Jordan : a myth of stability put to the test ?

Camille Abes­cat. The 1952 Consti­tu­tion defines Jor­dan as a here­di­ta­ry and par­lia­men­ta­ry monar­chy. Within this sys­tem, the figure of the king is cen­tral : he holds exe­cu­tive power, which he exer­cises through the govern­ment, whose mem­bers, gene­ral­ly tech­no­crats with no par­ty affi­lia­tion, he also appoints and dis­misses. Legis­la­tive power is also control­led by the sove­rei­gn, although theo­re­ti­cal­ly sha­red with Par­lia­ment. The lat­ter is com­po­sed of an upper house – the Senate, whose mem­bers are appoin­ted by the King – and a lower house com­po­sed of depu­ties. The monarch retains the power to dis­solve Par­lia­ment whe­ne­ver he wishes. Royal powers have been streng­the­ned since the 2016 consti­tu­tio­nal reform. From now on, appoint­ment decrees issued by Abdul­lah II no lon­ger need to be coun­ter­si­gned by the Prime Minister.

A few months before the reform pro­cess began in 2021, around 20 people were arres­ted by the secu­ri­ty ser­vices on charges of plot­ting a coup. Among the alle­ged culprits was Prince Ham­zah bin Hus­sein, the king’s half-bro­ther and a popu­lar figure in the coun­try. In a video broad­cast by the BBC, he denied the coup attempt and spoke out stron­gly against cor­rup­tion and the rise of poli­ti­cal repression.

In this poli­ti­cal and media context, the announ­ce­ment of reforms by the “Royal Com­mit­tee to Moder­nise the Poli­ti­cal Sys­tem” was seen as an attempt to appease social unrest and proof that the monar­chy was moving towards the demo­cra­ti­sa­tion of its ins­ti­tu­tions. For example, the new elec­to­ral law, enac­ted in 2022, now reserves 41 seats for poli­ti­cal par­ties, thus respon­ding to a long-stan­ding demand by the oppo­si­tion. Howe­ver, not all of the mea­sures announ­ced were equal­ly well recei­ved : the crea­tion of the Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil, a body com­po­sed of seve­ral minis­ters, the chief of staff and the head of intel­li­gence, was met with fierce cri­ti­cism. For many Jor­da­nians, this Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil is a new way of cir­cum­ven­ting exis­ting ins­ti­tu­tions, such as Parliament.

The Isla­mic Action Front enjoyed its most deci­sive vic­to­ry since its foun­da­tion. The party’s mem­bers them­selves were see­min­gly sur­pri­sed by the announ­ce­ment of such a result : they mana­ged to win 31 seats, eight of which were held by women. Fur­ther­more, the suc­cess was nation­wide, not limi­ted to a few geo­gra­phi­cal areas but affec­ting the whole coun­try. These results are also consistent with those of the student elec­tions held a few months ear­lier : lists affi­lia­ted with the Mus­lim Bro­the­rhood came out on top at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Jor­dan, based in Amman. The regio­nal context, and par­ti­cu­lar­ly the impact of the Israe­li government’s geno­ci­dal war in Gaza, may have played in favour of the par­ty, which is per­cei­ved as the main defen­der of the Pales­ti­nian cause in the coun­try. Voter tur­nout was just over 30%, slight­ly higher than in 2020. For a high­ly anti­ci­pa­ted and wide­ly publi­ci­sed elec­tion, this figure may seem sur­pri­sing at first glance, but it reflects both citi­zens’ disin­te­rest (with Par­lia­ment being per­cei­ved as a power­less ins­ti­tu­tion) and gro­wing dis­content with increa­sing repres­sion and the concen­tra­tion of poli­ti­cal power.

Although the Bro­the­rhood had alrea­dy cea­sed to exist legal­ly in Jor­dan since 2020, this total ban came a few days after the arrest of seve­ral indi­vi­duals who clai­med to be affi­lia­ted with the Mus­lim Bro­the­rhood and were accu­sed of pos­ses­sing wea­pons and plan­ning an attack on Jor­da­nian soil. In addi­tion to this event, the deci­sion is a means of cur­bing the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s rising popu­la­ri­ty and reflects the dete­rio­ra­tion of rela­tions bet­ween the govern­ment and the Bro­the­rhood. The lat­ter has repea­ted­ly denoun­ced the conti­nued diplo­ma­tic and eco­no­mic col­la­bo­ra­tion bet­ween the Jor­da­nian state and Israel. Final­ly, geo­po­li­ti­cal alliances cer­tain­ly wei­ghed on the ver­dict. Sau­di Ara­bia and the Uni­ted Arab Emi­rates, two stra­te­gic part­ners of Jor­dan, consi­der the Mus­lim Bro­the­rhood a regio­nal threat.

The regio­nal cri­sis has seve­re­ly affec­ted the tou­rism indus­try, a pillar of the natio­nal eco­no­my that employs tens of thou­sands of Jor­da­nians and accoun­ted for 18% of GDP in 2023 (before 7^th Octo­ber). Hotel reve­nues fell over seve­ral months, ending up well below fore­casts (-65%). To limit the knock-on effects, the govern­ment tem­po­ra­ri­ly sus­pen­ded social secu­ri­ty contri­bu­tions for the most affec­ted busi­nesses. It is in this uncer­tain eco­no­mic context that Pre­sident Trump’s return to office and the sub­sequent re-eva­lua­tion of US finan­cial sup­port have cau­sed serious concern. These concerns are jus­ti­fied, as Jor­dan is hea­vi­ly and struc­tu­ral­ly dependent on this aid, being one of the main reci­pient coun­tries in the region. In April 2025, the King repor­ted­ly recei­ved solid assu­rances from Donald Trump that mili­ta­ry assis­tance and bud­ge­ta­ry sup­port (approxi­ma­te­ly US$1.5 bil­lion) would remain intact. Howe­ver, the sus­tai­na­bi­li­ty of US aid is less clear when it comes to the edu­ca­tion and health sectors.

The “myth” of a stable coun­try in a region pla­gued by conflict is in rea­li­ty a poli­ti­cal nar­ra­tive construc­ted joint­ly by the Jor­da­nian autho­ri­ties and inter­na­tio­nal donors, who have eve­ry inter­est in pre­sen­ting the monar­chy as a poli­ti­cal model, an oasis of sta­bi­li­ty, thus making it the ideal ally in the Middle East. Howe­ver, this nar­ra­tive has obs­cu­red the trans­for­ma­tions that Jor­da­nian poli­tics and socie­ty have under­gone. Pro­test move­ments are part of eve­ry­day life in Jor­dan, as are the res­ponses of the autho­ri­ties, which always oscil­late bet­ween repres­sion and control­led poli­ti­cal reform.

Interview by Alicia Piveteau