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What does it mean to “trust science”?

“The cacophony of ‘science experts’ has done a lot of harm”

with Clément Boulle, Executive director of Polytechnique Insights
On June 23rd, 2021 |
4min reading time
mathias girel
Mathias Girel
Philosopher, Lecturer at ENS-PSL and Director of CAPHES
Key takeaways
  • Contrary to what one might think, scientists don’t necessarily fit into the elitist image that we may have of them and therefore is not responsible for the mistrust.
  • Rather suspicion around science is in more likely fuelled by other perceptions of science, reinforced by the health crisis.
  • Scientists' role in the implementation of measures to combat the coronavirus has exacerbated the criticism directed at it as an institution, by consolidating science with a political function.
  • There is also confusion in the media created by “science experts” giving their opinion on issues that do not necessarily fall within their field of expertise, which undermines the credibility of the scientific community and its image.

There are count­less pro­grams, sym­posi­ums or art­icles ded­ic­ated to an alleged rise of sus­pi­cion towards sci­ence. What is your view?

It is indeed a fre­quent theme. How­ever, opin­ion polls show a more nuanced real­ity. When the ques­tion is more gen­er­ic (“Do you trust research­ers from pub­lic insti­tu­tions to tell the truth about their research top­ics?”), two thirds of respond­ents answer ‘yes’. Even though, in some cases, the out­look can be much dark­er – par­tic­u­larly with regards to med­ic­al top­ics1. Yet, the fact remains that, in gen­er­al, there is more con­fid­ence in sci­ence than in politi­cians. I do not think how­ever that there is a feel­ing of mis­trust towards sci­ence across the board, so we need to exam­ine each case carefully. 

Tell us more!

I see two prob­lems linked to the issue of mistrust. 

The first is that it is a vague notion. We some­times dis­tin­guish ‘mis­trust’, a dif­fuse feel­ing, from ‘sus­pi­cion’, a struc­tured atti­tude based on either good or bad reas­ons. The reas­ons for which should be invest­ig­ated because there are oth­er close notions with dif­fer­ent implic­a­tions; ‘hes­it­a­tion’, for example. It is widely stud­ied in regard to vac­cines, but it is not the same as mis­trust or sus­pi­cion. I also think about ‘con­fu­sion’, which can have the same effects as sus­pi­cion, in terms of dis­missal. How­ever, it reflects the absence of reli­able points of ref­er­ence, or the dif­fi­culty to dif­fer­en­ti­ate seem­ingly close real­it­ies. In the lat­ter situ­ation, the caco­phony between the expert­ise of agen­cies and experts on TV shows for example has cre­ated a great deal of con­fu­sion. In a much broad­er sense, it is at the heart of the “infodem­ic” concept revived by the World Health Organ­isa­tion (WHO) since Feb­ru­ary 2020. 

A dis­tinc­tion is some­times made between dis­trust, which is a dif­fuse atti­tude, and mis­trust, which is an atti­tude struc­tured by reasons.

The second prob­lem is that objec­ti­fy­ing this defi­ance, if it exists, and tak­ing it for gran­ted a little too fast, can have an effect on the demo­crat­ic debate. What is the use of try­ing to con­vince people of the valid­ity of a meas­ure if a large part of the pop­u­la­tion is con­sidered to be opposed to it as a mat­ter of prin­ciple? Last autumn, there was much talk about an import­ant and rel­at­ively recent form of mis­trust from French people towards vac­cines. Even though at the time no Cov­id-19 vac­cine was avail­able yet, which made any declar­a­tion highly abstract. In addi­tion, the begin­ning of the Cov­id-19 vac­cin­a­tion cam­paign showed a wide­spread desire to have access to vac­cin­a­tion as soon as pos­sible (the hes­it­a­tion towards the AstraZeneca vac­cine being a sep­ar­ate case). In this par­tic­u­lar case, the beha­vi­our­al cri­terion – how will people con­cerned behave? – seems more rel­ev­ant to me than statements.

Some research­ers speak of com­munity phe­nom­ena. In oth­er words, where sci­ent­ists form part of an elite. As such, the work­ing class can’t identi­fy with them lead­ing to mis­trust towards them.  What is your opinion? 

It should be cla­ri­fied what is meant by “elite” here. Need­less to say, the daily life of research­ers is rather dif­fer­ent than the life­style of busi­ness elites. Except in some par­tic­u­lar cases, they are also detached from polit­ic­al decision-mak­ing: research­ers and engin­eers are far from over-rep­res­en­ted among polit­ic­al rep­res­ent­at­ives and senators. 

It seems to me that the prob­lem is instead linked to how we per­ceive sci­ence. It cor­res­ponds to at least three real­it­ies. First, there is our know­ledge of research, its con­di­tions, what it’s like to be a research­er. This usu­ally sparks interest, and some con­fer­ences, like the Sci­ence Fest­iv­al (Fête de la sci­ence), or well-made pop­ular­isa­tion videos, win over a wide audience. 

Second, there is the indi­vidu­al or col­lect­ive expert­ise, with­in an agency, a com­mis­sion, an organ­isa­tion, which is often mis­un­der­stood. Yet, gen­er­ally it is a pro­ced­ure that obeys very strict rules, can lead to bal­anced judg­ment, and even some­times includes a plur­al­ity of views. It col­lides with the image of ‘experts’ seen on news chan­nels, or even more gen­er­ally, with the media image of those who feel entitled to give their opin­ion on oth­er sci­entif­ic dis­cip­lines or issues just because they are qual­i­fied in a par­tic­u­lar field. This image of experts ‘in sci­ence’ does a lot of dam­age, and we have seen the emer­gence of many impro­vised epi­demi­olo­gists these past few months!

Finally, there is the case when sci­ence is used to jus­ti­fy a polit­ic­al decision (“we fol­low sci­ence”, “sci­ence says…”). Cri­ti­cism some­times falls on sci­ence when it is in fact raised against polit­ics. This last type of vis­ion seems to fall under what we once called “the lin­ear mod­el”. Basic­ally, only one policy stems from sci­entif­ic con­clu­sions, yet this is illus­ory. Even on sub­jects that are per­fectly stable from the sci­entif­ic point of view, wheth­er in the field of energy, health or the envir­on­ment, there is gen­er­ally a plur­al­ity of scen­ari­os. Decision-makers can­not hide behind research­ers or experts, but they can unfor­tu­nately ignore them.

It is com­mon that con­spir­acy the­or­ies have no sci­entif­ic basis. Could their alleged increase be a sign of the grow­ing mis­trust in science?

There is indeed cause for con­cern. For example, the doc­u­ment­ary Hold up, which was viewed mil­lions of times, mixes ques­tions on the SARS-CoV­‑2 vir­us with spec­u­la­tion on the real­ity of the out­break, the glob­al pro­ject named “the great reset”, not to men­tion 5G, and this can have a health impact. It is pos­sible that social net­works increase the vis­ib­il­ity of this phe­nomen­on. But, even when a con­spir­acy the­ory appears on a sub­ject covered by sci­entif­ic research as well, it is only part of the phe­nomen­on. For instance, many of Don­ald Trump’s voters are still con­vinced that the res­ult of the last elec­tion was a plot of the Democrats. 

Even if there is a resur­gence of con­spir­acy the­or­ies… they do not, or hardly ever, tar­get research as such.

It seems to me that this last con­spir­acy the­ory has severe con­sequences, and it gives no state­ment on sci­ence. If we use the lan­guage of sus­pi­cion, such an atti­tude reflects a lack of trust in insti­tu­tions, sus­pec­ted of fol­low­ing a secret agenda. Con­spir­acy the­or­ies on sci­entif­ic sub­jects are prob­ably only one aspect of this gen­er­al atti­tude, only in this case they tar­get the par­tic­u­lar insti­tu­tion that is sci­ence. Per­haps it is more strik­ing because the idea that a sci­entif­ic state­ment could be the res­ult of a hid­den agenda con­flicts with the val­ues of uni­ver­sal­ity, truth and integ­rity pre­sup­posed by sci­ence. How­ever, if you look in detail, to my know­ledge, exist­ing con­spir­acy the­or­ies focus more on the second and third images of sci­ence men­tioned earli­er. We hardly see any con­spir­acy the­or­ies on black mat­ter or string the­ory, for example. All this would sug­gest that even if there is an increase in con­spir­acy the­or­ies, and even if we are right­fully con­cerned about some of their mani­fest­a­tions and we must address them when know­ledge is threatened, they do not neces­sar­ily express defi­ance towards sci­ence nor tar­get research itself.

1https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2020–12/rapport_sapiens_science_et_societe_octobre_2020_def.pdf

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