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Oil to lithium, the energy transition is shuffling the cards for global politics

China has a monopoly on rare earth metals

with Mathieu Xémard, project leader at Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Études pour la Défense et la Sécurité (IP Paris)
On January 29th, 2025 |
4 min reading time
Mathieu Xemard
Mathieu Xémard
project leader at Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Études pour la Défense et la Sécurité (IP Paris)
Key takeaways
  • Rare earths are metallic elements used in the manufacture of catalysts for catalytic converters, magnets and robotic devices.
  • Today, their role in weapons production raises questions of sovereignty, due to China’s monopoly in this area.
  • China accounted for 69% of the world's production of rare earth elements in 2023, far ahead of the United States (12%), Burma (11%) and Australia (5%).
  • While some companies are announcing that they want to regain control of this market, China's monopoly allows it to stand in the way by artificially increasing price volatility.
  • To counter the Chinese monopoly, organisations such as Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris) are working on recycling as an alternative supply method for rare earths.

Why are rare-earths metals not like other metals ?

Mathieu Xemard. Rare-earth metals are a fami­ly of 17 metal­lic ele­ments with simi­lar phy­si­co­che­mi­cal pro­per­ties. They are rare only in name since they are rela­ti­ve­ly wides­pread on the pla­net. For example, the most abun­dant (cerium) is more com­mon in the Ear­th’s crust than cop­per. On the other hand, they are high­ly dilu­ted in depo­sits where they are not the main metal, and large quan­ti­ties of ore must be mined to meet demand.

One of the cha­rac­te­ris­tics of these metals is their high­ly spe­ci­fic trade balance. Sepa­ra­tion pro­cesses require the iso­la­tion of each rare earth from ores where they are all sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly mixed toge­ther. The pro­duc­tion of each rare earth is the­re­fore not dic­ta­ted by its own mar­ket, but by demand for the most sought-after ones. This is why the more abun­dant rare earths are strug­gling to find a mar­ket, while others are in high demand. Added to this is Chi­na’s near-exclu­sive mono­po­ly, des­pite the fact that the world needs more and more of cer­tain rare earths.

What are rare earths used for ?

The most abun­dant (cerium and lan­tha­num) are main­ly used in cata­lysts for cata­ly­tic conver­ters or for the cata­ly­tic cra­cking of oil into petrol1. The gra­dual disap­pea­rance of inter­nal com­bus­tion vehicles in favour of elec­tric vehicles can explain why the mar­ket is decrea­sing. Vol­tage rare earths are those used to manu­fac­ture magnets : neo­dy­mium, dys­pro­sium, ter­bium and pra­seo­dy­mium. Their mar­ket is boo­ming. Neo­dy­mium-iron-boron magnets are the most power­ful magnets manu­fac­tu­red today and are wide­ly used to manu­fac­ture power­ful minia­tu­ri­sed motors, in elec­tric cars in par­ti­cu­lar. Because of their remar­kable magne­tic pro­per­ties, these magnets are also used in off­shore wind tur­bines – from 80 kg/MW to 200 kg/MW of rare earths in 2015, depen­ding on the tech­no­lo­gy used2 – and in robotics.

You work at the Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Études pour la Défense et la Sécurité. What are the military uses of rare-earth metals ?

Once again, they are used in the form of magne­tic alloys in motors of all sizes or in hard disks. Because of their opti­cal and elec­tro­nic pro­per­ties, they are also used in many optro­nic appli­ca­tions (obser­va­tion, gui­dance, com­mu­ni­ca­tion, etc.). They are present almost eve­ryw­here in wea­pons sys­tems : for example, an Ame­ri­can F35 figh­ter plane contains more than 400 kg of various mate­rials contai­ning at least one rare earth3. Even if the quan­ti­ties invol­ved in arma­ments remain small com­pa­red with civi­lian mar­kets, this raises real ques­tions of sove­rei­gn­ty because of Chi­na’s monopoly.

To what extent does China have a monopoly on rare earths ?

Chi­na accoun­ted for around 69% of the world’s pro­duc­tion of rare earth ores in 20234. Far behind are the Uni­ted States (12%), Bur­ma (11%) and Aus­tra­lia (5%). Once these ores have been extrac­ted, they need to be pro­ces­sed to sepa­rate, puri­fy and refine each of the rare earths. Howe­ver, Chi­na is the only coun­try that car­ries out all these stages, with Aus­tra­lia and the Uni­ted States sel­ling some of their semi-pro­ces­sed ores back to Chi­na to com­plete the refi­ning ! Chi­na thus pro­duces 85% of the puri­fied light rare earths used world­wide, and 100% of the hea­vy rare earths.

Does China have a monopoly on the entire rare earths value chain ?

Yes, today Chi­na domi­nates the entire value chain. The coun­try has pro­gres­si­ve­ly moved from extrac­tion to sepa­ra­tion, via refi­ning and metal­lur­gy, to the manu­fac­ture of magnets. In the 1990s, Japan and the Uni­ted States were the main magnet manu­fac­tu­rers. Their know-how was based on strong exper­tise in metal­lur­gy and pre­cise control of the com­po­si­tion of the magne­tic alloys they pro­du­ced. But in the Uni­ted States, Magne­quench – the Gene­ral Motors sub­si­dia­ry res­pon­sible for magnet pro­duc­tion – was bought out by two Chi­nese groups in 1997. In Japan, Chi­na first esta­bli­shed itself as a sup­plier of puri­fied rare earths, then pushed Japa­nese com­pa­nies to relo­cate part of their magnet pro­duc­tion to gain access to Chi­nese mar­kets, the­re­by gai­ning access to the last mis­sing tech­no­lo­gies in the ear­ly 2010s5.

Chi­na now hard­ly ever sells raw mate­rials : it uses them to manu­fac­ture pro­ducts with higher added value, such as magnets and elec­tric motors. In 2019, Chi­na accoun­ted for 92% of the world’s pro­duc­tion of rare earth per­ma­nent magnets6. And the coun­try is now esta­bli­shing itself as a manu­fac­tu­rer of elec­tric cars – the final stage in this value chain – by pene­tra­ting the Euro­pean market.

Aren’t other countries trying to regain a foothold in this market ?

A few decades ago, France was a major player in sepa­ra­tion, thanks to Rhône-Pou­lenc (now Sol­vay). In 1992, for eco­no­mic and regu­la­to­ry rea­sons, its plant at La Rochelle had to res­trict itself to cer­tain very spe­ci­fic uses for rare earths. Howe­ver, at the end of 2022, Sol­vay announ­ced its inten­tion to relaunch its acti­vi­ties in the sepa­ra­tion and puri­fi­ca­tion of rare earth oxides for magnets7.

The main dif­fi­cul­ty remains Chi­na’s posi­tion : if neces­sa­ry, it can arti­fi­cial­ly increase price vola­ti­li­ty. The eco­no­mic via­bi­li­ty of this type of indus­trial pro­ject is dif­fi­cult to ensure, and it is now vir­tual­ly impos­sible to find pri­vate players pre­pa­red to make the hea­vy invest­ments requi­red to open new plants. The Uni­ted States has deci­ded to get round this pro­blem by pla­cing large orders through the Depart­ment of Ener­gy and the Depart­ment of Defense to build up stra­te­gic stocks. This has alrea­dy made it pos­sible to relaunch the his­to­ric Moun­tain Pass mine in Cali­for­nia and to finance the future ope­ning of a sepa­ra­tion plant8.

Are there other ways of curbing the Chinese monopoly ?

The first thing to do – and the most effec­tive and qui­ckest – is to reduce consump­tion. The less we consume, the more we reduce our depen­dence. One pos­sible approach is eco-desi­gn : it is pos­sible to dis­pense with magnets and rare earths for cer­tain appli­ca­tions, while accep­ting the asso­cia­ted loss of per­for­mance. Second­ly, we need to deve­lop com­pa­nies at eve­ry stage of the value chain. This creates com­pe­ti­tion and helps to break a mono­po­ly situa­tion. If Chi­na moves far enough down the value chain, the mar­kets will be less control­led by that state, which is the pur­pose of the Euro­pean Union’s Cri­ti­cal Raw Mate­rial Act, adop­ted in 2024.

Doesn’t recycling offer an alternative means of supply ?

Yes, of course, as Japan chose to do, for example, fol­lo­wing the export quo­tas impo­sed by Chi­na in 2010. Howe­ver, recy­cling remains a cost­ly acti­vi­ty both in terms of ener­gy and eco­no­mics if we are aiming for rare earth puri­ty levels simi­lar to those obtai­ned from mines.

At Ecole Poly­tech­nique (IP Paris), we are wor­king on the deve­lop­ment of pro­ducts that use recy­cled mate­rials without neces­sa­ri­ly invol­ving the high levels of puri­ty nee­ded to manu­fac­ture magnets. For example, we are stu­dying the influence of sub­sti­tu­tions or impu­ri­ties on the magne­tic pro­per­ties of rare earth alloys9. It is also pos­sible to find higher value-added out­lets for rare earths whose mar­kets are shrin­king (cerium and lan­tha­num in par­ti­cu­lar), which would make it pos­sible to increase the added value of rare earth sepa­ra­tion acti­vi­ties. The use of arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence is also envi­sa­ged as an acce­le­ra­tor for this type of appli­ca­tion. Howe­ver, this work is not yet at the indus­trial stage.

Interview by Anaïs Marechal
1https://​scr​reen​.eu/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​2​0​2​3​/​0​8​/​S​C​R​R​E​E​N​2​_​f​a​c​t​s​h​e​e​t​s​_​R​E​E​-​E​U​R​O​S​T​A​T.pdf
2R. Lacal-Arán­te­gui. Mate­rials use in elec­tri­ci­ty gene­ra­tors in wind tur­bines – state-of-the-art and future spe­ci­fi­ca­tion. J. Clean. Prod., 87 (2015), pp. 275–283
3https://​sgp​.fas​.org/​c​r​s​/​n​a​t​s​e​c​/​R​4​1​7​4​4.pdf
4Cor­dier D. J. (2024) Mine­ral Com­mo­di­ty Sum­ma­ries – Rare earths (pp. 144–145). U.S. Geo­lo­gi­cal Sur­vey. DOI : 10.3133/mcs2024
5Pois­son R. La Guerre des terres rares. L’Actualité chi­mique. 2012 ; 369 : 47–54
6Smith, B. J. et al. (2022) Rare Earth Per­ma­nent Magnets – Sup­ply Chain Deep Dive Assess­ment. US Depart­ment of Ener­gy Office of Poli­cy DOI : 10.2172/1871577
7https://​www​.sol​vay​.com/​e​n​/​p​r​e​s​s​-​r​e​l​e​a​s​e​/​s​o​l​v​a​y​-​d​e​v​e​l​o​p​-​m​a​j​o​r​-​h​u​b​-​r​a​r​e​-​e​a​r​t​h​-​m​a​g​n​e​t​s​-​e​urope
8https://​www​.defense​.gov/​N​e​w​s​/​N​e​w​s​-​S​t​o​r​i​e​s​/​A​r​t​i​c​l​e​/​A​r​t​i​c​l​e​/​3​7​0​0​0​5​9​/​d​o​d​-​l​o​o​k​s​-​t​o​-​e​s​t​a​b​l​i​s​h​-​m​i​n​e​-​t​o​-​m​a​g​n​e​t​-​s​u​p​p​l​y​-​c​h​a​i​n​-​f​o​r​-​r​a​r​e​-​e​a​r​t​h​-​m​a​t​e​r​ials/
9J. Boust, et al., Ce and Dy sub­sti­tu­tions in Nd2Fe14B : Site-spe­ci­fic magne­tic ani­so­tro­py from first prin­ciples, Phys. Rev. Mate­rials. 6 (2022), 084410 DOI : 10.1103/PhysRevMaterials.6.084410

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