Why have MAGA voters lost trust in the scientific community?
- The American right has historically been pro-science, but the MAGA movement has developed a growing mistrust of scientific institutions since the 2000s.
- This mistrust stems from three currents: an anti-state movement hostile to regulation, an ultra-conservative evangelical right, and a populist electorate that views science as elitist intellectualism.
- Universities are perceived by the MAGA camp as progressive sanctuaries, a narrative amplified by Fox News and now transmuted into concrete attacks by the federal administration.
- Paradoxically, the MAGA movement is not anti-technology: it espouses a strong form of ‘techno-populism’, viewing digital technology as a tool for emancipation from the elites.
- To rebuild trust, three levers have been identified: strengthening science education, involving citizens in research, and regulating social media platforms that fragment public debate.
In most countries, political leanings have no impact on overall trust in scientists. But in the United States, as in certain European countries or Brazil, being conservative appears to go hand in hand with a certain mistrust of the scientific community. According to data from the General Social Survey (a national survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago), between 1973 and 2000, an average of 42% of Republicans reported having “a great deal of trust” in the scientific community, compared with 38% of Democrats, and only 6% reported having almost no trust (7.5% among Democrats). Between 2002 and 2024, the trend reversed: 36% of Republicans expressed high trust, compared with 45% of Democrats, and mistrust—which remained relatively stable in both camps until 2020—rose by more than 10 percentage points among conservatives after that date (20% in 2022, 16% in 20241.
Across the Atlantic, this polarisation of trust has been observed since the turn of the 2000s and is said to have intensified since 2020. How can this trust crisis be explained? And what is its connection to the MAGA movement? We discuss this with Olivier Nay, professor of political science at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a member of the CESSP. A specialist in the sociology of institutions, he works on international administrations, development policies and the production of government knowledge. He has also been an associate professor at Columbia University since 2018.
What relationship has the American right had with science over the past few decades?
The American right has traditionally placed great trust in applied sciences, which are seen as supporting both the defence sector and technological progress, both of which play an important role in economic growth. Even in the Reagan years, confidence in science among Republicans was widespread. In 1984, 53% of them said they had ‘great confidence’ in science, compared with only 46% of Democrats, even though the civil rights movements relied heavily on the social sciences. Today, science is still seen as a driver of progress by the moderate, liberal-conservative wing of the Republican Party. However, the MAGA movement, which forms the core of Trump’s activist and electoral base, is in fact far more sceptical of science.
How can this scepticism be explained?
The MAGA movement stems from an alliance of diverse sensibilities which, over the last decade, have expressed growing mistrust of political and academic elites:
- An anti-state, pro-market and libertarian movement hostile to regulation and, as a result, critical of climate or medical science, whose findings may hinder economic and industrial activities.
- This approach already existed at the end of the 20th Century, when the tobacco and agri-food industries began to attack biomedical science by funding their own pseudo-studies to downplay the harmful effects of their products.
- An ultra-conservative movement, driven by pro-family associations with links to conservative evangelical circles, which wield significant influence over the education system in certain states. For example, they acted as conduits for attempts to infiltrate the curriculum with creationist views at the turn of the 2000s. Today, they oppose the teaching of “gender studies”, which they accuse of undermining the traditional family. These associations are also increasingly challenging the authority of academic institutions perceived as ideologically biased and hostile to tradition.
- Finally, there is a whole section of the electorate receptive to populist rhetoric, affected by increasing poverty which fuels resentment against the elites in general, and which sees the sciences as a form of intellectualism that feeds the progressive, “woke” thinking they abhor.
So, it is not just the leaders of this movement who are challenging academic institutions, but the grassroots of the electorate?
Initially, the criticism came mainly from politicians, preachers, business leaders, activists and influencers. But certain media outlets, foremost among them Fox News and many local radio shows, have contributed to its popularisation, portraying universities as sanctuaries ensuring the dominance of progressive elites over American society. Since Donald J. Trump’s return to power, this logic of a ‘culture war’ to be waged has found its expression in the violent attacks launched by the federal administration against universities and centres of scientific research.
In fact, liberals are significantly more numerous than conservatives among the teaching staff at American universities2. Does this over-representation play a role in the anti-elitism of the MAGA camp?
We must draw a clear distinction here. The combative interpretation that has taken hold in the MAGA camp’s narrative must be condemned, as it is mistaken. There has never been an “academic caste” controlling the content of teaching and the direction of research, as J.D. Vance claimed. But on the other hand, there is no denying that we need to reflect on pluralism in universities, and that there are institutional problems which contribute to fuelling or reinforcing anti-elite sentiment amongst a section of the population. That said, it is less the partisan affiliations of professors that seem to me to be at stake than the political polarisation surrounding the results of the research itself – on climate change, public health, and social inequalities, to name just three areas.
In the United States, the social sciences have focused heavily in recent decades on discrimination linked to race, gender or sexual orientation. These issues have been widely covered by activist movements and the media. At the same time, and despite the interest in the work of David Graeber or Thomas Piketty, economic inequalities, structural poverty and deindustrialisation are scarcely discussed in social science departments. Yet there has been a considerable increase in economic inequalities in America since the late 20th century.
In this sense, I believe we must take J.D. Vance’s book (Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis) seriously, in which he describes the profound disconnect he felt, after a childhood marked by economic and social hardship, upon arriving at a university that seemed unconcerned with the problems faced by working-class people living in the heartland. There is a connection to be made between the rise of neoliberalism, the increase in poverty and social insecurity, and popular mistrust of scientific and cultural institutions.
In Europe, an increasing number of voices are also expressing concern about the rapid pace of technological deployment, particularly digital technologies. Does this criticism contribute to anti-science sentiment?
Criticism does exist in the United States, but it is largely confined to intellectual circles and does not reach the grassroots of society. There is certainly an anthropological critique, fuelled by Christian leaders, of digital technologies that are reshaping social norms, sexuality, socialisation and authority. But at the grassroots level of ultra-conservative movements, there is no evidence to suggest that there is any mistrust of destabilising technocracy.
I would even say the opposite: the MAGA camp is in fact characterised by a strong techno-populism: through technology, the people can express themselves freely and in many ways – whereas universities are controlled by the elites – and military and economic power can be guaranteed. There is both a strong expectation of the federal government to support the development of technologies serving the market, and a radical hostility towards the regulatory state. It is a paradox, but it is very real.
Is mistrust of educational and research institutions unique to the United States?
No, it is found in all neo-reactionary and techno-populist movements. In Europe, attacks have already begun: one of Viktor Orbán’s first measures upon coming to power in Hungary, for example, was to dismantle public education, notably by transferring control of a number of public universities to foundations controlled by the ruling party and by pursuing a policy of reprisals against dissident teachers. In France, the RN has launched or supported initiatives to combat “wokeism” in universities, promoting the idea of a cultural war to be waged against centres of knowledge production. Such initiatives are springing up almost everywhere3.
What needs to be done to bridge the divide between the MAGA electorate and the centres of knowledge production?
It is undoubtedly necessary to undertake a fundamental review of the pluralism of research and teaching within universities, and perhaps to broaden the pool of researchers recruited, to avoid the dominance of particular currents and schools of thought. But the divide runs deep, and trust cannot be restored simply by changing university governance. Action is needed across several areas.
Firstly, we must strengthen science education to avoid producing young citizens who are hostile to facts. Unfortunately, much of the content and curriculum is still determined at the level of school boards, where parents sometimes call the shots. Next, citizens should be involved in choosing scientific research programmes. This requires building bridges between civil society organisations and scientific networks – which is difficult when civil society itself is polarised. Finally, we must act swiftly and decisively on social media platforms. Instead of facilitating dialogue between differing viewpoints, they fragment the space for civic deliberation into a multitude of micro-communities that speak only to themselves, under the influence of the cognitive bubbles created by algorithmic regulation. I therefore dream of large-scale algorithms that are open, public and subject to debate, rather than left in the hands of the economic interests of GAFAM. In my view, this is the major battle to be fought in the coming years. There is little chance of it being fought in the United States. But Europe is now leading the way.
