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Can insurers save the planet (and themselves)?

Fanny Henriet
Fanny Henriet
CNRS Research Director at Aix-Marseille School of Economics and Lecturer at Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris)
Christian Gollier
Christian Gollier
Executive Director at Toulouse School of Economics
Key takeaways
  • Faced with global warming, it is now crucial for insurance companies to address environmental issues and climate disasters.
  • Public policy plays a fundamental role in encouraging action on energy transition, particularly by making investments by other players more profitable.
  • Despite the short-term costs associated with reducing emissions, these efforts are profitable in the long term because they prevent future climate damage.
  • Insurance companies are facing changes in the claims experience of their policyholders, which raises the delicate question of possible price increases.
  • The question is therefore how insurance companies could change their financing model to cover these future risks.

With the increase in extreme weath­er events, the insur­ance sec­tor is on the front line when it comes to see­ing the phys­ic­al dam­age caused by cli­mate change. How­ever, accord­ing to sev­er­al of its rep­res­ent­at­ives1, this sec­tor is also one of the main pil­lars – if not the main pil­lar – of invest­ment in soci­ety. French insurers are said to account for €2.5 tril­lion of this invest­ment. And, as Fanny Hen­riet, Dir­ect­or of Research at the CNRS at the Aix-Mar­seille School of Eco­nom­ics, argues in her book L’É­conomie peut-elle sauver le cli­mat?2, the eco­nomy must play a lead­ing role in the eco­lo­gic­al trans­ition, then isn’t it in the insur­ance sec­tor’s best interests to take action on cli­mate issues, which are among its most crit­ic­al chal­lenges for the future?

Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er, research­er, author and dir­ect­or of the Toulouse School of Eco­nom­ics, has been work­ing on these issues for many years. In his new book, Économie de l’(in)action cli­matique3 (The Eco­nom­ics of Cli­mate (In)action), he argues that cli­mate change is the most rad­ic­al fail­ure of our lib­er­al demo­cracy and puts for­ward sev­er­al ways to cor­rect it, from eco­lo­gic­al dic­tat­or­ship to car­bon pri­cing. The role of fin­ance is also dis­cussed. As the author of an art­icle4 pub­lished in 2001 on the lim­its of insur­ab­il­ity linked to cli­mate risks, he is now able to take a step back from his past ana­lyses and draw an alarm­ing con­clu­sion: “At the time of writ­ing, there was wide­spread deni­al of glob­al warm­ing, but although it is now com­monly accep­ted, there is still deni­al about the sac­ri­fices that will have to be made to com­bat it. I am stunned by the con­trast between aware­ness and the lack of con­ver­gence in polit­ic­al decision-making.”

“The insur­ance sec­tor is both exposed to cli­mate dam­age and a major play­er in invest­ment. It is there­fore at the heart of the issues,” explains Fanny Hen­riet. How­ever, as she points out, investors will not invest “on prin­ciple, but for prof­it­ab­il­ity.” The chal­lenge, there­fore, is to show that this fight can be eco­nom­ic­ally profitable.

Are public policies an essential driver of transition?

In France, assur­ance vie is the most pop­u­lar form of sav­ings, account­ing for nearly €2 tril­lion in assets. This alone rep­res­ents a sig­ni­fic­ant source of invest­ment for the eco­lo­gic­al trans­ition. “In the­ory, the hold­ers of these assets, mainly house­holds able to save over the long term, could mobil­ise part of their sav­ings to meet their respons­ib­il­ity towards future gen­er­a­tions, par­tic­u­larly in terms of cli­mate change. But their motiv­a­tion remains primar­ily fin­an­cial,” explains Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er. “In prac­tice, it’s com­plic­ated, because tra­di­tion­ally it is the respons­ib­il­ity of the state, at least in the com­mon view, to estab­lish an eco­nomy that works for the com­mon good.”

This idea of pub­lic respons­ib­il­ity tends to dis­cour­age massive invest­ment by indi­vidu­als, but also by the private sec­tor, in the absence of pub­lic policy. This leads eco­nom­ists to con­sider the role of the state as the ini­ti­at­or of this fight, as in the case of café ter­races that can no longer be heated, speed lim­its on motor­ways, or the intro­duc­tion of a car­bon tax. Fanny Hen­riet explains this well using the example of renew­able energy: “As shown by the fall­ing costs of wind and sol­ar power, low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies can become prof­it­able over time through learn­ing by doing. But this dynam­ic does not hap­pen on its own: the gov­ern­ment must play an ini­ti­at­ing role by sup­port­ing invest­ment at the out­set, for example through sub­sidies, and by mak­ing pol­lut­ing activ­it­ies less prof­it­able through a car­bon tax.” This is how, through pub­lic action, invest­ment in the trans­ition could become prof­it­able. Fur­ther­more, Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er main­tains that “if gov­ern­ment does­n’t do it, who will? The indi­vidu­al sac­ri­fices required to achieve this lim­it the level of commitment.”

This is espe­cially true giv­en that fin­an­cing green activ­it­ies is already, almost by defin­i­tion, less prof­it­able and more expens­ive than fin­an­cing brown activ­it­ies. For this reas­on, it is not enough to force investors to divest from car­bon-intens­ive activ­it­ies, as this will lead to “fin­an­cial car­bon leak­age,” argues Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er. “Pen­al­ising the most car­bon-intens­ive com­pan­ies by increas­ing the cost of cap­it­al will also increase the prof­it­ab­il­ity of invest­ments in these com­pan­ies. It is there­fore a very inef­fect­ive solu­tion, which will push investors motiv­ated solely by prof­it­ab­il­ity to favour com­pan­ies with the most ‘brown’ activities.”

The State would there­fore need to play a role in provid­ing incent­ives, but this would not be easy to imple­ment. The prob­lem remains that, regard­less of the pub­lic policy instru­ments used, the trans­ition is costly, espe­cially in the short term. “But we must bear in mind that, des­pite the short-term costs asso­ci­ated with redu­cing emis­sions, these efforts are prof­it­able in the long term because they pre­vent much of the future cli­mate dam­age,” insists Fanny Hen­riet. When it comes to cov­er­ing the cost of cli­mate dam­age, the insur­ance sec­tor also has an import­ant role to play.

A market weakened by climate change

“Insur­ance com­pan­ies are faced with chan­ging claims pat­terns among poli­cy­hold­ers [Edit­or­’s note: an aver­age of €6 bil­lion per year over the last four years in France5],” admits Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er. “This raises a del­ic­ate ques­tion about the insur­ance mod­el, as it should lead to price increases.” Fanny Hen­riet agrees: “When the risk becomes too high or too sys­tem­ic, insur­ance premi­ums skyrock­et or insurers simply with­draw from the mar­ket. In the United States, sev­er­al major insur­ance com­pan­ies have stopped writ­ing new home insur­ance policies in Cali­for­nia due to the increased risk of wild­fires. Sim­il­arly, in Flor­ida, the increase in hur­ricanes has led to high­er premi­ums and reduced coverage.”

The ques­tion is there­fore how insurers could change their fin­an­cing mod­el to be able to cov­er these poten­tial future risks. The increas­ing fre­quency of extreme weath­er events is mak­ing some exposed areas unin­hab­it­able. “In the Cat-Nat sys­tem, the gov­ern­ment’s desire to lim­it insur­ance premi­um increases in these areas cre­ates a sub­sidy for set­tling there and imposes heavy losses on insurers,” adds Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er. “The desire for solid­ar­ity is com­mend­able, but it leads to dis­aster.” Nev­er­the­less, many risks remain dif­fi­cult to quanti­fy, which means that they are effect­ively unin­sur­able through the usu­al insur­ance mech­an­isms. The res­ult is highly inef­fi­cient risk alloc­a­tion and man­age­ment in our soci­ety. “To address this issue, the gov­ern­ment has developed com­pens­a­tion funds, often fin­anced by tax­pay­ers. How­ever, this approach does not help to make indi­vidu­als respons­ible for man­aging risk in the pub­lic interest, he insists. The mar­ket, for its part, has also developed solu­tions based on fin­an­cial products, such as Cat Bonds6, which spread risks around the world and allow investors’ views to be aggreg­ated through the emer­gence of a mar­ket price for risk.”

That said, con­crete lines of action can be put in place. The insur­ance sec­tor is both exposed to the con­sequences of cli­mate change and has con­sid­er­able fin­an­cial lever­age to respond to it. “These future chal­lenges could also make European mod­els pre­curs­ors,’ she con­cludes. We often hear that tak­ing the lead without glob­al coordin­a­tion would be futile. But in real­ity, being the first allows us to learn, test and demon­strate that the trans­ition is feas­ible. This will inform the choices of oth­er coun­tries when they, in turn, are forced to act,” con­cludes Fanny Henriet

Pablo Andres
1Com­ments made dur­ing the Assur­ances de France con­fer­ence, S.M.A.R.T 2024, organ­ised by France Assur­ances.
2Fanny Hen­riet, L’é­conomie peut-elle sauver le cli­mat ?
(Can the eco­nomy save the cli­mate?) – PUF, 2025
3Chris­ti­an Gol­li­er, L’é­conomie de l’(in)action cli­matique (The eco­nom­ics of cli­mate (in)action) – Book to be pub­lished in July 2025
4Gol­li­er, C. (2001). TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF INSURABILITY. Assur­ances, 68(4), 453–473. https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​7​2​0​2​/​1​1​0​5​340ar
5Report by France Assureurs
6Fin­an­cial Sta­bil­ity Review, June 2019 – Banque de France

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