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Can insurers save the planet (and themselves)?

Fanny Henriet
Fanny Henriet
CNRS Research Director at Aix-Marseille School of Economics and Lecturer at Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris)
Christian Gollier
Christian Gollier
Executive Director at Toulouse School of Economics
Key takeaways
  • Faced with global warming, it is now crucial for insurance companies to address environmental issues and climate disasters.
  • Public policy plays a fundamental role in encouraging action on energy transition, particularly by making investments by other players more profitable.
  • Despite the short-term costs associated with reducing emissions, these efforts are profitable in the long term because they prevent future climate damage.
  • Insurance companies are facing changes in the claims experience of their policyholders, which raises the delicate question of possible price increases.
  • The question is therefore how insurance companies could change their financing model to cover these future risks.

With the increase in extreme wea­ther events, the insu­rance sec­tor is on the front line when it comes to seeing the phy­si­cal damage cau­sed by cli­mate change. Howe­ver, accor­ding to seve­ral of its repre­sen­ta­tives1, this sec­tor is also one of the main pillars – if not the main pillar – of invest­ment in socie­ty. French insu­rers are said to account for €2.5 tril­lion of this invest­ment. And, as Fan­ny Hen­riet, Direc­tor of Research at the CNRS at the Aix-Mar­seille School of Eco­no­mics, argues in her book L’É­co­no­mie peut-elle sau­ver le cli­mat ?2, the eco­no­my must play a lea­ding role in the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion, then isn’t it in the insu­rance sec­tor’s best inter­ests to take action on cli­mate issues, which are among its most cri­ti­cal chal­lenges for the future ?

Chris­tian Gol­lier, resear­cher, author and direc­tor of the Tou­louse School of Eco­no­mics, has been wor­king on these issues for many years. In his new book, Éco­no­mie de l’(in)action cli­ma­tique3 (The Eco­no­mics of Cli­mate (In)action), he argues that cli­mate change is the most radi­cal fai­lure of our libe­ral demo­cra­cy and puts for­ward seve­ral ways to cor­rect it, from eco­lo­gi­cal dic­ta­tor­ship to car­bon pri­cing. The role of finance is also dis­cus­sed. As the author of an article4 publi­shed in 2001 on the limits of insu­ra­bi­li­ty lin­ked to cli­mate risks, he is now able to take a step back from his past ana­lyses and draw an alar­ming conclu­sion : “At the time of wri­ting, there was wides­pread denial of glo­bal war­ming, but although it is now com­mon­ly accep­ted, there is still denial about the sacri­fices that will have to be made to com­bat it. I am stun­ned by the contrast bet­ween awa­re­ness and the lack of conver­gence in poli­ti­cal decision-making.”

“The insu­rance sec­tor is both expo­sed to cli­mate damage and a major player in invest­ment. It is the­re­fore at the heart of the issues,” explains Fan­ny Hen­riet. Howe­ver, as she points out, inves­tors will not invest “on prin­ciple, but for pro­fi­ta­bi­li­ty.” The chal­lenge, the­re­fore, is to show that this fight can be eco­no­mi­cal­ly profitable.

Are public policies an essential driver of transition ?

In France, assu­rance vie is the most popu­lar form of savings, accoun­ting for near­ly €2 tril­lion in assets. This alone repre­sents a signi­fi­cant source of invest­ment for the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion. “In theo­ry, the hol­ders of these assets, main­ly hou­se­holds able to save over the long term, could mobi­lise part of their savings to meet their res­pon­si­bi­li­ty towards future gene­ra­tions, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in terms of cli­mate change. But their moti­va­tion remains pri­ma­ri­ly finan­cial,” explains Chris­tian Gol­lier. “In prac­tice, it’s com­pli­ca­ted, because tra­di­tio­nal­ly it is the res­pon­si­bi­li­ty of the state, at least in the com­mon view, to esta­blish an eco­no­my that works for the com­mon good.”

This idea of public res­pon­si­bi­li­ty tends to dis­cou­rage mas­sive invest­ment by indi­vi­duals, but also by the pri­vate sec­tor, in the absence of public poli­cy. This leads eco­no­mists to consi­der the role of the state as the ini­tia­tor of this fight, as in the case of café ter­races that can no lon­ger be hea­ted, speed limits on motor­ways, or the intro­duc­tion of a car­bon tax. Fan­ny Hen­riet explains this well using the example of rene­wable ener­gy : “As shown by the fal­ling costs of wind and solar power, low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies can become pro­fi­table over time through lear­ning by doing. But this dyna­mic does not hap­pen on its own : the govern­ment must play an ini­tia­ting role by sup­por­ting invest­ment at the out­set, for example through sub­si­dies, and by making pol­lu­ting acti­vi­ties less pro­fi­table through a car­bon tax.” This is how, through public action, invest­ment in the tran­si­tion could become pro­fi­table. Fur­ther­more, Chris­tian Gol­lier main­tains that “if govern­ment doesn’t do it, who will ? The indi­vi­dual sacri­fices requi­red to achieve this limit the level of commitment.”

This is espe­cial­ly true given that finan­cing green acti­vi­ties is alrea­dy, almost by defi­ni­tion, less pro­fi­table and more expen­sive than finan­cing brown acti­vi­ties. For this rea­son, it is not enough to force inves­tors to divest from car­bon-inten­sive acti­vi­ties, as this will lead to “finan­cial car­bon lea­kage,” argues Chris­tian Gol­lier. “Pena­li­sing the most car­bon-inten­sive com­pa­nies by increa­sing the cost of capi­tal will also increase the pro­fi­ta­bi­li­ty of invest­ments in these com­pa­nies. It is the­re­fore a very inef­fec­tive solu­tion, which will push inves­tors moti­va­ted sole­ly by pro­fi­ta­bi­li­ty to favour com­pa­nies with the most ‘brown’ activities.”

The State would the­re­fore need to play a role in pro­vi­ding incen­tives, but this would not be easy to imple­ment. The pro­blem remains that, regard­less of the public poli­cy ins­tru­ments used, the tran­si­tion is cost­ly, espe­cial­ly in the short term. “But we must bear in mind that, des­pite the short-term costs asso­cia­ted with redu­cing emis­sions, these efforts are pro­fi­table in the long term because they prevent much of the future cli­mate damage,” insists Fan­ny Hen­riet. When it comes to cove­ring the cost of cli­mate damage, the insu­rance sec­tor also has an impor­tant role to play.

A market weakened by climate change

“Insu­rance com­pa­nies are faced with chan­ging claims pat­terns among poli­cy­hol­ders [Edi­tor’s note : an ave­rage of €6 bil­lion per year over the last four years in France5],” admits Chris­tian Gol­lier. “This raises a deli­cate ques­tion about the insu­rance model, as it should lead to price increases.” Fan­ny Hen­riet agrees : “When the risk becomes too high or too sys­te­mic, insu­rance pre­miums sky­ro­cket or insu­rers sim­ply with­draw from the mar­ket. In the Uni­ted States, seve­ral major insu­rance com­pa­nies have stop­ped wri­ting new home insu­rance poli­cies in Cali­for­nia due to the increa­sed risk of wild­fires. Simi­lar­ly, in Flo­ri­da, the increase in hur­ri­canes has led to higher pre­miums and redu­ced coverage.”

The ques­tion is the­re­fore how insu­rers could change their finan­cing model to be able to cover these poten­tial future risks. The increa­sing fre­quen­cy of extreme wea­ther events is making some expo­sed areas unin­ha­bi­table. “In the Cat-Nat sys­tem, the govern­ment’s desire to limit insu­rance pre­mium increases in these areas creates a sub­si­dy for set­tling there and imposes hea­vy losses on insu­rers,” adds Chris­tian Gol­lier. “The desire for soli­da­ri­ty is com­men­dable, but it leads to disas­ter.” Never­the­less, many risks remain dif­fi­cult to quan­ti­fy, which means that they are effec­ti­ve­ly unin­su­rable through the usual insu­rance mecha­nisms. The result is high­ly inef­fi­cient risk allo­ca­tion and mana­ge­ment in our socie­ty. “To address this issue, the govern­ment has deve­lo­ped com­pen­sa­tion funds, often finan­ced by tax­payers. Howe­ver, this approach does not help to make indi­vi­duals res­pon­sible for mana­ging risk in the public inter­est, he insists. The mar­ket, for its part, has also deve­lo­ped solu­tions based on finan­cial pro­ducts, such as Cat Bonds6, which spread risks around the world and allow inves­tors’ views to be aggre­ga­ted through the emer­gence of a mar­ket price for risk.”

That said, concrete lines of action can be put in place. The insu­rance sec­tor is both expo­sed to the conse­quences of cli­mate change and has consi­de­rable finan­cial leve­rage to respond to it. “These future chal­lenges could also make Euro­pean models pre­cur­sors,’ she concludes. We often hear that taking the lead without glo­bal coor­di­na­tion would be futile. But in rea­li­ty, being the first allows us to learn, test and demons­trate that the tran­si­tion is fea­sible. This will inform the choices of other coun­tries when they, in turn, are for­ced to act,” concludes Fan­ny Henriet

Pablo Andres
1Com­ments made during the Assu­rances de France confe­rence, S.M.A.R.T 2024, orga­ni­sed by France Assu­rances.
2Fan­ny Hen­riet, L’é­co­no­mie peut-elle sau­ver le cli­mat ?
(Can the eco­no­my save the cli­mate?) – PUF, 2025
3Chris­tian Gol­lier, L’é­co­no­mie de l’(in)action cli­ma­tique (The eco­no­mics of cli­mate (in)action) – Book to be publi­shed in July 2025
4Gol­lier, C. (2001). TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF INSURABILITY. Assu­rances, 68(4), 453–473. https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​7​2​0​2​/​1​1​0​5​340ar
5Report by France Assu­reurs
6Finan­cial Sta­bi­li­ty Review, June 2019 – Banque de France

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