sienceEtDefiance_TriBonMuavais doute
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What does it mean to “trust science”?

How to filter good doubt from bad

with Agnès Vernet, Science journalist
On June 23rd, 2021 |
4min reading time
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
Professor of computer science at Sorbonne University and Philosopher
Key takeaways
  • Doubt is an essential element of science, and in the scientific community, the absence of consensus is the norm.
  • But in the face of this inherent mistrust in scientists, society is currently crossed by another form of doubt: a general skepticism questioning the results of science.
  • Nevertheless, doubt must be part of the scientific process. For Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, it is therefore essential to give science, and particularly the scientific method, a central place in education.

Science without suspicion

Sci­ence without con­science is but the ruin of the soul”, Rabelais once said. We could also mis­quote by say­ing “Sci­ence without sus­pi­cion is but the ruin of the soul”, giv­en that scep­ti­cism is an essen­tial driv­ing force of sci­ence. Without it, know­ledge would remain abso­lute. Sci­ence involves ques­tion­ing the most obvi­ous truths. A sci­ent­ist is nat­ur­ally troubled. He is will­ing to ques­tion everything, and to that end, he nur­tures a “good” form of doubt, one that is con­struct­ive and methodical.

Because of the sci­ent­ists’ nat­ur­al scep­ti­cism, soci­ety is riddled with anoth­er form of doubt: wide­spread scep­ti­cism, chal­len­ging the res­ults of sci­ence. When both phe­nom­ena meet, sci­ent­ists become host­ages of their own doubt. 

In the sci­entif­ic com­munity, lack of con­sensus is a nor­mal situ­ation. Sci­ence advances by con­tro­versy, which is even­tu­ally resolved.

In the sci­entif­ic com­munity, absence of con­sensus is nat­ur­al. Sci­ence moves for­ward through con­tro­ver­sial debates which end up being resolved. A res­ult or an exper­i­ment takes into con­sid­er­a­tion two or three dif­fer­ent views, new ques­tions emerge, and nov­el con­tro­ver­sies are formed. How­ever, in the pub­lic sphere sci­ent­ists only cri­ti­cise to offer counter-argu­ments, not to advance the under­stand­ing of a phe­nomen­on. This stance has noth­ing to do with sci­entif­ic doubt.

As long as sci­ent­ists worked on the fringes of the pub­lic sphere, con­tro­ver­sies were con­fined to the sci­entif­ic com­munity. Nowadays, thanks to open access pub­lic­a­tions and oth­er forms of know­ledge dis­sem­in­a­tion, the cir­cu­la­tion of sci­ence has opened up. On one hand, this shar­ing of know­ledge is an oppor­tun­ity, but on the oth­er, it is met by a col­lect­ive form of mis­trust. The first months of the Cov­id-19 out­break in 2020 are a strik­ing example of this phe­nomen­on. Research­ers and doc­tors in France who nat­ur­ally con­fron­ted their hypo­theses faced “60 mil­lion vir­o­lo­gists”. A clash between scep­ti­cism and mistrust.

The methodology of defiance

When a sci­ent­ist doubts, he does not do so without meth­od. If he ques­tions a fact, some­times just to explore in great­er depth an ele­ment in a giv­en issue, in return, he accepts that his ques­tion can be rebut­ted. Where­as in pub­lic opin­ion, objec­tion is com­plete. Cri­ti­cism is not inten­ded to solve prob­lems, it is an assert­ive stance, a com­mit­ment. In some debates, par­tic­u­larly in the media, we thus wit­ness the con­front­a­tion between con­vic­tions and hypo­theses. A mix of genres that sows con­fu­sion and rattles more than one scientist.

As early as 2018, the prob­lem of sci­entif­ic pos­ture at the time of post-truth polit­ics was the sub­ject of a report dir­ec­ted by the Eth­ic­al Comity of the Centre Nation­al de Recher­che Sci­en­ti­fique (CNRS)1, to which I belong. This exer­cise reminds us that organ­ised scep­ti­cism, as advoc­ated by the Amer­ic­an epi­stem­o­lo­gist Robert King Mer­ton in its defin­i­tion of an ideal of pure sci­ence, does not chal­lenge know­ledge. It is rather a rig­or­ous col­lect­ive pro­cess, a meth­od­o­logy to express doubt. Each step which brings a sci­ent­ist closer to a fact gen­er­ates new hypo­theses. The sci­entif­ic com­munity then meas­ures the gap between the under­stand­ing of this phe­nomen­on in this new the­or­et­ic­al space and its rel­ev­ance to the world. Doubt is organ­ised to bring new know­ledge and insight.

Defi­ance in the pub­lic sphere is alto­geth­er a dif­fer­ent mat­ter. Mis­trust is built on the sus­pi­cion that per­son­al interests might cor­rupt research integ­rity. Yet, if out­side his labor­at­ory a sci­ent­ist may have social ambi­tions and be influ­enced by com­plex motives, sci­ent­ists as a com­munity are only driv­en by the search for truth.

Para­dox­ic­ally, this col­lect­ive dimen­sion might have been over­shad­owed by “sci­ence stud­ies”, a social sci­ences field which stud­ies how sci­entif­ic expert­ise works. By sug­gest­ing that power issues in the sci­entif­ic com­munity are identic­al to those in oth­er areas of soci­ety, they have over­looked the acid test that is sci­entif­ic exper­i­ence. In sci­ence, truth always comes out as new facts are dis­covered. We bow down before evidence.

Pub­lic mis­trust in the face of sci­ence also thrives on post-truth speech, mean­ing argu­ments imposed by force, without any form of evid­ence. This post-truth regime is some­times delib­er­ate, when it serves eco­nom­ic, polit­ic­al, ideo­lo­gic­al or reli­gious interests. It often arises from a simple assumed indif­fer­ence in rela­tion to the facts.

Restore science education to its rightful place 

To fight mis­trust and help the pub­lic to dis­tin­guish good doubt from wide­spread sus­pi­cion, sci­ent­ists only have few tools at their dis­pos­al. It is very dif­fi­cult to con­vince the gen­er­al pub­lic that all the mat­ters called into ques­tion are not legitimate.

We must firstly remind the facts, provide evid­ence. This is what dif­fer­ent media ensure with “fact check­ing”. This exer­cise has now become essen­tial. Non­ethe­less, it is not enough, the amount of false inform­a­tion cir­cu­lat­ing is still too great. Fur­ther­more, the per­ni­cious impact per­sists even though fal­lacy has been demon­strated. The pub­lic is not made of sci­entif­ic minds.

The pub­lic is not made up of sci­entif­ic minds. It is there­fore cru­cial to bet­ter explain the sci­entif­ic pro­cess in primary school.

It is there­fore cru­cial to start explain­ing the sci­entif­ic approach in primary school. This wish­ful think­ing is how­ever hampered by the ini­tial train­ing of school teach­ers, who mostly have a lit­er­at­ure back­ground. This ques­tion of sci­ence train­ing from a very early age remains a major lever.

In my view, it would also be use­ful to teach the his­tory of sci­ence. This dis­cip­line has the mer­it of show­ing that sci­ence makes pro­gress through tri­al and error. It shows the nature of sci­entif­ic con­tro­versy and, com­bined with epi­stem­o­logy, it helps explain the way ideas are built. These approaches are still poorly rep­res­en­ted, includ­ing in aca­dem­ic courses. They could nev­er­the­less be meth­od­o­lo­gic­al allies for research­ers, or even, if taught in high school, restore sci­entif­ic under­stand­ing in gen­er­al knowledge.

1https://​comite​-ethique​.cnrs​.fr/​a​v​i​s​-​d​u​-​c​o​m​e​t​s​-​q​u​e​l​l​e​s​-​n​o​u​v​e​l​l​e​s​-​r​e​s​p​o​n​s​a​b​i​l​i​t​e​s​-​p​o​u​r​-​l​e​s​-​c​h​e​r​c​h​e​u​r​s​-​a​-​l​h​e​u​r​e​-​d​e​s​-​d​e​b​a​t​s​-​s​u​r​-​l​a​-​p​o​s​t​-​v​e​rite/

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