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Should we really be worried about France’s declining fertility rate ?

Hervé Le Bras
Hervé Le Bras
Research director in demographics at EHESS and Emeritus research director at Ined
Key takeaways
  • The year 2023 marked a fall in the fertility rate in France, with the number of births down 6.7% on the previous year.
  • In European countries, a pattern seems to be emerging around the figure of 1.5 children per woman.
  • The reasons for this convergence include the later arrival of the first child, changes in gender relations, and the importance given by women to their professional careers.
  • In theory, this demographic change will not affect the pension system until more than 20 years from now, when the younger generations enter the labour market.
  • There is no proven link between good economic health and high fertility rates, and pro-natalist policies generally have very little effect on the number of births.

 

Fertility rates fell sharply in France in 2023. How do you explain this ?

In 2023, 678,000 babies were born in France, 6.7% fewer than in 2020 and 16% fewer than in 2010. We are now at an ave­rage of 1.68 chil­dren per woman, the lowest fer­ti­li­ty rate since 1945. There was a very rapid fall last year, which no one quite unders­tands. We don’t know what could have cau­sed this sud­den down­turn ; there were no major poli­ti­cal or eco­no­mic events, as was the case in the Uni­ted States in 2009, for example, fol­lo­wing the cre­dit crunch. It would be irres­pon­sible to attempt to over­sim­pli­fy the rea­sons behind this sharp fall. Nor is there any link with the Covid-19 pan­de­mic. The decline in fer­ti­li­ty began around 2012 in France, when there was a mar­ked drop. The decline was then fair­ly stea­dy until 2023.

How does France compare with birth rates in Europe and the rest of the world ?

Glo­bal­ly, the contrasts are increa­sing. The world can be divi­ded into three main regions : a part of Afri­ca, from the Sahel to Bots­wa­na, where there is a demo­gra­phic explo­sion, with the record being Niger (6.8 chil­dren per woman); the Far East, where fer­ti­li­ty is fal­ling rapid­ly, with the record being South Korea (0.78 chil­dren per woman); and final­ly, the rest of the world, where births fluc­tuate bet­ween 1.5 and 2.5 chil­dren per woman on average.

France has had one of the highest birth rates in Europe for quite some time, and this is still the case, but not by much. Ire­land and Roma­nia are more or less at the same level. Across the Euro­pean Union, there is conver­gence at around 1.5 chil­dren per woman. Euro­stat data clear­ly show a fair­ly sharp fall in all the Euro­pean coun­tries where births were highest. On the other hand, where fer­ti­li­ty was the lowest, it has remai­ned so or risen slight­ly. There is no doubt that a Euro­pean fami­ly model is emerging.

Are there any explanations for the convergence of European countries around the figure of 1.5 children per woman ?

The main rea­son for this conver­gence is a change in the rela­tion­ship bet­ween men and women. Women, who are far more high­ly edu­ca­ted than men, are less accep­ting of the double wor­king day and the une­qual divi­sion of labour than they were in the 1980s, for example. This mecha­nism is in the pro­cess of being set in motion in many Euro­pean coun­tries. In addi­tion, the ave­rage age of mothers at the birth of their first child conti­nues to rise, which tech­ni­cal­ly reduces fer­ti­li­ty, as it is spread over a slight­ly lon­ger per­iod. For this rea­son, the fer­ti­li­ty rate falls at youn­ger ages, up to 30–35, then sta­bi­lises and rises the­reaf­ter. Final­ly, there is an increase in the pro­por­tion of women who have no chil­dren or only one.

Are we facing a major change in the birth rate, like the baby boom, for example ?

It’s the same thing because there is a tur­ning point. When you fol­low demo­gra­phic indices, there is a point at which they reverse, but that takes time. It takes at least one gene­ra­tion ; eve­ry 30 or 40 years. So, there was the baby-boom gene­ra­tion, the gene­ra­tion that delayed child­bea­ring, and now we’re facing a rever­sal that will lead to a fair­ly low fer­ti­li­ty rate of around 1.5 chil­dren per woman.

We always think that imme­diate events will have conse­quences, but only a few events mark a rapid change. The oil cri­sis in 1973 was a major tur­ning point, but it was pre­ce­ded by the arri­val of modern contra­cep­tion in 1965, which trig­ge­red a fall in fertility.

What impact could the drop in births have on the country’s economy ?

There is a lot of confu­sion about this impact. At the time of the pen­sion reform, the poli­ti­cal right clai­med that the drop in the birth rate was very serious for the balance of the sys­tem. In rea­li­ty, it depends on the time frame you look at. The pen­sion sys­tem will only be affec­ted when the gene­ra­tions born today enter the labour mar­ket, i.e. in just over 20 years’ time. Until 2045, the­re­fore, there will be no pro­blem in rela­tion to pen­sions. Will there be any nega­tive conse­quences in the short or medium term ? It’s dif­fi­cult to say. There will be changes in consump­tion, an increase in pur­cha­sing power for adults, lower costs for schools, or the pos­si­bi­li­ty of having fewer chil­dren per class… It’s not all nega­tive or posi­tive. I car­ried out a stu­dy sho­wing that the pro­blem of pen­sions will affect the gene­ra­tions that have had fewer or no chil­dren, so they will have had more dis­po­sable income for them­selves at the ages when chil­dren are concei­ved. This makes sense in a way that is rare­ly mentioned.

Is there a clear link between a country’s economic health and population growth ?

No, that’s an old idea. The French have very much hoped that there would be a link. There have been many stu­dies, nota­bly those by the eco­no­mist Alfred Sau­vy, but they have never shown any­thing of the sort. Cor­re­la­tions don’t work. It’s too dis­join­ted, there are so many inter­me­dia­ries bet­ween eco­no­mic and demo­gra­phic growth, such as edu­ca­tion, investment…

If there is no evidence that a high birth rate leads to economic growth, why do we pay so much attention to the birth rate in France ?

The impor­tance of fer­ti­li­ty dates back to the defeat by Ger­ma­ny in 1870. It was thought that because the Ger­mans had more chil­dren, they would have more sol­diers. The defeat was equa­ted with France’s low fer­ti­li­ty rate, which was incor­rect. In rea­li­ty, Ger­ma­ny had fewer sol­diers at the time. The Church clai­med that the defeat was a punish­ment because the French were not having enough chil­dren. This was a source of regret, which led to the deve­lop­ment of pro-nata­list move­ments. The idea spread that it was bad to have only one child. Psy­cho­lo­gists clai­med that an only child socia­li­sed bad­ly, which later led to the crea­tion of nur­se­ries and crèches. Com­ba­ting the one-child poli­cy ensu­red that the fer­ti­li­ty rate rose again during the baby boom from 1945–1946 onwards. It’s a ques­tion of morals, spe­ci­fic to France. Coun­tries such as England and Ger­ma­ny have never been afraid of having low fer­ti­li­ty rates ; in fact, his­to­ri­cal­ly, the oppo­site has been true. So, there is still this idea in the French men­ta­li­ty that having chil­dren is good for the coun­try. This theme is par­ti­cu­lar­ly strong among poli­ti­cians, because it shows that they care about the nation.

Emmanuel Macron wants to introduce parental leave to bring about a “demographic rearmament”. Do pro-natalist policies have any real effect on the birth rate ?

Birth rate poli­cies have almost no effect. Many stu­dies have been car­ried out, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in other coun­tries. In 1967, Roma­nian Pre­sident Nico­lae Ceaușes­cu ban­ned abor­tion. The fol­lo­wing year, fer­ti­li­ty dou­bled, but it qui­ck­ly drop­ped again. In Chi­na, contra­ry to popu­lar belief, it was not the one-child poli­cy that cau­sed a fall in birth rates. By 1978, when it was intro­du­ced, Chi­na had alrea­dy gone from 5 chil­dren per woman to 2.7. This mea­sure mere­ly accom­pa­nied the trend. And when the one-child poli­cy was aban­do­ned in 2016, ins­tead of rising, fer­ti­li­ty plum­me­ted (to 1.11 chil­dren per woman in 2022).

In Euro­pean coun­tries, there is often a wind­fall effect fol­lo­wing a pro-nata­list mea­sure. There is a small rise in the num­ber of births in the fol­lo­wing year or two, then a small fall, and the ini­tial level is rea­ched again. In Hun­ga­ry, a pro-nata­list poli­cy is cur­rent­ly being imple­men­ted. Howe­ver, fer­ti­li­ty trends are evol­ving in the same way as in neigh­bou­ring coun­tries. Small advan­tages are not going to change a deci­sion as impor­tant as that of buil­ding a fami­ly. OECD eco­no­mist Oli­vier Thé­ve­non puts the increase in fer­ti­li­ty at 5% if we off­set a quar­ter of the cost of having a child, which is a lot. That’s 0.1 chil­dren in France. Increa­sin­gly, the dis­tri­bu­tion of fer­ti­li­ty rates cor­res­ponds to major cultu­ral grou­pings, such as Sou­thern Europe and East Asia…

Sirine Azouaoui

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