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Will weaknesses in the US economy resist Trump’s strategy ?

Patrick_Artus
Patrick Artus
Economic Advisor to Ossiam and Member of Cercle des Économistes
Key takeaways
  • Per capita productivity increased by 45% in the United States between 2002 and the end of 2024, compared with only 10% in Europe.
  • However, the US economy has weaknesses, such as a low-skilled workforce and a low level of skills among Americans themselves.
  • The US has comparative advantages in the production of sophisticated services (technology, information, finance), but not in manufactured goods.
  • With the US's comparative advantages, protectionism is ineffective for the country, unlike a policy of free trade for goods and services.
  • The US must implement an economic strategy aimed at strengthening its competitive edge in the finance and information and communication technology sectors.

The strengths of the Ame­ri­can eco­no­my are well known and wide­ly dis­cus­sed, par­ti­cu­lar­ly when dra­wing atten­tion to Euro­pe’s short­co­mings. Per capi­ta pro­duc­ti­vi­ty increa­sed by 45% in the Uni­ted States from 2002 to the end of 2024, and by only 10% in Europe, which explains the dif­fe­rence in growth over the same per­iod in terms of Gross Domes­tic Pro­duct (GDP) in volume : 65% in the Uni­ted States and 30% in Europe (in the euro zone). This gap is lin­ked to the signi­fi­cant Research and Deve­lop­ment effort in the Uni­ted States (total R&D reaches 3.6% of GDP com­pa­red to 2.2% of GDP in the euro zone), the avai­la­bi­li­ty of signi­fi­cant funds to finance ris­ky invest­ments (in 2024, funds rai­sed in ven­ture capi­tal rea­ched $250bn in the Uni­ted States, com­pa­red with $110bn in Chi­na and $22bn in Europe), and the high level of invest­ment in new tech­no­lo­gies (IT, soft­ware, arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, etc.), which is close to 4% of GDP in the Uni­ted States com­pa­red with 2.3% of GDP in Europe.

An economic assessment that needs to be qualified

But the nume­rous weak­nesses of the US eco­no­my should not be over­loo­ked. First­ly, the labour force is poor­ly qua­li­fied, as is clear­ly shown by the results of the OECD’s PIAAC sur­vey on adult skills (the ove­rall PIAAC score for the Uni­ted States is 251, com­pa­red with 267 for Ger­ma­ny, 276 for the Nether­lands and 285 for Japan). The low level of skills among Ame­ri­cans requires signi­fi­cant immi­gra­tion (14.5% of Ame­ri­cans were born abroad at the end of 2024, com­pa­red to 11.5% in 2007 and 13% in 2018), in par­ti­cu­lar because the pro­por­tion of high­ly qua­li­fied immi­grants is high (25.8% of immi­grants in 2023 have a higher edu­ca­tion degree – Mas­ter’s or PhD – com­pa­red to 14.8% of the total population).

What’s more, the Uni­ted States is on a path of constant dein­dus­tria­li­sa­tion. The manu­fac­tu­ring sec­tor’s share of GDP fell from 12.5% in 2007 to 10.3% at the end of 2024 ; the goods trade balance is in defi­cit by $100bn dol­lars per month. We will use these deve­lop­ments later to cha­rac­te­rise the com­pa­ra­tive advan­tages of the Uni­ted States.

The constant trade defi­cit has led to the accu­mu­la­tion of a very large net forei­gn debt, which rea­ched 80% of GDP in 2024. Fur­ther­more, the employ­ment rate for 15–64 year olds is low in the Uni­ted States (72%) com­pa­red to Ger­ma­ny (78%), Japan (80%) and Swe­den (77%). This dis­cre­pan­cy is the result of the health pro­blems faced by many Ame­ri­cans : 14% of Ame­ri­can adults are unfit for work and 25% of Ame­ri­cans have not seen a doc­tor for over a year due to the high cost of healthcare.

Final­ly, the infra­struc­ture (trans­port, elec­tro­nic, water sup­ply, school buil­dings) is in poor condi­tion in the Uni­ted States. For example, 45,000 bridges and 20% of roads are bad­ly dama­ged and 17% of Ame­ri­cans do not have access to the Internet.

What comparative advantages and, consequently, what strategy for the United States ?

We have just seen the list of US eco­no­mic strengths (high level of research and deve­lop­ment and invest­ment in new tech­no­lo­gies) and weak­nesses (dein­dus­tria­li­sa­tion, skills shor­tages, health pro­blems and low employ­ment rate, as well as poor infra­struc­ture). In view of this list, it is nor­mal to conclude that the Uni­ted States has com­pa­ra­tive advan­tages in the pro­duc­tion of sophis­ti­ca­ted ser­vices (tech­no­lo­gi­cal ser­vices, infor­ma­tion ser­vices, finan­cial ser­vices), but not in the pro­duc­tion of manu­fac­tu­red goods.

Indeed, the low level of skills among the wor­king popu­la­tion, the low weight of the manu­fac­tu­ring indus­try in the eco­no­my and the trade defi­cit for goods reveal that the Uni­ted States does not have the labour force or the infra­struc­ture neces­sa­ry for the deve­lop­ment of indus­try. The contrast is clear bet­ween the trade defi­cit for manu­fac­tu­red goods ($1.6tn per year) and the trade sur­plus for ser­vices ($300bn per year). We must the­re­fore consi­der the opti­mal stra­te­gy for a coun­try that has com­pa­ra­tive advan­tages – that has the neces­sa­ry fac­tors of pro­duc­tion – for the pro­duc­tion of sophis­ti­ca­ted ser­vices and not for the pro­duc­tion of manu­fac­tu­red goods.

Free trade as an effective strategy for the United States

It is clear that, given the nature of the Uni­ted States’ com­pa­ra­tive advan­tages, a pro­tec­tio­nist poli­cy is bad for the coun­try. Taxing imports of manu­fac­tu­red goods from the rest of the World will not result in a signi­fi­cant relo­ca­tion of their pro­duc­tion, as the Uni­ted States has no com­pa­ra­tive advan­tage in the pro­duc­tion of these goods. It will sim­ply push up the prices of imports and the domes­tic prices of manu­fac­tu­red goods. Pro­tec­tio­nism will the­re­fore lead to a loss of pur­cha­sing power for Ame­ri­can consu­mers, and to very lit­tle sub­sti­tu­tion of Ame­ri­can domes­tic pro­duc­tion for imports.

It is clear that a pro­tec­tio­nist poli­cy, given the nature of the Uni­ted States’ com­pa­ra­tive advan­tages, is an inef­fec­tive poli­cy for the coun­try. Taxing imports of manu­fac­tu­red goods from the Rest of the World, since the Uni­ted States has no com­pa­ra­tive advan­tage in the pro­duc­tion of these goods, will not result in a signi­fi­cant relo­ca­tion of their pro­duc­tion and will sim­ply raise import prices and domes­tic prices of manu­fac­tu­red goods. Pro­tec­tio­nism will the­re­fore lead to a loss of pur­cha­sing power for Ame­ri­can consu­mers, and to very lit­tle sub­sti­tu­tion of Ame­ri­can domes­tic pro­duc­tion for imports.

An effec­tive stra­te­gy for the Uni­ted States would the­re­fore be to main­tain free trade in goods and ser­vices, which allows goods to be impor­ted from the rest of the world without these imports being made more expen­sive by cus­toms duties, and to avoid trade reta­lia­tion mea­sures by other coun­tries, which ham­per exports of sophis­ti­ca­ted ser­vices (tech­no­lo­gi­cal, finan­cial, etc.) from the Uni­ted States.

Fur­ther­more, this stra­te­gy includes an eco­no­mic poli­cy aimed at deve­lo­ping the Uni­ted States’ lead over its com­pe­ti­tors in finance and infor­ma­tion and com­mu­ni­ca­tion tech­no­lo­gies. This stra­te­gy involves public aid for the deve­lop­ment of arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, or for deve­lo­ping quan­tum com­pu­ters. This public aid was intro­du­ced by Donald Trump, but in a context of trade war, which will lead other coun­tries to res­trict their imports of tech­no­lo­gi­cal pro­ducts from the Uni­ted States. This stra­te­gy (free trade and sup­port for US tech­no­lo­gi­cal advan­ce­ment) would conti­nue to attract capi­tal and skilled labour to the Uni­ted States ; the resul­ting capi­tal inflows would easi­ly finance the goods trade defi­cit, while the ser­vices trade sur­plus would conti­nue to grow.

An eco­no­mic stra­te­gy that does not cor­res­pond to a coun­try’s com­pa­ra­tive advan­tages is inevi­ta­bly doo­med to fai­lure. This is the case with Donald Trump’s pro­tec­tio­nist stra­te­gy, which will not lead to signi­fi­cant indus­trial relo­ca­tions to the Uni­ted States, given the state of the skills of the labour force and the dete­rio­ra­tion of infra­struc­ture. Europe is wor­ried about a relo­ca­tion move­ment towards the Uni­ted States, but in rea­li­ty, this is not hap­pe­ning (the manu­fac­tu­ring indus­try’s share of the US GDP conti­nues to decrease) and will not hap­pen. Indeed, the real and legi­ti­mate fear for Europe is the US domi­na­tion of tech­no­lo­gi­cal and finan­cial services.

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