Since the COP16 on biodiversity in 2024, the concept of ‘biodiversity credits’ has emerged on the international stage. What exactly are they?
Alain Karsenty. Biodiversity credits enable environmental damage to be offset. The system does not, in essence, alter the principle of regulatory offsetting that already exists in many countries, recently including France. An infrastructure developer must follow the ‘avoid, reduce, offset’ sequence, and therefore counterbalance any damage to nature that could not be avoided. This offsetting must take place near the affected areas and within similar ecosystems.
Whereas, under traditional compensation, the project developer seeks a site themselves to meet their obligations, biodiversity credits offer supply-side compensation. In other words, a third party carries out conservation or restoration work before ecological damage occurs and then sells the credits to those who need them. These parties are required by regulation to purchase credits corresponding to the habitats affected.
This system has advantages. Firstly, it ensures that compensation takes place, as it is carried out in advance. It also enables the development of more coherent conservation frameworks by creating biodiversity corridors, rather than establishing conservation or renaturation areas solely based on land availability. France is developing natural sites for compensation, restoration and renaturation (SNCRR) based on this approach.
How does this differ from biodiversity “certificates”?
Certificates are a financial instrument like any other. They attest to a positive impact on nature. A company can purchase this tool and highlight it in its reporting or as part of its CSR policy. As compensation is no longer an issue, a local connection is no longer necessary. For example, a Japanese bank could purchase certificates to fund the creation of a new protected area in Madagascar. The main problem that can arise is that of greenwashing or double counting: a company may purchase a certificate, publicise its positive impact, and then resell it to another company.
Nevertheless, some stakeholders use the terms “credit” and ‘certificate’ interchangeably. This is the case with the IAPB, the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits, which uses the term ‘credit’ in both instances, on the basis that credits could serve both as offsets and as contributions.
Does this mean that certificates could ultimately be used for offsetting?
Yes, in theory. But in my view, we need to keep these two mechanisms clearly separated. Offsetting is governed by very strict rules of equivalence and proximity, which is not the case with certificates. Accepting the versatility of these tools risks weakening the regulatory framework governing offsetting requirements, whereas we should instead be tightening them.
On the other hand, we can envisage ways of linking the two. Once everything that could be done in terms of local offsetting has been done but obligations remain, it should then be possible to supplement these by purchasing certificates. Offsets must be provided ‘in kind’ and close to the affected areas, but it is not uncommon for operators to be unable to find sufficient land to restore or equivalent habitats to conserve in the vicinity. Many regulations outside France therefore allow operators to fulfil their compensation obligations by contributing money to specialised funds or protected areas. Extending this flexibility to the purchase of certificates certified by public authorities would help to stimulate demand for these voluntary instruments.
Are such mechanisms currently being developed at a European level, like the carbon market?
The European Union is currently working on a system of nature certificates, intended to be supplemented by nature credits. Nature certificates would be generated from practices deemed to be beneficial to an ecosystem, whilst credits would be issued based on an index of the health of the ecosystem in question.
The practice-based certificate approach is, for example, championed by the Organisation for Biodiversity Certificates (OBC) in France. These certificates would specifically fund the cost of actions undertaken, such as planting hedgerows or recruiting eco-guards to combat poaching. However, there is no consensus on this approach. Some believe that only results measured using a biodiversity ‘metric’ (number of species, improvement in water quality, etc.) should be taken into account. But this poses certain problems. Firstly, because results are sometimes only measurable years after a practice has been implemented. Yet these actions come at a cost. Certificates would help fund the adoption of new practices or the continuation of good practices.
Furthermore, climatic uncertainties and bad luck must be taken into account. A project may have put all the right practices in place, but be affected by external events (fire, flooding, diseases, etc.) which can undo all the efforts – and thus undermine its ability to secure funding. The originality of the European project lies in combining these two dimensions, even though, at this stage, representatives of the European Commission envisage that only credits will be tradable units. Consultations are expected to continue for at least another year before this European market is launched.
You were talking about the risks of greenwashing. What are they?
Greenwashingcan occur on the supply side: that is, through the sale of bogus biodiversity credits or certificates, which do not make much of a difference on the ground. We won’t be able to avoid this. In particular, for credits derived from conservation measures, it will be difficult to determine whether, without the sale of these credits or certificates, a landowner would actually have carried out economic activities that destroy natural habitats. When it comes to ecosystem restoration, there will always be a risk of excessive issuance of credits or certificates relative to the actual cost of the operations.
But there is also, of course, the issue of greenwashingon the part of buyers. What happens if mining or oil companies want to buy biodiversity certificates to publicise the fact that they, too, have a positive impact on nature? This is a question that will inevitably arise. Project initiators (local authorities, farmers, organisations, etc.) could certainly include exclusion clauses.
The aim is also to avoid replicating the problems identified in the carbon market. For example, it is important that it is the people concerned who determine the actions to be taken in their area, rather than an external party coming in and telling them: ‘We want to run a biodiversity project; we’ll pay you, but in exchange, you must adopt the practices we prescribe.’ The objectives must be the result of collective decisions.