Asymmetric warfare : how to respond to hybrid threats

What is a ‘hybrid’ threat ?

Jérôme Clech. In addi­tion to states that prac­tice hybrid war­fare (such as Rus­sia or Chi­na), com­bi­ning conven­tio­nal modes of action and infor­ma­tion mani­pu­la­tion (fake news, deep fakes, etc.), the hybrids ; cri­mi­nals, traf­fi­ckers, gang­sters and ter­ro­rists, use the same tech­no­lo­gi­cal means that enable glo­ba­li­sa­tion. They make up its dark side, which is why they represent such a chal­lenge for states and even large companies.

IT has not put an end to the asym­me­try of hard power bet­ween deve­lo­ped states and non-state actors, but it does serve an equa­li­ser in all areas of soft power clo­se­ly lin­ked to the infor­ma­tio­nal sphere (culture, influence, media, social net­works, pro­pa­gan­da, etc.). As infor­ma­tion moves at the speed of light for eve­ryone. By inves­ting in the “infos­phere”, non-state actors have res­to­red the sym­me­tri­cal aspect of confron­ta­tion, but in a main­ly non-kine­tic regis­ter : the impact of an attack is much grea­ter than the num­ber of deaths, as Wes­tern socie­ties have a very low accep­tance of risk.

How can we respond to this threat ?

Hybrid threats require a hybrid stra­te­gy. Our natio­nal defence and secu­ri­ty stra­te­gy, consi­de­ring the absence of a “cri­ti­cal mass” in our sys­tem, aims to lower the trig­ger point for large-scale mili­ta­ry inter­ven­tion, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in the event of hybrid attacks. But there is a gap in the conti­nuum of stra­te­gic func­tions that nei­ther nuclear “deter­rence” nor the “pro­tec­tion” of ter­ri­to­ries and popu­la­tions can fill. A form of “aug­men­ted pre­ven­tion” would be requi­red : the cur­rent “pre­ven­tion” would be exten­ded to in-depth action aimed at inti­mi­da­tion and ear­ly dis­rup­tion through a com­bi­na­tion of remote kine­tic strikes and cyber offen­sives, not only in the phy­si­cal layer of cybers­pace, but also in the logi­cal and socio-cog­ni­tive layers of cyberspace.

In concrete terms, aug­men­ted pre­ven­tion would focus on nerve points, such as drone strikes aiming to neu­tra­li­sing ter­ro­rist lea­ders, for example. Both mili­ta­ry and lar­ge­ly dehu­ma­ni­sed and – more or less – steal­thy or sche­du­led, these remote strikes are also the source of ethi­cal concerns. Europe is fol­lo­wing suit, since one of the pro­jects of the Per­ma­nent Struc­tu­red Coope­ra­tion (PESCO, esta­bli­shed in 2017) is none other than the MALE (Medium Alti­tude Long Endu­rance) Euro­drone, which could even­tual­ly be armed and whose deve­lop­ment is part­ly finan­ced by the pre­cur­sor of the Euro­pean Defence Fund (EDF). 

On the cyber side, cyber offen­sives consti­tute a hybrid mode of action at a dis­tance : with a mate­rial aim when it is a ques­tion of hit­ting the phy­si­cal layer of cybers­pace ; imma­te­rial when it is a ques­tion of exploi­ting or rea­ching the infos­phere. A Com­pu­ter Net­work Attack (CNA), which is hybrid in nature in that it involves inter­na­li­sing hacking skills within the defence esta­blish­ment, is a cyber offen­sive mode acting on the logi­cal layer. Hybrid and cyber threats are one of the areas of NATO-EU coope­ra­tion, and PESCO has near­ly ten pro­jects in this area.

Aug­men­ted pre­ven­tion could also have an impact through hybrid bor­der sur­veillance. Drones are a great asset in terms of obser­va­tion and are used in the civi­lian sec­tor for bor­der sur­veillance in the Uni­ted States. The aim is not only to hin­der ille­gal immi­gra­tion, which is known to feed into eve­ry level of the ille­gal eco­no­my, but also traf­fi­cking of all kinds (arms, drugs, coun­ter­feit goods, etc.), which hybri­dises the threats and pro­vides a bree­ding ground for inter­na­tio­nal ter­ro­rism. Since 2020, the use of drones has streng­the­ned the Fron­tex sys­tem at the bor­ders of the Euro­pean Union (EU). Inte­gra­ting the sys­tem into the range of sen­sors ope­ra­ted by the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty (inclu­ding the DGSE and Trac­fin) would undoub­ted­ly increase its effectiveness.

The aim is to cha­rac­te­rise and iden­ti­fy the poten­tial threat posed by an indi­vi­dual accor­ding to their beha­viou­ral profile. 

From bor­der control to bor­der risk mana­ge­ment, the emer­gence of the concept of “smart bor­ders” cor­res­ponds to the imple­men­ta­tion of “intel­li­gent” sys­tems at air­ports, ini­tial­ly based on bio­me­trics. The aim is to cha­rac­te­rise and iden­ti­fy the poten­tial threat posed by an indi­vi­dual accor­ding to their beha­viou­ral pro­file. For example, the PNR (Per­so­nal Name Record) is a device for asses­sing the risk of a tra­vel­ler being lin­ked to a ter­ro­rist orga­ni­sa­tion ; it is desi­gned to know “what the indi­vi­dual has done” before boo­king a flight and to pre­dict “what he or she is like­ly to do” at destination.

In order to see more clear­ly into the digi­tal maze gene­ra­ted by the “com­pu­te­ri­sa­tion of the body” (the sha­dow body, a cloud of data and infor­ma­tion that goes beyond one par­ti­cu­lar indi­vi­dual since some of this data only makes sense as part of a series), it could then be use­ful for the data­mi­ning enabled by AI to cross-refe­rence the PNR with the files held by natio­nal defence and secu­ri­ty forces, and more par­ti­cu­lar­ly those held by agen­cies in the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty. Sub­ject to net­work sove­rei­gn­ty in place at a Euro­pean level (as this is the rele­vant scale), it is concei­vable that all this data could even­tual­ly be hos­ted on a dedi­ca­ted cloud.

But what would be the value of a secret cloud if only France was to input in cer­tain ele­ments of the intel­li­gence infor­ma­tion col­lec­ted by its sen­sors (rela­ting to coun­ter­ter­ro­rism or illi­cit flows, for example)? For the time being, we only have an Intel­li­gence Col­lege in Europe – not a Euro­pean Col­lege of Intel­li­gence ! Naming it such might bring it to life, or per­haps not : nothing ope­ra­tio­nal, but the ambi­tion to build a “com­mon stra­te­gic culture” … This, as Jean Mon­net belie­ved, is cer­tain­ly where any Euro­pean pro­ject should start, but consi­de­rable efforts need to be made, as Pre­sident Macron ack­now­led­ged in his 2017 Sor­bonne speech with the Euro­pean Inter­ven­tion Ini­tia­tive (EII).

Natu­ral­ly, the use of data and the search for such syner­gies raise ethi­cal and legal ques­tions that bring us back to the secu­ri­ty-free­dom dilemma.

Are we hea­ding for wides­pread hybridisation ?

The res­ponse to hybrids would in fact bene­fit from more hybri­di­sa­tion. For while tech­no­lo­gies have a major and gro­wing role to play, the rela­ted capa­ci­ties (equip­ment and know-how) must not be redu­ced to tech­ni­cal feti­shism. We must be able to arti­cu­late the explo­ra­to­ry force of the machine with human intui­tion in order to, at least, streng­then their co-pro­duc­tion if not hybri­dise them. Aug­men­ted pre­ven­tion would only be a stra­te­gic shift. We need to do even more : a quan­tum leap in terms of the anti­ci­pa­tion of threats. Anti­ci­pa­ting hybrids so as not to have to respond to them is, in my opi­nion, the way to unders­tand the logic of “win­ning the war before the war”, to quote the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. This would imply rethin­king the methods and tools of stra­te­gic fore­sight, paying rene­wed atten­tion to the ear­ly detec­tion of “weak signals”, in order to nip future threats in the bud before they emerge. Per­cei­ving and cha­rac­te­ri­sing the under­lying struc­ture of emer­ging hybrid phe­no­me­na undoub­ted­ly requires defi­ning and buil­ding the ‘honest cyborg’ of the 21st cen­tu­ry. But that’s ano­ther story !