From control to incentives : the evolution of demographic policies in China

In many parts of the world, a trend is towards demo­gra­phic decline is occur­ring with Chi­na being the most dra­ma­tic. Cur­rent­ly the second most popu­lous coun­try in the world, it will expe­rience the shar­pest decline in popu­la­tion in abso­lute terms, losing 204 mil­lion inha­bi­tants by 2054. How is Bei­jing pre­pa­ring for such a demo­gra­phic shift ?

Pau­line Ros­si. After the Great Famine of 1958–1961, the autho­ri­ties fea­red a popu­la­tion explo­sion, which they saw as syno­ny­mous with an explo­sion of pover­ty in the 1960s. To avoid this sce­na­rio, poli­cies pro­mo­ting late mar­riage and then birth quo­tas were impo­sed on the entire popu­la­tion. The limit of two chil­dren per hou­se­hold was redu­ced to one child in the 1980s.

Mea­sures to enforce com­pliance with the quo­tas were dras­tic : the pos­si­bi­li­ty of dis­mis­sal from work, the intro­duc­tion of for­ced abor­tions, and other serious human rights vio­la­tions. These coer­cive mea­sures, cou­pled with strong eco­no­mic deve­lop­ment, led to a rapid demo­gra­phic transition.

Today, Chi­na, along­side Ita­ly, Spain and the Repu­blic of Korea, is part of a group of coun­tries where fer­ti­li­ty is clas­si­fied as ‘ultra-low’, with less than 1.4 births per woman. In 2024, for the first time, Bei­jing will see a decline in its popu­la­tion, fal­ling from 1.413 bil­lion in 2021 to 1.408 bil­lion three years later. The decline will not stop there. Accor­ding to Uni­ted Nations esti­mates, the popu­la­tion could fall below the sym­bo­lic thre­shold of one bil­lion by 2070¹.  Final­ly, while demo­gra­phic esti­mates become uncer­tain in the long term, some pre­dict that by the end of the cen­tu­ry, Chi­na is expec­ted to lose more than half of its cur­rent popu­la­tion, rea­ching 638 mil­lion inha­bi­tants, and thus return to the demo­gra­phic weight of the late 1950s.

Today, Chi­na’s pros­pe­ri­ty relies hea­vi­ly on its indus­tries, which require a large labour pool to ope­rate at full capa­ci­ty. The pre­dic­ted decline and ageing of the popu­la­tion will auto­ma­ti­cal­ly reduce the num­ber of workers.

Like Japan and South Korea, two neigh­bou­ring powers expe­rien­cing the same situa­tion, the autho­ri­ties are focu­sing on robo­ti­sa­tion and auto­ma­tion in indus­try to limit the impact of labour shor­tages. Chi­na will fol­low suit. Ope­ning up to labour migra­tion does not seem to be on the agen­da, and the needs will be such that, unlike its two Asian neigh­bours, this option will not be enough for China.

The most pres­sing mat­ter, both eco­no­mi­cal­ly and social­ly, remains the issue of finan­cing pen­sions and heal­th­care for the elder­ly. Mir­ro­ring the expe­rience of socie­ties in Europe, in 2024 the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty (CCP) cal­led for the reti­re­ment age to be rai­sed : from 60 to 63 for men ; from 50 to 55 for women in manual labour ; and from 55 to 58 for those employed in offices. A second reso­lu­tion will increase the mini­mum num­ber of years wor­ked before recei­ving a state pen­sion from 15 to 20 years star­ting in 2030. These mea­sures have spar­ked hea­ted debate within society.

It should be remem­be­red that a large part of the popu­la­tion depends on the infor­mal sec­tor and does not receive a pen­sion. For others, the low level of social pro­tec­tion offe­red means that they can­not give up all paid work. Final­ly, rural migrants wor­king in cities without per­mis­sion do not bene­fit from it either.

Aware of these issues since 2015, Bei­jing has taken action and deci­ded to abo­lish quo­tas. Women were allo­wed to have two chil­dren, and then three chil­dren from 2021 onwards. Howe­ver, the expec­ted baby boom never materialised.

Condi­tio­ned by the one-child poli­cy for seve­ral decades, fami­lies have deve­lo­ped a col­lec­tive habit of devo­ting a consi­de­rable por­tion of their income to the suc­cess of their only child, pro­vi­ding them with the best pos­sible edu­ca­tion to achieve excel­lence. The autho­ri­ties have attemp­ted to limit hou­se­hold spen­ding by ban­ning pri­vate tuto­ring, but a black mar­ket for home­work help has developed.

To bring about pro­found changes in fer­ti­li­ty deci­sions, a series of more incen­tive-based mea­sures have been adop­ted, inclu­ding fami­ly allo­wances and impro­ve­ments to mater­ni­ty leave. More intru­si­ve­ly, state ser­vices are now res­pon­sible for contac­ting women of child­bea­ring age to encou­rage them to have children.

Chi­na pre­sents itself as a major power in the eyes of the world, a nar­ra­tive sup­por­ted by its sta­tus as the most popu­lous coun­try. Losing this title to India is, at least sym­bo­li­cal­ly, bad news.

Howe­ver, there have long been two schools of thought within the par­ty. Opi­nions are divi­ded bet­ween those who prio­ri­tise impro­ving living condi­tions and those who defend the impor­tance of having a large popu­la­tion. In Mal­thu­sian logic, these two objec­tives are consi­de­red anta­go­nis­tic. The chal­lenges asso­cia­ted with ageing are now cal­ling this logic into ques­tion : demo­gra­phic decline is now per­cei­ved as a threat to both eco­no­mic pros­pe­ri­ty and poli­ti­cal power.

Interview by Alicia Piveteau