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Splinternet : how geopolitics is fracturing cyberspace

MHALLA Asma
Asma Mhalla
Specialist in the Geopolitics of the Digital Economy
Key takeaways
  • Today, cyberspace has become a battleground for power struggles between nations, leading to a fracturing of the global network.
  • It can be used as a weapon of war between countries, to cut off access to information, retrieve data or spread propaganda.
  • Some states are disconnecting from the global Internet in favour of their own network, isolated from the rest, over which they have control.
  • Authoritarian regimes use this phenomenon to gain control over their population and public opinion.
  • This weakens democracies: as the global Internet remains accessible to authoritarian regimes, foreign interference can occur.

In 1989, Tim Ber­ners-Lee and his team at CERN intro­du­ced an inno­va­tion that would change the world : the World Wide Web. This inno­va­tion, known sim­ply as the Web, lin­ked the entire world through almost inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ca­tion. This was its pri­ma­ry goal1 : to enable resear­chers in dif­ferent fields to com­mu­ni­cate with each other and share their know­ledge instantly.

The Splin­ter­net is the esta­blish­ment of a mul­ti­po­lar Inter­net, frag­men­ted into as many clo­sed cybers­paces as there are com­pe­ting blocks in the world.

The Inter­net the­re­fore comes from a dream, that of exchange, com­mu­ni­ca­tion, and mutual aid. But today, this dream seems increa­sin­gly unrea­lis­tic. Why is this ? Accor­ding to Asma Mhal­la, a spe­cia­list in the poli­ti­cal and geo­po­li­ti­cal stakes of the digi­tal eco­no­my and a lec­tu­rer at Sciences Po Paris and École Poly­tech­nique (IP Paris), cybers­pace has under­gone a pro­cess of mili­ta­ri­sa­tion, “It has become a bat­tle­ground for power struggles bet­ween nations, and more pre­ci­se­ly bet­ween dis­tinct ideo­lo­gi­cal blocs, lea­ding to a frac­tu­red glo­bal net­work,” she says. “As such, the Splin­ter­net was formed.”

What is the Splinternet ? 

To bet­ter unders­tand what the Splin­ter­net is, it is neces­sa­ry to unders­tand what cybers­pace is. This space is struc­tu­red in three inter­de­pendent macro-layers2. The first is the phy­si­cal layer, and revolves around the various infra­struc­tures that enable this net­work of connec­ti­vi­ty to be esta­bli­shed : the data­centres, the ser­vers, the cables, etc.  The second is the logi­cal layer : pro­to­cols, lan­guages, infor­ma­tion sys­tems. And the last, the seman­tic or cog­ni­tive layer, refers to all the appli­ca­tions in direct contact with the user. 

“Ini­tial­ly, this space was inten­ded to be free and open. It was concei­ved in the 1960s with the ideas of its time and was then mar­ked by the idea of hap­py glo­ba­li­sa­tion,” explains Asma Mhal­la. “Howe­ver, the poten­tial of this tech­no­lo­gy even­tual­ly tur­ned it into a stra­te­gic issue. The Inter­net has thus become a new are­na for influence, confron­ta­tion, and power rela­tions bet­ween dif­ferent world powers.” Today, its ubi­qui­tous use and the wealth of data it gene­rates make it a tar­get of war­fare – even a wea­pon. “This pro­cess of mili­ta­ri­sa­tion of cybers­pace has made it the 5th dimen­sion of conven­tio­nal war­fare (the first 4 being : land, sea, sky and space),” she says. “The three macro-layers have become tar­gets for the mili­ta­ry stra­te­gies of states.”

Take the example of the war in Ukraine : Rus­sia is atta­cking the infra­struc­ture (phy­si­cal layer) to cut off the Inter­net, or at least dis­rupt it. The Net­blocks asso­cia­tion also accuses Rus­sia of having redi­rec­ted the Ukrai­nian net­work to its own net­work, with the aim of reco­ve­ring data (logi­cal layer). Final­ly, the Krem­lin’s influence on appli­ca­tions in direct contact with the user (seman­tic layer) allows it to spread its pro­pa­gan­da and jus­ti­fy its invasion. 

Connec­ti­vi­ty to the Ukrai­nian net­work by pro­vi­der. Net­blocks obser­ved a dis­con­nec­tion in connec­ti­vi­ty which, upon its return to ser­vice, was redi­rec­ted to Rus­sian pro­vi­ders3.

“Through this pro­cess of mili­ta­ri­sa­tion, some states, such as Rus­sia, are begin­ning to dis­con­nect from the glo­bal Inter­net,” she notes, “in favour of an iso­la­ted and dis­con­nec­ted Inter­net, a kind of sca­led-up intra­net. Basi­cal­ly, and beyond the ques­tion of tech­ni­cal fea­si­bi­li­ty, the sub­ject is nothing less than ideo­lo­gi­cal : the Splin­ter­net is the esta­blish­ment of a mul­ti­po­lar Inter­net, frag­men­ted into as many clo­sed or semi-clo­sed cybers­paces as there are com­pe­ting blocks in the world. This phe­no­me­non is taking place in sym­me­try with the recom­po­si­tion of the world order cur­rent­ly being pushed by states such as Rus­sia and Chi­na, which are wor­king towards a mul­ti­po­lar inter­na­tio­nal order that will dis­rupt Ame­ri­can predominance.”

An existing fragmentation

Accor­ding to this defi­ni­tion, it is clear that the Splin­ter­net is alrea­dy here. And Chi­na was the first to launch this frag­men­ta­tion. It star­ted with the imple­men­ta­tion of the Great Fire­wall of Chi­na, aimed at blo­cking access to all web­sites that do not sup­port the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty (CCP). While not cen­so­ring the entire Inter­net, the Chi­nese govern­ment has mana­ged to esta­blish per­va­sive control over its content. “This shield, which limits access to Ame­ri­can tech­no­lo­gy giants, par­ti­cu­lar­ly for uses that inter­face direct­ly with users, has crea­ted a rela­ti­ve­ly clo­sed eco­sys­tem,” says Asma Mhal­la. “The aim was to qui­ck­ly create a sove­rei­gn Chi­nese tech eco­sys­tem, and more spe­ci­fi­cal­ly the BATX, the Chi­nese digi­tal giants, enabling the CCP to deve­lop a form of tech­no­lo­gi­cal sove­rei­gn­ty under control, essen­tial­ly social and poli­ti­cal control.” Today, the CCP has been able to deve­lop a Chi­nese Inter­net, with its 3 macro layers, and its own worldview.

Howe­ver, Chi­na is not the only power to have embar­ked on a pro­ject of this scale. Iran, too, has deve­lo­ped its own struc­tures to have an Inter­net cut off from the world. And recent­ly, Rus­sia seems to be moving in the same direc­tion, as Kévin Limo­nier, a Rus­sian-spea­king cybers­pace spe­cia­list, notes. The Rus­sian net­work was connec­ted to the glo­bal Inter­net, but, accor­ding to Limo­nier, Putin is gra­dual­ly deve­lo­ping the idea of infor­ma­tio­nal sove­rei­gn­ty4. This can be seen in various pieces of legis­la­tion issued by the Krem­lin over the past decade. The law “On the crea­tion of a sove­rei­gn Inter­net”5, adop­ted in Novem­ber 2019, is the most signi­fi­cant with regard to the Splin­ter­net. This 100% Rus­sian inter­net has been named the RuNet.

Chi­na is not the only power to have embar­ked on a pro­ject of this scale.

In Rus­sia, as in Chi­na, the Inter­net was ini­tial­ly connec­ted to the glo­bal net­work, and it remains dif­fi­cult to dis­con­nect from it. “Rus­sia is still in a test and learn phase for the first two layers of cybers­pace,” says the spe­cia­list. “As for the third layer, the seman­tic layer, it is gra­dual­ly disas­so­cia­ting itself from it. RuNet will acce­le­rate the pro­cess.” The Rus­sians are begin­ning to have their own net­work of appli­ca­tions in direct contact with the user : search engines, social net­works, e‑mail sys­tems, etc.

With these three Inter­nets, deve­lo­ped by these dif­ferent powers, we can consi­der that the glo­bal Inter­net, ours, is a fourth part of the Splin­ter­net – albeit not a clo­sed one. 

Democracies in a weak position

The Splin­ter­net is the­re­fore alrea­dy present, and the coun­tries that have pro­vo­ked this state of frag­men­ta­tion have one thing in com­mon : they are autho­ri­ta­rian regimes. This com­mo­na­li­ty seems logi­cal : the Inter­net has the cha­rac­te­ris­tic of faci­li­ta­ting debate and the exchange of opi­nions, which can be seen as anta­go­nis­tic to dic­ta­tor­ship. Moreo­ver, the Inter­net offers the pos­si­bi­li­ty of control­ling the infor­ma­tion that is dis­se­mi­na­ted on it, and the­re­fore the pos­si­bi­li­ty of infor­ma­tio­nal sove­rei­gn­ty : autho­ri­ta­rian regimes have an inter­est in having this type of control, which is syno­ny­mous with the control of local com­mon opinion.

Howe­ver, cir­cum­ven­tion stra­te­gies exist, such as the use of a VPN. Even if in a dic­ta­tor­ship these stra­te­gies remain iso­la­ted acts and are not mains­tream, VPNs show that this frag­men­ta­tion is not water­tight. The concern is that the level of impe­ne­tra­bi­li­ty is not the same bet­ween dic­ta­tor­ships and demo­cra­cies, for the simple rea­son that the glo­bal Inter­net remains acces­sible to powers with their own Inter­net. The des­ta­bi­li­sa­tion of our Inter­net can the­re­fore be mas­sive, as forei­gn inter­fe­rence is easier to achieve.

“This is the great weak­ness of demo­cra­cies in this sto­ry, because the net­works remain porous by nature,” says Asma Mhal­la. “This poro­si­ty repre­sents an oppor­tu­ni­ty for inter­fe­rence and influence at low cost for autho­ri­ta­rian regimes. Demo­cra­cy can, in the long run, be real­ly wea­ke­ned by this. The Wes­tern bloc is thus in an exis­ten­tial cri­sis and must qui­ck­ly cla­ri­fy its tech­no­po­li­ti­cal model.” In April, in the mid­st of the war in Ukraine, Joe Biden cal­led for a “free and open” Inter­net. This appeal, which was signed by some six­ty coun­tries6, shows the concern of Wes­tern coun­tries, and their willin­gness to act, about the direc­tion that cybers­pace is taking. Howe­ver, the future of the Inter­net also raises other ques­tions for Euro­pean coun­tries, par­ti­cu­lar­ly concer­ning their depen­dence on the Ame­ri­cans in this area.

Pablo Andres
1https://​www​.home​.cern/​f​r​/​s​c​i​e​n​c​e​/​c​o​m​p​u​t​i​n​g​/​b​i​r​t​h-web
2Ventre, D. 2011. Cybe­res­pace et acteurs du cyber­con­flit. Her­mès science publi­ca­tions. 
3https://​net​blocks​.org/​r​e​p​o​r​t​s​/​i​n​t​e​r​n​e​t​-​d​i​s​r​u​p​t​i​o​n​s​-​r​e​g​i​s​t​e​r​e​d​-​a​s​-​r​u​s​s​i​a​-​m​o​v​e​s​-​i​n​-​o​n​-​u​k​r​a​i​n​e​-​W​8​0​p4k8K
4LIMONIER Kévin, AUDINET Maxime, « La stra­té­gie d’influence infor­ma­tion­nelle et numé­rique de la Rus­sie en Europe », Héro­dote, 2017/1 (N° 164), p. 123–144. DOI : 10,391 7/her.164.0123. https://www.cairn.info/revue-herodote-2017–1‑page-123.htm
5Rap­port d’ICANN : lois sur l’Internet en Fédé­ra­tion de Rus­sie et déli­bé­ra­tions aux Nations Unies ; https://itp.cdn.icann.org/fr/files/government-engagement-ge/ge-006–19jan21-fr.pdf
6Euro­pean Com­mis­sion, Decla­ra­tion for the Future of Inter­net ; https://​digi​tal​-stra​te​gy​.ec​.euro​pa​.eu/​e​n​/​l​i​b​r​a​r​y​/​d​e​c​l​a​r​a​t​i​o​n​-​f​u​t​u​r​e​-​i​n​t​ernet

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