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Between strength and fracture: China's age of transition

5 episodes
  • 1
    From control to incentives: the evolution of demographic policies in China
  • 2
    Why greenhouse gas reduction reveals a series of paradoxes for China
  • 3
    Why China has a monopoly on rare earth metals
  • 4
    China: how Beijing plans to become a global leader in AI
  • 5
    China's engineering state: the hidden machinery of speed and scale
Épisode 1/5
On January 27th, 2026
3 min reading time
Pauline Rossi
Pauline Rossi
Professor of Economics at Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris) and Researcher at CREST

Key takeaways

  • By 2054, China's population decline will be close to 204 million people.
  • China, Italy, Spain and the Republic of Korea have ultra-low fertility rates, i.e. less than 1.4 births per woman.
  • According to United Nations estimates, China's population could fall below the symbolic threshold of one billion by 2070.
  • To counteract this loss of labour, on which the country's economy depends, China is focusing on the robotisation of its industries.
  • Despite the abolition of quotas by Beijing, the expected baby boom has not materialised, as the conditioning of the one-child policy remains ingrained in the habits of many Chinese people.
Épisode 2/5
On January 21st, 2026
4 min reading time
Jean-Paul Maréchal_VF
Jean-Paul Maréchal
Associate Professor in Economics at Université Paris-Saclay and Deputy Director of IDEST

Key takeaways

  • Prior to its proactive stance with the Paris Agreement in 2015, China refused to commit to reducing GHG emissions under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
  • Among China’s NDC commitments was a target to increase non-fossil fuels’ share of primary energy consumption by 20% by 2023.
  • China’s 15th Five-Year Plan set out ambitions to increase solar and wind energy production capacity sixfold compared to 2020.
  • In 2022, China’s global production capacity accounted for 68% of the world’s rare earth extraction and processed 90% of it.
  • China’s national carbon trading scheme, which started operating in 2021, currently only regulates CO2 emissions from the electricity sector but plans to cover eight sectors.
Épisode 3/5
On January 29th, 2025
4 min reading time
Mathieu Xemard
Mathieu Xémard
Project Leader at Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Études pour la Défense et la Sécurité (IP Paris)

Key takeaways

  • Rare earths are metallic elements used in the manufacture of catalysts for catalytic converters, magnets and robotic devices.
  • Today, their role in weapons production raises questions of sovereignty, due to China’s monopoly in this area.
  • China accounted for 69% of the world's production of rare earth elements in 2023, far ahead of the United States (12%), Burma (11%) and Australia (5%).
  • While some companies are announcing that they want to regain control of this market, China's monopoly allows it to stand in the way by artificially increasing price volatility.
  • To counter the Chinese monopoly, organisations such as Ecole Polytechnique (IP Paris) are working on recycling as an alternative supply method for rare earths.
Épisode 4/5
On May 4th, 2026
4 min reading time
Pierre Sel_VF
Pierre Sel
Associate Expert with the Asia Program at Institut Montaigne, PhD candidate at the University of Vienna, and Political Science Researcher

Key takeaways

  • According to the World Intellectual Property Organisation, Beijing filed nearly 30,000 patents related to generative AI between 2014 and 2024.
  • The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) places AI at the centre of its economic model and, more specifically, is advocating widespread deployment of generative AI.
  • DeepSeek has unveiled DeepSeek-R1, a high-performance open-source AI model, developed at a significantly lower cost than that of OpenAI.
  • In 2024–2025, over 50% of global semiconductor revenue was attributed to the United States.
  • Between 20% and 30% of the equipment used in Chinese chip manufacturing is expected to be produced in China by 2025, compared with 10% in 2022.
Épisode 5/5
On September 15th, 2026
4 min reading time
dan-wang2
Dan Wang
Researcher at the Hoover History Lab at Stanford University

Key takeaways

  • China is an engineering state that was formed in the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping came to power following the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) led by Mao Zedong.
  • The ruling class of the 1980s promoted engineers to the highest positions of state, and later, from 2002 onwards, all nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee held engineering degrees.
  • The country has developed an extraordinary capacity to train engineers to meet the needs of its industry, to the point where this has become a significant strategic asset.
  • Beijing favours a technocratic leadership focused on construction to maintain its growth targets, without serving the interests of specific groups or individuals.
  • In 2026, China spent 13.5 % of its GDP on infrastructure funding, whilst the US average had been around 3 % over the past three decades.