rir Square being taken over by a new popu­lar upri­sing. Eve­ry mea­sure is being taken to ward off this spectre : asso­cia­tions are strict­ly control­led, NGOs are pre­ven­ted from ope­ra­ting, demons­tra­tions are not autho­ri­sed, and repres­sion is the state’s almost auto­ma­tic res­ponse. The media land­scape, which had under­gone libe­ra­li­sa­tion under the impact of the pri­va­ti­sa­tion of the sec­tor since 2005, is seeing a major return to state control.

Final­ly, on the judi­cial front, a major consti­tu­tio­nal reform in 2019 redu­ced the inde­pen­dence of the judi­cia­ry, judges and magis­trates, giving the pre­sident control over judi­cial bodies. In total, more than 1,000 pri­sons are said to have been built since the begin­ning of his terms in office.

How can we gauge the support of the Egyptian people ?

Whe­ther it be pre­si­den­tial or par­lia­men­ta­ry elec­tions, it is impos­sible to rely on offi­cial elec­tion results to unders­tand the level of sup­port for the govern­ment in power. The entire pro­cess is control­led in advance : it is almost impos­sible for an inde­pendent can­di­date to stand for elec­tion. The last elec­tions that offe­red any sem­blance of trans­pa­ren­cy were in 2014. Ten years later, the can­di­dates are cho­sen by al-Sisi. The last inde­pendent can­di­date in the 2023 pre­si­den­tial elec­tions, Ahmed Tan­ta­wi, a for­mer mem­ber of par­lia­ment, was unable to stand and was sen­ten­ced to one year in pri­son for irre­gu­la­ri­ties iden­ti­fied by the secu­ri­ty services.

The President is said to have taken a neoliberal turn, changing the economic and social balance that had been in place until now. What are the signs of this ?

Eco­no­mi­cal­ly, the al-Sisi decade has had a pro­found impact on socie­ty. The new archi­tec­ture that has been erec­ted has cal­led into ques­tion the “autho­ri­ta­rian social pact” that has his­to­ri­cal­ly been in force in many poli­ti­cal regimes in the region. The tacit agree­ment is based on the exchange of free­dom for food, social and phy­si­cal secu­ri­ty. Far from this pact, the Pre­sident has built a state capi­ta­lism, using tools such as neo­li­be­ral aus­te­ri­ty poli­cies and the pri­cing of public goods and ser­vices, while pro­mo­ting the concen­tra­tion of wealth. The pri­ma­ry objec­tive was to create a new domi­nant social and eco­no­mic class that would depend on him and be struc­tu­red around the army.

Grand projects, but controversial effects ?

Al-Sisi is also known for his dreams of gran­deur, all accom­pa­nied by super­la­tives. He envi­sions pha­rao­nic works to expand the Suez Canal, build a new capi­tal on the outs­kirts of Cai­ro, a majes­tic ope­ra house, the lar­gest church in Afri­ca, the lar­gest mosque in Egypt, and much more. The rea­li­ty is not so rosy. These mega­pro­jects are a total fai­lure, having been car­ried out with a great deal of opa­ci­ty by mili­ta­ry com­pa­nies. They are part­ly res­pon­sible for the eco­no­mic ban­krupt­cy of the state.

Between rapid population growth and the effects of global warming, Egypt faces many agricultural and water-related challenges. How does the state intend to respond ?

The Renais­sance Dam plan­ned by Ethio­pia on the Blue Nile, ups­tream from the Egyp­tian Aswan Dam built under Nas­ser, has been a source of ten­sion and fear for seve­ral years. The main concern is the reduc­tion in the river’s flow and the wor­se­ning of droughts.

Apart from this dis­pute with Addis Aba­ba, redu­cing water waste is a key natio­nal issue. Seve­ral mea­sures have been pro­po­sed, such as lining the Nile’s irri­ga­tion canals or imple­men­ting water ratio­ning sys­tems (alter­na­ting bet­ween three days with water and three days without). Ano­ther mea­sure, which has been stron­gly cri­ti­ci­sed, was to limit – or even ban – water-inten­sive crops such as rice. Howe­ver, this cereal is the main source of nutri­tion for mil­lions of far­mers in the coun­try2. Seve­ral mega­pro­jects have been laun­ched to increase the amount of agri­cul­tu­ral land by crea­ting new culti­vable areas in the desert, nota­bly the Future of Egypt in the New Del­ta pro­ject3. Here too, the mega­pro­jects pro­po­sed are not uni­ver­sal­ly popular.

Under the weight of political repression and the erosion of the socio-economic context, could a significant wave of protest emerge in the coming years ?

The regime is cur­rent­ly very fra­gile. Social ser­vices are mini­mal, and only the intel­li­gence ser­vices lis­ten to the people. Fur­ther­more, there is no ideo­lo­gy capable of win­ning the wides­pread sup­port of Egyp­tians, and the govern­ment gene­ral­ly views its popu­la­tion with contempt.

Al-Sis­si has been able to res­tore his image to some extent recent­ly with his posi­tions on regio­nal issues. He oppo­sed Donald Trump’s posi­tion when the lat­ter wan­ted to relo­cate Gazans to the Sinai. But recent­ly, people have begun to speak out more free­ly, as evi­den­ced by the social move­ments of inner-city resi­dents against rent libe­ra­li­sa­tion in May 2025. Move­ments to pro­tect lawyers, strikes by pri­vate sec­tor wor­kers and the elec­tion of an inde­pendent can­di­date to head the jour­na­lists’ union can be seen as signs. These are faint signals that need to be monitored.

Interview by Alicia Piveteau
1Yezid Sayigh, The Second Repu­blic : Rema­king Egypt Under Abdel-Fat­tah el-Sisi, https://​car​ne​gieen​dow​ment​.org/​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​/​2​0​2​5​/​0​5​/​t​h​e​-​s​e​c​o​n​d​-​r​e​p​u​b​l​i​c​-​t​h​e​-​r​e​m​a​k​i​n​g​-​o​f​-​e​g​y​p​t​-​u​n​d​e​r​-​a​b​d​e​l​-​f​a​t​t​a​h​-​e​l​-​s​i​s​i​?​l​a​ng=en
2Saker el Nour, https://​afri​ca​nar​gu​ments​.org/​2​0​2​1​/​0​1​/​g​e​r​d​-​t​h​e​-​t​r​e​e​-​w​h​i​c​h​-​h​i​d​e​s​-​t​h​e​-​f​o​r​e​s​t​-​o​n​-​w​a​t​e​r​-​i​n​e​q​u​a​l​i​t​i​e​s​-​i​n​-​e​gypt/
3https://​french​.ahram​.org​.eg/​N​e​w​s​/​5​8​3​0​1​.aspx

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