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What can the international market do to address Chinese technological innovation ?

Maximilian von Zedtwitz_VF
Maximilian von Zedtwitz
Professor of Strategy at the University of St. Gallen and Visiting Professor at Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris)
Key takeaways
  • There are three strategies for countering China's technological rise: techno-nationalism, techno-localism, and protectionism.
  • Techno-nationalism causes immediate disruption through bans and export controls.
  • Techno-localism requires a local presence to access the market, which creates opportunities but also competitive risks.
  • Protectionism aims to protect domestic industries through tariffs, subsidies, and supply preferences.
  • Market-driven globalisation is coming to an end, replaced by trade influenced by geopolitics and competition rules.

Two decades ago, Chi­na was the world’s fac­to­ry floor—a place where Wes­tern-desi­gned pro­ducts were assem­bled by low-cost labour and ship­ped back to affluent mar­kets. Today, Chi­nese com­pa­nies are set­ting the pace in arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, domi­na­ting elec­tric vehicle sales, and chal­len­ging Sili­con Valley’s tech­no­lo­gi­cal supre­ma­cy. This trans­for­ma­tion has sent sho­ck­waves through Washing­ton, Brus­sels, and other Wes­tern capi­tals, for­cing poli­cy­ma­kers to craft increa­sin­gly sophis­ti­ca­ted res­ponses to what they see as an exis­ten­tial threat to their eco­no­mic leadership.

The result is a com­plex web of poli­cies that many exe­cu­tives mis­ta­ken­ly view as simple “decou­pling” from Chi­na. But the rea­li­ty is far more nuan­ced. Wes­tern govern­ments are deploying three dis­tinct yet over­lap­ping strategies—each with dif­ferent impli­ca­tions for busi­nesses trying to navi­gate this new land­scape. Unders­tan­ding these approaches is cru­cial for com­pa­nies see­king to iden­ti­fy both risks and oppor­tu­ni­ties in an increa­sin­gly frag­men­ted glo­bal economy.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. China’s rapid tech­no­lo­gi­cal ascent has crea­ted depen­den­cies that are dif­fi­cult and expen­sive to unwind, while its 1.4 bil­lion consu­mers represent a mar­ket too large for most com­pa­nies to aban­don. Yet natio­nal secu­ri­ty concerns are dri­ving poli­cies that could fun­da­men­tal­ly reshape how glo­bal busi­ness ope­rates, from sup­ply chains to research part­ner­ships to mar­ket access strategies.

Techno-nationalism : drawing hard lines in critical sectors

The most aggres­sive Wes­tern res­ponse has been techno-nationalism—the deli­be­rate exclu­sion of Chi­nese com­pa­nies from cri­ti­cal tech­no­lo­gy eco­sys­tems based on natio­nal secu­ri­ty grounds. This approach repre­sents a fun­da­men­tal shift from the eco­no­mic logic that has dri­ven glo­ba­li­sa­tion for decades, prio­ri­ti­sing secu­ri­ty concerns over com­mer­cial inter­ests. The clea­rest example remains the com­pre­hen­sive cam­pai­gn against Hua­wei, once the world’s lar­gest smart­phone manu­fac­tu­rer and a lea­der in 5G tele­com­mu­ni­ca­tions equip­ment. The Trump administration’s res­tric­tions, which have been main­tai­ned and expan­ded under Pre­sident Biden, effec­ti­ve­ly cut Hua­wei off from Google ser­vices, advan­ced semi­con­duc­tors, and cri­ti­cal soft­ware updates. The impact was devas­ta­ting : Huawei’s glo­bal smart­phone mar­ket share col­lap­sed from 20% to bare­ly 2% within two years.

The US Bureau of Indus­try and Secu­ri­ty now main­tains enti­ty lists with over 600 Chi­nese com­pa­nies ban­ned from recei­ving Ame­ri­can technology.

But Hua­wei was just the begin­ning. The U.S. Bureau of Indus­try and Secu­ri­ty now main­tains enti­ty lists with over 600 Chi­nese com­pa­nies ban­ned from recei­ving Ame­ri­can tech­no­lo­gy. These res­tric­tions span from obvious tar­gets like tele­com­mu­ni­ca­tions giant ZTE to les­ser-known firms in arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, bio­tech­no­lo­gy, and advan­ced manu­fac­tu­ring. The Chi­nese AI com­pa­ny Deep­Seek, des­pite its open-source approach, has seen its gene­ra­tive AI tools ban­ned from U.S. govern­ment sys­tems, with law­ma­kers pro­po­sing even broa­der res­tric­tions. Europe has fol­lo­wed suit, though often with less swee­ping mea­sures. The UK ban­ned Hua­wei from its 5G net­works by 2027, while the Euro­pean Union has given mem­ber states tools to exclude “high-risk ven­dors” from cri­ti­cal infra­struc­ture pro­jects. The Nether­lands, home to cri­ti­cal semi­con­duc­tor equip­ment manu­fac­tu­rer ASML, has res­tric­ted exports of advan­ced litho­gra­phy machines that are essen­tial for pro­du­cing cut­ting-edge com­pu­ter chips.

The semi­con­duc­tor sec­tor has become a par­ti­cu­lar fla­sh­point. Export controls now prevent Chi­nese com­pa­nies from acces­sing not just advan­ced chips, but also the equip­ment nee­ded to manu­fac­ture them. These res­tric­tions have for­ced Chi­na to invest bil­lions in domes­tic semi­con­duc­tor capa­bi­li­ties, though experts debate whe­ther these efforts can over­come the tech­no­lo­gi­cal gaps any­time soon. For Wes­tern busi­nesses, tech­no-natio­na­list poli­cies create imme­diate and often pain­ful dis­rup­tions. Com­pa­nies with Chi­nese part­ners, sup­pliers, or cus­to­mers in res­tric­ted sec­tors face for­ced sepa­ra­tions with lit­tle time to adjust. The les­son for exe­cu­tives is clear : wai­ting for res­tric­tions to be announ­ced is often too late. Smart com­pa­nies are conduc­ting regu­lar risk assess­ments, deve­lo­ping contin­gen­cy sup­ply chains, and lob­bying for rea­so­nable imple­men­ta­tion time­lines through indus­try associations.

Techno-localism : keeping the door open with conditions

Where tech­no-natio­na­lism shuts the door enti­re­ly, tech­no-loca­lism keeps it open but demands a price : Chi­nese com­pa­nies can par­ti­ci­pate in Wes­tern mar­kets, but they must esta­blish sub­stan­tial local pre­sence and often trans­fer tech­no­lo­gy as the cost of admis­sion. This approach reco­gnises that com­plete exclu­sion of Chi­nese tech­no­lo­gy may be eco­no­mi­cal­ly dama­ging or even coun­ter­pro­duc­tive. Ins­tead, it seeks to cap­ture the bene­fits of Chi­nese inno­va­tion while main­tai­ning domes­tic control over cri­ti­cal tech­no­lo­gies and pro­duc­tion capa­bi­li­ties. Iro­ni­cal­ly, this mir­rors China’s own play­book from the past two decades, when forei­gn com­pa­nies faced simi­lar requi­re­ments to access the Chi­nese mar­ket. The most pro­minent example has been the ongoing bat­tle over Tik­Tok. Rather than ban­ning the app outright, U.S. law­ma­kers have deman­ded that Byte­Dance sell its Ame­ri­can ope­ra­tions to domes­tic owners. The under­lying logic is that Tik­Tok’s algo­rithm and user data represent valuable assets that should bene­fit Ame­ri­can rather than Chi­nese inter­ests. Simi­lar pres­sures have been applied to other Chi­nese apps and ser­vices that handle sen­si­tive user information.

In the elec­tric vehicle sec­tor, the Euro­pean Union has embra­ced tech­no-loca­lism as a way to bene­fit from Chi­nese bat­te­ry tech­no­lo­gy while buil­ding domes­tic indus­trial capa­ci­ty. Chi­nese bat­te­ry giants like CATL and BYD have esta­bli­shed Euro­pean manu­fac­tu­ring faci­li­ties to access sub­stan­tial deve­lop­ment grants and sub­si­dies. These arran­ge­ments give Euro­pean govern­ments some control over cri­ti­cal sup­ply chains while allo­wing Chi­nese com­pa­nies to par­ti­ci­pate in the lucra­tive tran­si­tion to elec­tric mobi­li­ty. The approach extends to data loca­li­sa­tion requi­re­ments, where Chi­nese tech com­pa­nies must store Euro­pean user data within EU bor­ders, and joint ven­ture man­dates that effec­ti­ve­ly force tech­no­lo­gy sha­ring as a condi­tion of mar­ket entry. Some arran­ge­ments go fur­ther, requi­ring licen­sing deals that ensure Wes­tern com­pa­nies gain access to Chi­nese innovations.

For busi­nesses, tech­no-loca­list poli­cies present both oppor­tu­ni­ties and risks. In the short term, Wes­tern com­pa­nies can gain access to cut­ting-edge Chi­nese tech­no­lo­gy, expan­ded mar­ket share, and cost advan­tages through these arran­ge­ments. Howe­ver, for­ced tech­no­lo­gy trans­fer can reduce Chi­nese com­pa­nies’ incen­tives to inno­vate in open part­ner­ships, poten­tial­ly lea­ving Wes­tern part­ners with access to out­da­ted tech­no­lo­gy as Chi­nese com­pa­nies focus their latest deve­lop­ments on unres­tric­ted mar­kets. The key for exe­cu­tives is to care­ful­ly balance imme­diate gains against long-term com­pe­ti­tive risks. Com­pa­nies that become too dependent on for­ced tech­no­lo­gy trans­fers may find them­selves at a disad­van­tage as Chi­nese part­ners deve­lop alter­na­tive stra­te­gies or focus inno­va­tion elsewhere.

Protectionism : geographic preference over ownership

The third stra­te­gy, pro­tec­tio­nism, takes a dif­ferent approach enti­re­ly. Rather than focu­sing on com­pa­ny owner­ship or secu­ri­ty concerns, it seeks to pro­tect domes­tic indus­tries through tariffs, sub­si­dies, and pro­cu­re­ment preferences—regardless of where a com­pa­ny’s head­quar­ters hap­pens to be loca­ted. The Biden administration’s 100% tariff on Chi­nese-built elec­tric vehicles repre­sents per­haps the star­kest example of this approach. The tariff effec­ti­ve­ly doubles the price of Chi­nese EVs, making them uncom­pe­ti­tive with domes­tic alter­na­tives regard­less of their tech­no­lo­gi­cal merits. Simi­lar duties have been impo­sed on Chi­nese solar panels, semi­con­duc­tors, steel, and alu­mi­nium, crea­ting sub­stan­tial cost disad­van­tages for Chi­nese exporters.

But modern pro­tec­tio­nism goes beyond tariffs. The Infla­tion Reduc­tion Act pro­vides up to $369bn in clean ener­gy incen­tives, with domes­tic content requi­re­ments that favour Ame­ri­can manu­fac­tu­rers. The CHIPS Act allo­cates $52bn for semi­con­duc­tor manu­fac­tu­ring, with res­tric­tions pre­ven­ting reci­pients from expan­ding advan­ced chip pro­duc­tion in Chi­na. Europe has respon­ded with its own Green Deal Indus­trial Plan, inclu­ding sub­stan­tial sub­si­dies for clean tech­no­lo­gy manu­fac­tu­ring within the EU.

Pro­tec­tio­nist poli­cies often prove less effec­tive than inten­ded because they address geo­gra­phy rather than owner­ship or control.

These poli­cies aim to rebuild domes­tic indus­trial capa­ci­ty that has been hol­lo­wed out by decades of glo­ba­li­za­tion. “Buy Ame­ri­can” pro­vi­sions in fede­ral pro­cu­re­ment give domes­tic com­pa­nies signi­fi­cant bid­ding advan­tages, while state-level pre­fe­rences extend pro­tec­tio­nist poli­cies to regio­nal govern­ment pur­cha­sing. Howe­ver, pro­tec­tio­nist poli­cies often prove less effec­tive than inten­ded because they address geo­gra­phy rather than owner­ship or control. Chi­nese com­pa­nies have demons­tra­ted remar­kable adap­ta­bi­li­ty in cir­cum­ven­ting trade bar­riers through direct invest­ment, third-coun­try stra­te­gies, and com­plex part­ner­ship arrangements.

BYD, des­pite facing high tariffs on Chi­nese-built vehicles, has main­tai­ned lucra­tive contracts with Ame­ri­can tran­sit autho­ri­ties through its Cali­for­nia manu­fac­tu­ring faci­li­ty. The com­pa­ny tech­ni­cal­ly pro­duces « Ame­ri­can-made » vehicles while retai­ning Chi­nese owner­ship and control. Simi­lar­ly, Chi­nese solar manu­fac­tu­rers have esta­bli­shed signi­fi­cant U.S. pro­duc­tion capa­ci­ty, enabling them to qua­li­fy for the very sub­si­dies desi­gned to sup­port Ame­ri­can indus­try. Chi­nese manu­fac­tu­rers are also increa­sin­gly rou­ting pro­ducts through Mexi­co, Viet­nam, and other coun­tries to avoid tariffs, while main­tai­ning control over key tech­no­lo­gies and pro­cesses. These stra­te­gies high­light a fun­da­men­tal chal­lenge with pro­tec­tio­nist approaches : in a glo­bal­ly inte­gra­ted eco­no­my, natio­na­li­ty of pro­duc­tion and owner­ship can be decou­pled in ways that under­mine poli­cy effectiveness.

Navigating the new landscape

The three-stra­te­gy fra­me­work reveals why simple “decou­pling” nar­ra­tives miss the mark. Wes­tern govern­ments are not uni­form­ly shut­ting out Chi­nese tech­no­lo­gy but are ins­tead deploying sophis­ti­ca­ted tools to reshape com­pe­ti­tive dyna­mics in their favour. The chal­lenge for busi­ness lea­ders is unders­tan­ding which approach applies to their spe­ci­fic indus­try and adjus­ting stra­te­gies accor­din­gly. Com­pa­nies ope­ra­ting in sec­tors dee­med cri­ti­cal to natio­nal security—telecommunications, semi­con­duc­tors, arti­fi­cial intelligence—should expect tech­no-natio­na­list res­tric­tions and plan accor­din­gly. Those in indus­tries where tech­no­lo­gy trans­fer is valuable may find oppor­tu­ni­ties in tech­no-loca­list arran­ge­ments, though they must care­ful­ly manage long-term com­pe­ti­tive risks. In sec­tors facing pro­tec­tio­nist mea­sures, the key is reco­gni­zing that these poli­cies often create win­dows rather than walls—opportunities for stra­te­gic repo­si­tio­ning rather than per­ma­nent exclusion.

The broa­der trend is clear : the era of pure­ly mar­ket-dri­ven glo­ba­li­za­tion is ending, repla­ced by a more com­plex sys­tem where geo­po­li­ti­cal consi­de­ra­tions increa­sin­gly shape com­mer­cial rela­tion­ships. Com­pa­nies that adapt qui­ck­ly to these new rules of enga­ge­ment will find oppor­tu­ni­ties even in a more frag­men­ted world. Those that cling to old assump­tions about fric­tion­less glo­bal mar­kets may find them­selves increa­sin­gly disad­van­ta­ged. As China’s most capable com­pa­nies conti­nue adap­ting to each poli­cy shift, Wes­tern firms face a stark choice : evolve their stra­te­gies to match this new rea­li­ty or risk being left behind in a rapid­ly chan­ging com­pe­ti­tive land­scape. The com­pa­nies that thrive will be those that view these poli­cy fra­me­works not as obs­tacles to over­come but as new rules of the game to master.

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