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“The climate challenge is an opportunity for capitalism”

Pierre Dockès
Pierre Dockès
Honorary Professor of Economic History at the University of Lyon 2

Capi­ta­lism has been the sub­ject of severe cri­ti­cism, from its ori­gins and throu­ghout its his­to­ry. What is the secret to its survival ?

To unders­tand the his­to­ry of capi­ta­lism, we must aban­don the idea that it is a sin­gu­lar term ; it can­not be locked into a single des­crip­tion. There are seve­ral dif­ferent ways of seeing it, and this is the secret of its resi­lience. Look at Chi­na, where we observe a very dif­ferent ver­sion of capi­ta­lism than that which we know in Europe or America. 

If you define it as an eco­no­mic sys­tem based on free­dom of ideas, a mar­ket, pri­vate pro­per­ty, you miss much of the point. Rather, capi­ta­list sys­tems are mar­ked by the very strong pre­sence of a regu­la­to­ry, inter­ven­tio­nist and even autho­ri­ta­rian state.

In the same way, a Mar­xian defi­ni­tion, insis­ting on the rela­tion­ship bet­ween pro­duc­tion and the “wage-ear­ner”, only cap­tures some of the pos­si­bi­li­ties (i.e., the first and second indus­trial revo­lu­tions). Some forms of capi­ta­lism deve­lo­ped using slaves or ensla­ved popu­la­tions, while others, yes­ter­day or today, mobi­lise semi-dependent workers.

A Schum­pe­ter-like defi­ni­tion, empha­si­sing the ‘enter­prise’ and the figure of the entre­pre­neur, also misses part of the point. That only appea­red at a late stage.

The uni­ty and his­to­ri­cal cohe­rence of capi­ta­lism is the domi­na­tion of money and of the class of hol­ders with finan­cial means – in brief, the bour­geoi­sie. When it emer­ged in the 16th cen­tu­ry, this new model was at first mar­gi­nal within an eco­no­my still not very mone­ta­ri­sed and domi­na­ted by agri­cul­tu­ral pro­duc­tion. What ensu­red its suc­cess and led it to control, and then absorb, a gro­wing share of pro­duc­tion and trade was its capa­ci­ty for inno­va­tion or, bet­ter still : ‘crea­tive des­truc­tion’, as Schum­pe­ter put it, but which had alrea­dy been hai­led in the Com­mu­nist Manifesto.

So, the inno­va­tive power of capi­ta­lism has enabled it to respond to the chal­lenges it has faced ? 

Yes, and it is not limi­ted to tech­no­lo­gy. In the 19th cen­tu­ry, the indus­trial revo­lu­tion gave rise to the “social ques­tion” because of the increase in the num­ber of wor­kers and the dra­ma­tic living condi­tions that the free labour mar­ket impo­sed on them. As ear­ly as the 1880s, Bis­marck crea­ted the first social insu­rance schemes. In the 1930s and post-1945, dri­ven by social and poli­ti­cal pro­test, a “great trans­for­ma­tion” (in the sense of Karl Pola­nyi) took place in res­ponse to this chal­lenge, rege­ne­ra­ting capitalism.

State inter­ven­tion, the fight against inequa­li­ty and trans­fers consti­tutes a return of poli­ti­cal control over the eco­no­my (the ‘re-inte­gra­tion’ of which Pola­nyi speaks) that cor­rects the des­truc­tive conse­quences of self-regu­la­ting mar­kets. And what is remar­kable is the way capi­ta­lism has trans­for­med these constraints into a power­ful engine.

For­dism is one form of this meta­mor­pho­sis. It was not to sell cars that Hen­ry Ford paid his wor­kers more, rather it was to solve the pro­blem of tur­no­ver asso­cia­ted with low wages. This res­ponse to an inter­nal com­pa­ny pro­blem became, under the lea­der­ship of the state, the para­gon of a new age of capi­ta­lism. Mass consump­tion and pro­duc­tion, the explo­sion of pro­duc­ti­vi­ty, the rise of the urban middle classes, the lei­sure eco­no­my, the deve­lop­ment of ser­vices, etc., cor­res­pon­ded to the excep­tio­nal growth of the Glo­rious Thirty. 

The his­to­ry of capi­ta­lism  can be cha­rac­te­ri­sed by its rhythms, major crises – eco­no­mic, social, poli­ti­cal – and its rebound phases.

Chal­lenges and uphea­vals thus mark the his­to­ry of capi­ta­lism, a his­to­ry that can be cha­rac­te­ri­sed by its rhythms, major crises – eco­no­mic, social, poli­ti­cal – and its rebound phases : the some­times-violent emer­gence of a pro­blem (wars play a major role), res­ponse and trans­for­ma­tion of the sys­tem, new pro­blem (some­times resul­ting from the res­ponse), new res­ponse… And it goes on ! 

Thus, it was from the cri­sis of For­dism, which could no lon­ger raise its pro­duc­ti­vi­ty, that the revo­lu­tion of the 1970s and 1980s was born, embo­died by That­cher and Rea­gan. A new ‘great trans­for­ma­tion’, this time neo-libe­ral, in which finance is omni­present, based on the third indus­trial revo­lu­tion, revi­ved the inno­va­tion machine, hence the growth of 1994–2006 (the fabu­lous decade). But it has again gene­ra­ted the condi­tions for the great finan­cial cri­sis that broke out in 2008, and the exhaus­tion of pro­duc­ti­vi­ty gains.

In your book on Capi­ta­lism and its rhythms (Gar­nier, two volumes, 2017 and 2019), you insist on the endo­ge­nous cha­rac­ter of these crises, and on the fact that capi­ta­lism always pushes its limits. This is a mark of its dyna­mism, but isn’t it also its weakness ?

Capi­ta­lism is mar­ked by an accu­mu­la­tive logic, which radi­cal­ly dis­tin­guishes it from pre­vious eco­no­mic sys­tems (ancient, feu­dal etc.). “Accu­mu­late, accu­mu­late,” said Marx in Book I of Capi­tal, “this is the law and the pro­phets. This unli­mi­ted accu­mu­la­tion leads capi­ta­lism to deep contradictions.”

It is in this that crises are endo­ge­nous, and I am not just tal­king about finan­cial crises. It crea­ted the social ques­tion, but also, at the turn of the 20th cen­tu­ry, the ques­tion of mono­po­lies, hence the res­ponse of anti­trust in the Uni­ted States, of Ger­man decar­te­li­sa­tion after 1945, etc. In the same way, this regime of pre­da­tion on nature has crea­ted the envi­ron­men­tal issue that is today a major challenge.

The cli­mate and envi­ron­men­tal chal­lenge is thro­wing the com­passes out of kil­ter. With col­lap­so­lo­gy, we are seeing the reap­pea­rance of apo­ca­lyp­tic thin­king : we will be puni­shed for our sins against nature, as we were yes­ter­day against God ! But it has hel­ped to make people unders­tand the impor­tance of the chal­lenge, for poli­ti­cians and for eco­no­mic agents, hou­se­holds and busi­nesses, who are now playing a lea­ding role in deve­lo­ping a response.

Like its pre­de­ces­sors, this new chal­lenge will have its ans­wer. Changes in men­ta­li­ties and beha­viours, and the regu­la­to­ry push will pro­duce tech­no­lo­gi­cal and social inno­va­tions in which capi­ta­lism, once again regu­la­ted by the state and its indus­trial poli­cies, will be a sta­ke­hol­der. The new alliance bet­ween capi­tal and the state will acti­ve­ly par­ti­ci­pate in the deve­lop­ment of the next world, a world of clean ener­gy where the envi­ron­men­tal foot­print of each addi­tio­nal point of GDP will be ever smal­ler, an evo­lu­tion that has alrea­dy begun.

I will go fur­ther : the cli­mate chal­lenge is per­haps an oppor­tu­ni­ty for capi­ta­lism. It is an oppor­tu­ni­ty to respond to ano­ther chal­lenge : that of “secu­lar stag­na­tion”, an old concern that was revi­ved in 2013 by Lar­ry Sum­mers, for­mer chair­man of Barack Oba­ma’s Natio­nal Eco­no­mic Council. 

Sum­mers, along with others such as Robert Gor­don, has obser­ved the decline in pro­duc­ti­vi­ty gains over the past thir­ty years. He explains it by a gro­wing defi­cit of invest­ment oppor­tu­ni­ties. A cri­sis of lan­gui­shing demand, a cri­sis of matu­ri­ty : the hap­py days of easy growth are behind us.

It is per­fect­ly pos­sible that the envi­ron­men­tal chal­lenge will pro­vide an ans­wer to this lan­gui­shing demand. The envi­ron­men­tal tran­si­tion is a huge under­ta­king. With the end of coal and oil, the rise in ener­gy prices pro­mises pro­fi­table invest­ments. It also offers a wel­come return of infla­tion, which has deser­ted the goods mar­kets to concen­trate on real estate and finan­cial assets alone. It is also an oppor­tu­ni­ty to eli­mi­nate waste and unne­ces­sa­ry production.

Of course, one can dis­cuss the nega­tive effects of higher ener­gy prices, espe­cial­ly for areas like Europe that will be lea­ders in this tran­si­tion. There is a price to pay in terms of com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness, and unless we want to be the butt of the joke, we will need a car­bon tax at the bor­ders. There is a pro­blem of inter­na­tio­nal coor­di­na­tion here, which is no small mat­ter since the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion must be glo­bal. But the new constraints also pro­mise a rebound. The “capi­ta­list machine”, sup­por­ted by the old, but inter­mit­tent, accom­plice, the state, may find in the cli­mate chal­lenge an oppor­tu­ni­ty to bounce back again.

Interview by Richard Robert

Contributors

Pierre Dockès

Pierre Dockès

Honorary Professor of Economic History at the University of Lyon 2

Pierre Dockès specialises in historical economics (Le Sucre et les Larmes, Descartes, 2009), the history of economic ideas (the Complete Works of A. and L. Walras (ed.); Hobbes. Economie, terreur et politique, Economica, 2008). He is particularly interested in the globalisation of capitalism (Le Sucre et les Larmes, Descartes, 2009), its evolution and its crises (Le capitalisme et ses rythmes, 2 volumes, Classiques Garnier 2017-2019).

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