Why greenhouse gas reduction reveals a series of paradoxes for China

As the world’s lar­gest emit­ter of car­bon dioxide, Chi­na embo­dies all the para­doxes of the glo­bal ener­gy tran­si­tion. In two decades, the Asian giant has gone from cate­go­ri­cal­ly refu­sing to make any com­mit­ments under the Kyo­to Pro­to­col in 1997 to playing a lea­ding role in the Paris Agree­ment in 2015, announ­cing at the end of 2025 a 7–10% reduc­tion in its GHG emis­sions by 2035. Howe­ver, this ambi­tion is at odds with the country’s depen­dence on coal and the conti­nued ope­ning of fos­sil fuel power plants. Behind these contra­dic­to­ry contra­dic­tions lies a pre­me­di­ta­ted stra­te­gy, as Jean-Paul Maré­chal, senior lec­tu­rer in eco­no­mics, explains.

Jean-Paul Maré­chal. For a coun­try that refu­sed to make any quan­ti­fied com­mit­ments under the Kyo­to Pro­to­col in 1997, Chi­na has indeed become one of the key players in the desi­gn and adop­tion of the Paris Agree­ment in 2015. Seve­ral fac­tors explain this change of course. On the one hand, since the 2000s, the Chi­nese autho­ri­ties have become aware of the harm­ful effects of air pol­lu­tion on public health and the nega­tive conse­quences of glo­bal war­ming on the coun­try, par­ti­cu­lar­ly the threat to coas­tal cities and the impact on agri­cul­ture. On the other hand, Bei­jing qui­ck­ly unders­tood the eco­no­mic poten­tial in terms of exports and the deve­lop­ment of low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies. Final­ly, the desire to improve its inter­na­tio­nal image has also contri­bu­ted to the country’s new “green” positioning.

Indeed, the China’s natio­nal car­bon tra­ding scheme, which star­ted in 2021, cur­rent­ly only regu­lates CO2 emis­sions from the elec­tri­ci­ty sector

It is in this context, and with a proac­tive atti­tude, that Bei­jing pro­po­sed its NDC (Natio­nal­ly Deter­mi­ned Contri­bu­tion) for COP21 in Paris in 2015, with four key commitments :

• To reach peak car­bon dioxide emis­sions around 2030 and do eve­ry­thing pos­sible to reach this level earlier.
• Reduce CO2 emis­sions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65% by 2030 com­pa­red to 2005 levels.
• Increase the share of non-fos­sil fuels in pri­ma­ry ener­gy consump­tion to around 20% by 2030.
• Increase forest wood stocks by around 4.5 bil­lion cubic metres by 2030 com­pa­red to 2005 levels.

Two years later in Bei­jing, on 18^th Octo­ber 2017, during the 19^th Congress of the CCP (Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty), Xi Jin­ping decla­red that it was up to Chi­na “to accom­plish the buil­ding of an eco­lo­gi­cal civi­li­sa­tion, the bene­fi­cial effects of which will be enjoyed by suc­ces­sive gene­ra­tions of Chi­nese people for cen­tu­ries to come.”

In 2020, the Chi­nese autho­ri­ties announ­ced a cap on emis­sions “before” 2030 rather than “around” 2030 ; a reduc­tion in the country’s car­bon foot­print of “more than 65%” rather than “bet­ween 60 and 65%”; a share of rene­wable ener­gy that should reach 25% by 2030 ; and, final­ly, car­bon neu­tra­li­ty for the coun­try by 2060. Howe­ver, it was in the autumn of 2025, when China’s 15^th five-year plan (2026–2030) was announ­ced, that the most signi­fi­cant announ­ce­ments were made.

The aim this time is to reduce GHG emis­sions by 7–10% from their peak, nota­bly by increa­sing non-fos­sil fuel ener­gy sources to 30% of total ener­gy consump­tion and by increa­sing solar and wind ener­gy pro­duc­tion capa­ci­ty six­fold com­pa­red to 2020 levels. These com­mit­ments are ful­ly reflec­ted in Chi­na’s NDC for COP30.

When Xi Jin­ping unvei­led the main points of this future 15^th five-year plan, he empha­si­sed the “dri­ving role of scien­ti­fic and tech­no­lo­gi­cal inno­va­tion” and the need to “acce­le­rate the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion at all levels”. Point 46 of the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty Cen­tral Committee’s pro­po­sals of this plan¹ spe­ci­fies that by conti­nuous­ly increa­sing the share of new ener­gies in the ener­gy mix, care must be taken to ensure that the repla­ce­ment of fos­sil fuels takes place in a “safe, reliable and order­ly man­ner”, adding that while the deve­lop­ment of wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power must be pur­sued, this does not mean aban­do­ning fos­sil fuels. Point 47 calls for the esta­blish­ment of a dual emis­sions control sys­tem (based on inten­si­ty and volume) and the exten­sion of the natio­nal car­bon tra­ding scheme to addi­tio­nal sec­tors. Indeed, the China’s natio­nal car­bon tra­ding scheme, which star­ted in 2021, cur­rent­ly only regu­lates CO2 emis­sions from the elec­tri­ci­ty sec­tor. It is expec­ted to even­tual­ly cover eight sec­tors (hea­vy indus­try, che­mi­cals, etc.).

China’s ener­gy mix remains hea­vi­ly car­bon-based, and although the use of coal is on the decline, it still plays a major role. Accor­ding to the Inter­na­tio­nal Ener­gy Agen­cy, in 2023, coal accoun­ted for 71% of the ener­gy pro­du­ced and 61% of the ener­gy sup­ply. The first half of 2025 saw orders for 21GW of coal-fired gene­ra­tion capa­ci­ty, the highest level for a half-year per­iod since 2016, brin­ging the total figure for construc­tion and orders to 80GW in 2025. In this context, it is easier to unders­tand why, at COP26 in Glas­gow in 2021, Bei­jing did not oppose India’s last-minute request to replace “pha­sing out coal” with “pha­sing down coal” in the final text.

With coal being very abun­dant in China’s sub­soil, some lea­ders see the ener­gy tran­si­tion as poten­tial­ly at odds with the country’s ener­gy secu­ri­ty. Fur­ther­more, the struc­ture of the elec­tri­ci­ty grid has been lar­ge­ly desi­gned around coal, and regio­nal offi­cials pre­fer not to depend on each other for ener­gy sup­plies. Added to this is the fact that the construc­tion of coal-fired power sta­tions is a signi­fi­cant source of employment.

As high­ligh­ted in a recent report by CREA (Centre for Research on Ener­gy and Clean Air)², the ins­tal­la­tion of wind tur­bines and solar panels in 2025 is expec­ted to be more than suf­fi­cient to meet the growth in elec­tri­ci­ty demand. As for the deve­lop­ment of low-car­bon indus­tries, in terms of glo­bal pro­duc­tion capa­ci­ty, in 2021 Chi­na accoun­ted for 97% of semi­con­duc­tor mate­rials and 85% of cells in the solar sec­tor, and 84% of blades, 73% of nacelles and 54% of towers in the off­shore wind sec­tor³. In 2022, it extrac­ted 68% of the world’s rare earths and pro­ces­sed 90% of them⁴.

Unable to make its eco­no­my as green as it would like, or as it should, Chi­na has mana­ged to secure a vir­tual mono­po­ly on the value chains of many low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies and pro­ducts. This pre­sents Europe with the fol­lo­wing dilem­ma : acce­le­rate its ener­gy tran­si­tion by impor­ting Chi­nese pro­ducts on a mas­sive scale or slow it down by attemp­ting to deve­lop its own inno­va­tions and pro­duc­tion capacities.

Interview by Alicia Piveteau