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Sino-American rivalry in orbit: what are the facts?

Isabelle Sourbès‑Verger_VF
Isabelle Sourbès-Verger
Geographer and CNRS Research Director
Key takeaways
  • China is now a global space power, and notably the only nation besides the US to have successfully landed a rover on Mars and made it move.
  • However, further investment is still needed to compete with the US: China’s budget for space activities as a whole is $20bn.
  • While private players are an asset in space strategies, most Chinese players are heavily subject to state control and political decisions.
  • China is currently seeking to prioritise the use of resources on the Moon, using ISRU (In Situ Resource Utilisation) to contribute to the operation of its facilities.
  • Today, China has clear objectives: to send a Chinese citizen to the Moon, to set up a scientific exploration base, etc.

Since launch­ing its first satel­lite in 1970, Chi­na has trav­elled a spec­tac­u­lar path in the con­quest of space. Now the world’s third space pow­er, it rivals the Unit­ed States and Rus­sia on all fronts: crewed flights, plan­e­tary explo­ration, and appli­ca­tion satel­lites. Yet, despite bud­gets still three times small­er than Wash­ing­ton’s, Bei­jing dis­plays clear ambi­tions and a polit­i­cal con­sis­ten­cy that con­trasts with Amer­i­can rever­sals. Between myths of lunar pre­da­tion and tech­no­log­i­cal real­i­ties, what is the true nature of this Sino-Amer­i­can rival­ry in orbit? Isabelle Sour­bès-Verg­er, research direc­tor at CNRS, sorts fact from fiction.

#1 China is a leading space power

TRUE

With­out a doubt, Chi­na is now one of the world’s lead­ing space pow­ers. It has repeat­ed­ly demon­strat­ed its abil­i­ty to car­ry out all types of mis­sions, hav­ing invest­ed in sev­er­al major areas of space explo­ration in recent decades.

After gain­ing inde­pen­dent access to space in 1970 to send its own satel­lites into orbit, in 2003 the coun­try was able to send peo­ple into space and then have its own sta­tions in orbit, capa­bil­i­ties that pre­vi­ous­ly only Rus­sia and the Unit­ed States pos­sessed. Chi­na has also mas­tered explo­ration mis­sions, which involve leav­ing Earth’s orbit to trav­el to Mars, for exam­ple. To date, Chi­na and the Unit­ed States remain the only nations to have attempt­ed and suc­ceed­ed in land­ing a rover on Mars and get­ting it to move around. Its tech­no­log­i­cal exper­tise is evi­dent in the field of satel­lite sys­tems for telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions, obser­va­tion and nav­i­ga­tion. Astron­o­my and astro­physics are two oth­er fields of study in which it has invested.

In short, it meets all the cri­te­ria for achiev­ing space pow­er status.

UNCERTAIN

While the Unit­ed States has undoubt­ed­ly held the top spot in the rank­ings for sev­er­al decades, sec­ond and third place are more dif­fi­cult to deter­mine. Rus­sia stands out due to its capa­bil­i­ties in mil­i­tary space tech­nol­o­gy, while the Euro­pean Union has ambi­tious high-tech pro­grammes, even if it lacks auton­o­my in manned flights. If the cri­te­ri­on used to define the rank­ing is the diver­si­ty of capa­bil­i­ties, rather than their lev­el, then Chi­na ranks ahead of its two com­peti­tors, Rus­sia and the Euro­pean Union. Nev­er­the­less, sev­er­al years of effort and invest­ment will still be need­ed before it can com­pete on equal terms with the Unit­ed States.

A com­par­i­son of the bud­gets allo­cat­ed to space is enough to grasp the gap between the two pow­ers. Wash­ing­ton spends between $60–70bn on space, includ­ing $40–50bn on mil­i­tary space, while China’s total bud­get is $20bn. Bei­jing has achieved its pri­ma­ry objec­tive of being recog­nised glob­al­ly as a lead­ing space pow­er by catch­ing up from a con­sid­er­able ini­tial tech­no­log­i­cal lag. How­ev­er, it is not clear that it is in the space sec­tor that Chi­na wants to demon­strate its supe­ri­or­i­ty over its com­peti­tor; oth­er sym­bol­ic areas are also up for grabs.

#2 Private actors are an asset in space strategies

TRUE

In the his­to­ry of the US space pro­gramme, major tra­di­tion­al indus­tri­al­ists such as Boe­ing were indeed pri­vate actors who played a key role in nation­al strat­e­gy. This con­fig­u­ra­tion has changed pro­found­ly, as new play­ers, pri­mar­i­ly the Elon Musk led SpaceX and its sub­sidiary Star­link, have changed the rules of the game. They stand out for their desire to pur­sue their own space pol­i­cy, where­as the first gen­er­a­tion of play­ers were con­tent to ful­fil a ser­vice provider role by respond­ing to orders from NASA. Today, New­Space entre­pre­neurs can own their own launch vehi­cles. This is the case with Star­link, which uses Fal­con launch vehi­cles fre­quent­ly used by NASA and the Depart­ment of Defence. These pub­lic orders off­set and recoup their finan­cial costs.

The Chi­nese land­scape is dif­fer­ent in many respects. A few pri­vate com­pa­nies are active in the telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions and obser­va­tion sec­tors, and recent­ly, launch vehi­cle man­u­fac­tur­ers have emerged. How­ev­er, as state con­trol is inher­ent to the Chi­nese mod­el, the space econ­o­my and entre­pre­neur­ship out­side the pub­lic sphere remain sub­ject to polit­i­cal decisions.

UNCERTAIN

Half of the oper­a­tional satel­lites in low Earth orbit belong to Star­link, a com­pa­ny in which Elon Musk is the major­i­ty share­hold­er. In space, he is help­ing to con­sol­i­date the Unit­ed States’ dom­i­nant posi­tion, but above all he is fol­low­ing his own path, which is not always the same as that of the White House.

#3 Both China and the United States want to exploit resources on the Moon

FALSE

When dis­cussing lunar explo­ration, it is essen­tial to dif­fer­en­ti­ate between issues relat­ing to manned flights and those relat­ing to unmanned flights. With a view to exploit­ing lunar resources, human pres­ence is a fac­tor that cre­ates addi­tion­al con­straints due to the need for water, air, food, etc. This requires addi­tion­al infra­struc­ture and there­fore high addi­tion­al costs, where­as robot­ics has made major advances.

Resource exploita­tion has two com­po­nents: on-site use, known as ISRU (In Situ Resource Util­i­sa­tion), and exploita­tion for com­mer­cial pur­pos­es. ISRU is essen­tial for the oper­a­tion of facil­i­ties, and as such, nei­ther the Sino-Russ­ian base nor the Amer­i­can base can do with­out it. Com­mer­cial exploita­tion, on the oth­er hand, is a pure­ly Amer­i­can ini­tia­tive designed to attract the pri­vate sec­tor but which, for the moment, is main­ly sup­port­ed by NASA.

The dis­course in the Unit­ed States is to posi­tion Chi­na as a preda­to­ry com­peti­tor. This nar­ra­tive, which is inspired by com­pe­ti­tion on Earth but also refers to the race to the Moon with the USSR, serves to mobilise sup­port. But beyond the myths to be per­pet­u­at­ed and the tech­no­log­i­cal chal­lenges, polit­i­cal and even eth­i­cal ques­tions arise when we talk about lunar resources and their poten­tial use on Earth. What would be the point of bring­ing back a nec­es­sar­i­ly lim­it­ed quan­ti­ty of rare met­als in an era when their con­sump­tion is mea­sured in tonnes? Fur­ther­more, if we add the cost of return to the cost of exploita­tion, the eco­nom­ic bal­ance and sus­tain­abil­i­ty of such a mod­el seem inconsistent.

UNCERTAIN

Across the Atlantic, the great­est uncer­tain­ty is pri­mar­i­ly polit­i­cal. Pres­i­dent Trump’s plans for space explo­ration are incon­sis­tent. NASA’s Artemis space pro­gramme is proof of this. With the goal of land­ing a crew on the Moon by 2027, it was launched dur­ing his first term, con­tin­ued under Joe Biden, and is now being called into ques­tion dur­ing his sec­ond term.

In con­trast, Chi­na seems to be pur­su­ing a clear goal: to take a Chi­nese cit­i­zen to the Moon for the first time in the country’s his­to­ry, learn how to sus­tain human life there, and then set up a sci­en­tif­ic explo­ration base. Let us remem­ber that in 1969, while Neil Arm­strong was walk­ing on the Moon, Chi­na was under­go­ing the Cul­tur­al Rev­o­lu­tion. On the oth­er hand, in terms of dead­lines, it is unlike­ly that the crews will speed up the pace in response to Don­ald Trump’s with­draw­al. The rep­u­ta­tion­al stakes are high, and they will not run the risk of failure.

Alicia Piveteau

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