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Can insurers save the planet (and themselves)?

Fanny Henriet
Fanny Henriet
CNRS Research Director at Aix-Marseille School of Economics and Lecturer at Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris)
Christian Gollier
Christian Gollier
Executive Director at Toulouse School of Economics
Key takeaways
  • Faced with global warming, it is now crucial for insurance companies to address environmental issues and climate disasters.
  • Public policy plays a fundamental role in encouraging action on energy transition, particularly by making investments by other players more profitable.
  • Despite the short-term costs associated with reducing emissions, these efforts are profitable in the long term because they prevent future climate damage.
  • Insurance companies are facing changes in the claims experience of their policyholders, which raises the delicate question of possible price increases.
  • The question is therefore how insurance companies could change their financing model to cover these future risks.

With the increase in extreme weath­er events, the insur­ance sec­tor is on the front line when it comes to see­ing the phys­i­cal dam­age caused by cli­mate change. How­ev­er, accord­ing to sev­er­al of its rep­re­sen­ta­tives1, this sec­tor is also one of the main pil­lars – if not the main pil­lar – of invest­ment in soci­ety. French insur­ers are said to account for €2.5 tril­lion of this invest­ment. And, as Fan­ny Hen­ri­et, Direc­tor of Research at the CNRS at the Aix-Mar­seille School of Eco­nom­ics, argues in her book L’É­conomie peut-elle sauver le cli­mat?2, the econ­o­my must play a lead­ing role in the eco­log­i­cal tran­si­tion, then isn’t it in the insur­ance sec­tor’s best inter­ests to take action on cli­mate issues, which are among its most crit­i­cal chal­lenges for the future?

Chris­t­ian Gol­lier, researcher, author and direc­tor of the Toulouse School of Eco­nom­ics, has been work­ing on these issues for many years. In his new book, Économie de l’(in)action cli­ma­tique3 (The Eco­nom­ics of Cli­mate (In)action), he argues that cli­mate change is the most rad­i­cal fail­ure of our lib­er­al democ­ra­cy and puts for­ward sev­er­al ways to cor­rect it, from eco­log­i­cal dic­ta­tor­ship to car­bon pric­ing. The role of finance is also dis­cussed. As the author of an arti­cle4 pub­lished in 2001 on the lim­its of insur­a­bil­i­ty linked to cli­mate risks, he is now able to take a step back from his past analy­ses and draw an alarm­ing con­clu­sion: “At the time of writ­ing, there was wide­spread denial of glob­al warm­ing, but although it is now com­mon­ly accept­ed, there is still denial about the sac­ri­fices that will have to be made to com­bat it. I am stunned by the con­trast between aware­ness and the lack of con­ver­gence in polit­i­cal decision-making.”

“The insur­ance sec­tor is both exposed to cli­mate dam­age and a major play­er in invest­ment. It is there­fore at the heart of the issues,” explains Fan­ny Hen­ri­et. How­ev­er, as she points out, investors will not invest “on prin­ci­ple, but for prof­itabil­i­ty.” The chal­lenge, there­fore, is to show that this fight can be eco­nom­i­cal­ly profitable.

Are public policies an essential driver of transition?

In France, assur­ance vie is the most pop­u­lar form of sav­ings, account­ing for near­ly €2 tril­lion in assets. This alone rep­re­sents a sig­nif­i­cant source of invest­ment for the eco­log­i­cal tran­si­tion. “In the­o­ry, the hold­ers of these assets, main­ly house­holds able to save over the long term, could mobilise part of their sav­ings to meet their respon­si­bil­i­ty towards future gen­er­a­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly in terms of cli­mate change. But their moti­va­tion remains pri­mar­i­ly finan­cial,” explains Chris­t­ian Gol­lier. “In prac­tice, it’s com­pli­cat­ed, because tra­di­tion­al­ly it is the respon­si­bil­i­ty of the state, at least in the com­mon view, to estab­lish an econ­o­my that works for the com­mon good.”

This idea of pub­lic respon­si­bil­i­ty tends to dis­cour­age mas­sive invest­ment by indi­vid­u­als, but also by the pri­vate sec­tor, in the absence of pub­lic pol­i­cy. This leads econ­o­mists to con­sid­er the role of the state as the ini­tia­tor of this fight, as in the case of café ter­races that can no longer be heat­ed, speed lim­its on motor­ways, or the intro­duc­tion of a car­bon tax. Fan­ny Hen­ri­et explains this well using the exam­ple of renew­able ener­gy: “As shown by the falling costs of wind and solar pow­er, low-car­bon tech­nolo­gies can become prof­itable over time through learn­ing by doing. But this dynam­ic does not hap­pen on its own: the gov­ern­ment must play an ini­ti­at­ing role by sup­port­ing invest­ment at the out­set, for exam­ple through sub­si­dies, and by mak­ing pol­lut­ing activ­i­ties less prof­itable through a car­bon tax.” This is how, through pub­lic action, invest­ment in the tran­si­tion could become prof­itable. Fur­ther­more, Chris­t­ian Gol­lier main­tains that “if gov­ern­ment does­n’t do it, who will? The indi­vid­ual sac­ri­fices required to achieve this lim­it the lev­el of commitment.”

This is espe­cial­ly true giv­en that financ­ing green activ­i­ties is already, almost by def­i­n­i­tion, less prof­itable and more expen­sive than financ­ing brown activ­i­ties. For this rea­son, it is not enough to force investors to divest from car­bon-inten­sive activ­i­ties, as this will lead to “finan­cial car­bon leak­age,” argues Chris­t­ian Gol­lier. “Penal­is­ing the most car­bon-inten­sive com­pa­nies by increas­ing the cost of cap­i­tal will also increase the prof­itabil­i­ty of invest­ments in these com­pa­nies. It is there­fore a very inef­fec­tive solu­tion, which will push investors moti­vat­ed sole­ly by prof­itabil­i­ty to favour com­pa­nies with the most ‘brown’ activities.”

The State would there­fore need to play a role in pro­vid­ing incen­tives, but this would not be easy to imple­ment. The prob­lem remains that, regard­less of the pub­lic pol­i­cy instru­ments used, the tran­si­tion is cost­ly, espe­cial­ly in the short term. “But we must bear in mind that, despite the short-term costs asso­ci­at­ed with reduc­ing emis­sions, these efforts are prof­itable in the long term because they pre­vent much of the future cli­mate dam­age,” insists Fan­ny Hen­ri­et. When it comes to cov­er­ing the cost of cli­mate dam­age, the insur­ance sec­tor also has an impor­tant role to play.

A market weakened by climate change

“Insur­ance com­pa­nies are faced with chang­ing claims pat­terns among pol­i­cy­hold­ers [Edi­tor’s note: an aver­age of €6 bil­lion per year over the last four years in France5],” admits Chris­t­ian Gol­lier. “This rais­es a del­i­cate ques­tion about the insur­ance mod­el, as it should lead to price increas­es.” Fan­ny Hen­ri­et agrees: “When the risk becomes too high or too sys­temic, insur­ance pre­mi­ums sky­rock­et or insur­ers sim­ply with­draw from the mar­ket. In the Unit­ed States, sev­er­al major insur­ance com­pa­nies have stopped writ­ing new home insur­ance poli­cies in Cal­i­for­nia due to the increased risk of wild­fires. Sim­i­lar­ly, in Flori­da, the increase in hur­ri­canes has led to high­er pre­mi­ums and reduced coverage.”

The ques­tion is there­fore how insur­ers could change their financ­ing mod­el to be able to cov­er these poten­tial future risks. The increas­ing fre­quen­cy of extreme weath­er events is mak­ing some exposed areas unin­hab­it­able. “In the Cat-Nat sys­tem, the gov­ern­men­t’s desire to lim­it insur­ance pre­mi­um increas­es in these areas cre­ates a sub­sidy for set­tling there and impos­es heavy loss­es on insur­ers,” adds Chris­t­ian Gol­lier. “The desire for sol­i­dar­i­ty is com­mend­able, but it leads to dis­as­ter.” Nev­er­the­less, many risks remain dif­fi­cult to quan­ti­fy, which means that they are effec­tive­ly unin­sur­able through the usu­al insur­ance mech­a­nisms. The result is high­ly inef­fi­cient risk allo­ca­tion and man­age­ment in our soci­ety. “To address this issue, the gov­ern­ment has devel­oped com­pen­sa­tion funds, often financed by tax­pay­ers. How­ev­er, this approach does not help to make indi­vid­u­als respon­si­ble for man­ag­ing risk in the pub­lic inter­est, he insists. The mar­ket, for its part, has also devel­oped solu­tions based on finan­cial prod­ucts, such as Cat Bonds6, which spread risks around the world and allow investors’ views to be aggre­gat­ed through the emer­gence of a mar­ket price for risk.”

That said, con­crete lines of action can be put in place. The insur­ance sec­tor is both exposed to the con­se­quences of cli­mate change and has con­sid­er­able finan­cial lever­age to respond to it. “These future chal­lenges could also make Euro­pean mod­els pre­cur­sors,’ she con­cludes. We often hear that tak­ing the lead with­out glob­al coor­di­na­tion would be futile. But in real­i­ty, being the first allows us to learn, test and demon­strate that the tran­si­tion is fea­si­ble. This will inform the choic­es of oth­er coun­tries when they, in turn, are forced to act,” con­cludes Fan­ny Henriet

Pablo Andres
1Com­ments made dur­ing the Assur­ances de France con­fer­ence, S.M.A.R.T 2024, organ­ised by France Assur­ances.
2Fan­ny Hen­ri­et, L’é­conomie peut-elle sauver le cli­mat ?
(Can the econ­o­my save the cli­mate?) – PUF, 2025
3Chris­t­ian Gol­lier, L’é­conomie de l’(in)action cli­ma­tique (The eco­nom­ics of cli­mate (in)action) – Book to be pub­lished in July 2025
4Gol­lier, C. (2001). TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF INSURABILITY. Assur­ances, 68(4), 453–473. https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​7​2​0​2​/​1​1​0​5​340ar
5Report by France Assureurs
6Finan­cial Sta­bil­i­ty Review, June 2019 – Banque de France

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