Why greenhouse gas reduction reveals a series of paradoxes for China

As the world’s largest emit­ter of car­bon diox­ide, China embod­ies all the para­doxes of the glob­al energy trans­ition. In two dec­ades, the Asi­an giant has gone from cat­egor­ic­ally refus­ing to make any com­mit­ments under the Kyoto Pro­tocol in 1997 to play­ing a lead­ing role in the Par­is Agree­ment in 2015, announ­cing at the end of 2025 a 7–10% reduc­tion in its GHG emis­sions by 2035. How­ever, this ambi­tion is at odds with the country’s depend­ence on coal and the con­tin­ued open­ing of fossil fuel power plants. Behind these con­tra­dict­ory con­tra­dic­tions lies a pre­med­it­ated strategy, as Jean-Paul Maréchal, seni­or lec­turer in eco­nom­ics, explains.

Jean-Paul Maréchal. For a coun­try that refused to make any quan­ti­fied com­mit­ments under the Kyoto Pro­tocol in 1997, China has indeed become one of the key play­ers in the design and adop­tion of the Par­is Agree­ment in 2015. Sev­er­al factors explain this change of course. On the one hand, since the 2000s, the Chinese author­it­ies have become aware of the harm­ful effects of air pol­lu­tion on pub­lic health and the neg­at­ive con­sequences of glob­al warm­ing on the coun­try, par­tic­u­larly the threat to coastal cit­ies and the impact on agri­cul­ture. On the oth­er hand, Beijing quickly under­stood the eco­nom­ic poten­tial in terms of exports and the devel­op­ment of low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies. Finally, the desire to improve its inter­na­tion­al image has also con­trib­uted to the country’s new “green” positioning.

Indeed, the China’s nation­al car­bon trad­ing scheme, which star­ted in 2021, cur­rently only reg­u­lates CO2 emis­sions from the elec­tri­city sector

It is in this con­text, and with a pro­act­ive atti­tude, that Beijing pro­posed its NDC (Nation­ally Determ­ined Con­tri­bu­tion) for COP21 in Par­is in 2015, with four key commitments:

• To reach peak car­bon diox­ide emis­sions around 2030 and do everything pos­sible to reach this level earlier.
• Reduce CO2 emis­sions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65% by 2030 com­pared to 2005 levels.
• Increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy con­sump­tion to around 20% by 2030.
• Increase forest wood stocks by around 4.5 bil­lion cubic metres by 2030 com­pared to 2005 levels.

Two years later in Beijing, on 18^th Octo­ber 2017, dur­ing the 19^th Con­gress of the CCP (Chinese Com­mun­ist Party), Xi Jin­ping declared that it was up to China “to accom­plish the build­ing of an eco­lo­gic­al civil­isa­tion, the bene­fi­cial effects of which will be enjoyed by suc­cess­ive gen­er­a­tions of Chinese people for cen­tur­ies to come.”

In 2020, the Chinese author­it­ies announced a cap on emis­sions “before” 2030 rather than “around” 2030; a reduc­tion in the country’s car­bon foot­print of “more than 65%” rather than “between 60 and 65%”; a share of renew­able energy that should reach 25% by 2030; and, finally, car­bon neut­ral­ity for the coun­try by 2060. How­ever, it was in the autumn of 2025, when China’s 15^th five-year plan (2026–2030) was announced, that the most sig­ni­fic­ant announce­ments were made.

The aim this time is to reduce GHG emis­sions by 7–10% from their peak, not­ably by increas­ing non-fossil fuel energy sources to 30% of total energy con­sump­tion and by increas­ing sol­ar and wind energy pro­duc­tion capa­city six­fold com­pared to 2020 levels. These com­mit­ments are fully reflec­ted in Chin­a’s NDC for COP30.

When Xi Jin­ping unveiled the main points of this future 15^th five-year plan, he emphas­ised the “driv­ing role of sci­entif­ic and tech­no­lo­gic­al innov­a­tion” and the need to “accel­er­ate the eco­lo­gic­al trans­ition at all levels”. Point 46 of the Chinese Com­mun­ist Party Cent­ral Committee’s pro­pos­als of this plan¹ spe­cifies that by con­tinu­ously increas­ing the share of new ener­gies in the energy mix, care must be taken to ensure that the replace­ment of fossil fuels takes place in a “safe, reli­able and orderly man­ner”, adding that while the devel­op­ment of wind, sol­ar, hydro and nuc­le­ar power must be pur­sued, this does not mean abandon­ing fossil fuels. Point 47 calls for the estab­lish­ment of a dual emis­sions con­trol sys­tem (based on intens­ity and volume) and the exten­sion of the nation­al car­bon trad­ing scheme to addi­tion­al sec­tors. Indeed, the China’s nation­al car­bon trad­ing scheme, which star­ted in 2021, cur­rently only reg­u­lates CO2 emis­sions from the elec­tri­city sec­tor. It is expec­ted to even­tu­ally cov­er eight sec­tors (heavy industry, chem­ic­als, etc.).

China’s energy mix remains heav­ily car­bon-based, and although the use of coal is on the decline, it still plays a major role. Accord­ing to the Inter­na­tion­al Energy Agency, in 2023, coal accoun­ted for 71% of the energy pro­duced and 61% of the energy sup­ply. The first half of 2025 saw orders for 21GW of coal-fired gen­er­a­tion capa­city, the highest level for a half-year peri­od since 2016, bring­ing the total fig­ure for con­struc­tion and orders to 80GW in 2025. In this con­text, it is easi­er to under­stand why, at COP26 in Glas­gow in 2021, Beijing did not oppose India’s last-minute request to replace “phas­ing out coal” with “phas­ing down coal” in the final text.

With coal being very abund­ant in China’s sub­soil, some lead­ers see the energy trans­ition as poten­tially at odds with the country’s energy secur­ity. Fur­ther­more, the struc­ture of the elec­tri­city grid has been largely designed around coal, and region­al offi­cials prefer not to depend on each oth­er for energy sup­plies. Added to this is the fact that the con­struc­tion of coal-fired power sta­tions is a sig­ni­fic­ant source of employment.

As high­lighted in a recent report by CREA (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air)², the install­a­tion of wind tur­bines and sol­ar pan­els in 2025 is expec­ted to be more than suf­fi­cient to meet the growth in elec­tri­city demand. As for the devel­op­ment of low-car­bon indus­tries, in terms of glob­al pro­duc­tion capa­city, in 2021 China accoun­ted for 97% of semi­con­duct­or mater­i­als and 85% of cells in the sol­ar sec­tor, and 84% of blades, 73% of nacelles and 54% of towers in the off­shore wind sec­tor³. In 2022, it extrac­ted 68% of the world’s rare earths and pro­cessed 90% of them⁴.

Unable to make its eco­nomy as green as it would like, or as it should, China has man­aged to secure a vir­tu­al mono­poly on the value chains of many low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies and products. This presents Europe with the fol­low­ing dilemma: accel­er­ate its energy trans­ition by import­ing Chinese products on a massive scale or slow it down by attempt­ing to devel­op its own innov­a­tions and pro­duc­tion capacities.

Interview by Alicia Piveteau