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Knowledge as power: the role of research in modern intelligence methods

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Clémence Foufa
Senior French Army Officer specialising in Human Resources for Rare Profiles
Didier Bazalgette
Didier Bazalgette
Doctor of Neuroscience, Former AI and Cognitive Sciences Advisor to the Defense Innovation Agency
Key takeaways
  • Intelligence Studies generate scientific knowledge about intelligence, its practices, its organisations and how they evolve.
  • Over the past ten years, France has significantly strengthened its capacity to reflect on intelligence, to open up certain aspects of it to research and to foster dialogue with technology stakeholders.
  • The DGSE has a bold ambition: to facilitate the exchange of challenges, knowledge and perspectives between a secret service and its wider environment.
  • The Intelligence Campus, inaugurated in Creil in March 2017, harbours a comparable ambition in the technological sphere. The initial vision is that of a continuum: understanding, designing, experimenting and equipping.
  • •From 2023–2024 onwards, another framework becomes feasible: facilitating the convergence of the three forms of capital – operational, scientific and industrial.

Over the past ten years, France has sig­ni­fic­antly strengthened its capa­city to ana­lyse intel­li­gence, to open up cer­tain aspects of it to research, and to foster dia­logue with tech­no­logy stake­hold­ers. This pro­gress has also made it pos­sible to dis­tin­guish more clearly between three func­tions that ini­tial enthu­si­asm ten­ded to con­flate: pro­du­cing sci­entif­ic know­ledge on intel­li­gence; trans­form­ing an oper­a­tion­al need into a test­able prob­lem; and devel­op­ing, indus­tri­al­ising and main­tain­ing the res­ult­ing sys­tems. These func­tions must cooper­ate, but they do not draw on the same skills, the same time­frames or the same stand­ards of evidence.

Intel­li­gence Stud­ies occupy the first of these paths. Holeindre and Oudet point out that research­ers and prac­ti­tion­ers have ‘two dis­tinct voca­tions’ and must not be con­flated. Journ­als, sem­inars, accred­ited train­ing pro­grammes and net­works have gradu­ally estab­lished intel­li­gence as a cross-dis­cip­lin­ary field of sci­entif­ic study. Fol­low­ing a long peri­od of Brit­ish and Amer­ic­an influ­ence, French research now pos­sesses suf­fi­cient crit­ic­al mass to test the impor­ted cat­egor­ies against the back­drop of its own institutions.

The stra­tegic ques­tion is there­fore no longer wheth­er intel­li­gence stud­ies exist. It is to determ­ine how a sov­er­eign organ­isa­tion can exper­i­ment with sci­ence and industry without con­flat­ing know­ledge pro­duc­tion, oper­a­tion­al trans­form­a­tion and the devel­op­ment of capability.

2016–2018: openness gives rise to a scientific field

The cre­ation of Inter­ax­ions in 2016 marks a telling start­ing point. Presen­ted as the DGSE’s think tank, the ini­ti­at­ive her­alds an inter­face with civil soci­ety as a whole, extend­ing bey­ond the aca­dem­ic world alone. The ambi­tion is bold: to facil­it­ate the exchange of prob­lems, know­ledge and per­cep­tions between a secret ser­vice and its wider environment.

From 2017 onwards, Inter­ax­ions’ pub­lic activ­it­ies gradu­ally focused on the pro­duc­tion and cir­cu­la­tion of know­ledge. The pub­lic­a­tions cata­logued in 2018 focused in par­tic­u­lar on the post-ISIS era, Afric­an Islam and the West­ern Balkans. In March 2019, a work­shop devoted to the manip­u­la­tion of inform­a­tion built on the ques­tions raised by the 2017 pres­id­en­tial elec­tion. Dis­in­form­a­tion and cog­nit­ive vul­ner­ab­il­it­ies thus entered a struc­tured research frame­work at a very early stage.

This tra­ject­ory reveals a clas­sic insti­tu­tion­al mech­an­ism. Among sev­er­al ini­tial object­ives, the one that already bene­fits from an estab­lished com­munity, val­id­a­tion rules and pub­lic­a­tion plat­forms tends to sta­bil­ise more quickly. The inter­face becomes primar­ily aca­dem­ic. How­ever, this suc­cess pro­duces a sep­ar­at­ing effect: sci­entif­ic study gains its autonomy, whilst meth­od­o­lo­gic­al trans­la­tion and oper­a­tion­al devel­op­ment fail to find such a clearly iden­ti­fied com­mon ground.

2017–2025: from the sought-after continuum to specialised interfaces

The Intel­li­gence Cam­pus, inaug­ur­ated in Creil in March 2017, har­bours a com­par­able ambi­tion in the tech­no­lo­gic­al sphere. Mil­it­ary per­son­nel, research­ers, industry rep­res­ent­at­ives and start-ups are expec­ted to con­trib­ute to data pro­cessing and innov­a­tion with­in the Mil­it­ary Intel­li­gence Dir­ect­or­ate. The ini­tial vis­ion is that of a con­tinuum: under­stand­ing, design­ing, exper­i­ment­ing and equipping.

In a strik­ing par­al­lel with Inter­ax­ions’ tra­ject­ory, roles are rap­idly becom­ing spe­cial­ised. The agree­ment with the CNRS facil­it­ates col­lab­or­a­tion between research­ers and oper­a­tion­al staff; indus­tri­al part­ner­ships cla­ri­fy require­ments and facil­it­ate pro­cure­ment. Appear­ing before the Nation­al Assembly’s Defence Com­mit­tee in March 2021, the Dir­ect­or of the DRM described the Cam­pus as a ‘unit for gath­er­ing know­ledge and mon­it­or­ing tech­no­lo­gic­al build­ing blocks’ and spe­cified that the DRM gen­er­ally acquires ‘soft­ware build­ing blocks’. The decree of 16th Janu­ary 2025 main­tains the Cam​pus’s sup­port for innov­a­tion, but does not assign it a role com­bin­ing strategy, sci­entif­ic author­ity and indus­tri­al devel­op­ment. Its role is there­fore primar­ily that of a one-stop shop for iden­ti­fic­a­tion, com­mis­sion­ing and networking.

The part­ner­ship with Inria, in turn, sheds light on this spe­cial­isa­tion. Estab­lished in 2020, the Secur­ity and Defence Mis­sion organ­ises expert­ise, research and tech­no­logy trans­fer for the bene­fit of the Min­is­tries of the Armed Forces and the Interi­or. Developed in col­lab­or­a­tion with the DRM, IntelLab is presen­ted as a plat­form for sim­u­la­tion, train­ing and aware­ness-rais­ing that rep­lic­ates a cycle of multi-source stra­tegic inform­a­tion processing.

IntelLab thus helps to make intel­li­gence a share­able sci­entif­ic and tech­nic­al dis­cip­line. Scen­ari­os, ad hoc data, game design and debrief­ing make a gen­er­ic cycle vis­ible. In their 2023 art­icle, Crück and Asso­nion present the sim­il­ar­ity between sim­u­lated exper­i­ence and real-world activ­ity as a hypo­thes­is yet to be val­id­ated. The pub­lished work there­fore estab­lishes sig­ni­fic­ant achieve­ments in terms of accul­tur­a­tion, form­al­isa­tion and know­ledge. It estab­lishes neither a new oper­a­tion­al meth­od nor any meas­ur­able gains in terms of time, accur­acy or ana­lyt­ic­al robust­ness. The dis­tinc­tion is cru­cial: rais­ing aware­ness, demon­strat­ing and trans­form­ing a prac­tice are three dis­tinct levels.

2019–2024: why the accumulation of capital remains fragile

The cre­ation of the Defence Innov­a­tion Agency in Septem­ber 2018 makes this dis­tinc­tion even clear­er. Stra­tegic research and intel­li­gence stud­ies have their own chan­nels; innov­a­tion pri­or­it­ises applic­a­tion, demon­strat­ors and scal­ing up. Between the two lies a trans­form­at­ive func­tion which Didi­er Baza­l­gette – draw­ing on nearly thirty years of coordin­a­tion between R&D, the DGA, the European Defence Agency and industry – pro­poses to organ­ise under the name ‘oper­a­tion­al sci­ences and development’.

This func­tion requires the accu­mu­la­tion of three forms of cap­it­al. The first is oper­a­tion­al, at a stra­tegic and meth­od­o­lo­gic­al level: under­stand­ing a ser​vice’s stra­tegic dir­ec­tion, its trade-offs, its doc­trines and its secur­ity con­straints. The second is sci­entif­ic: know­ing how to for­mu­late a test­able prob­lem, organ­ise a pro­gramme, super­vise research and assess the robust­ness of a res­ult. The third is indus­tri­al and entre­pren­eur­i­al: trans­form­ing evid­ence into a product that is main­tain­able, fund­able and integ­rable. Seni­or­ity alone does not guar­an­tee any of these trans­itions; hybrid­ity requires a sus­tained abil­ity to switch between dif­fer­ent lan­guages, meth­ods and cri­ter­ia for success.

Such a mod­el can pro­duce res­ults, but it can­not be scaled up when it relies on just a few individuals. 

Such a mod­el can pro­duce res­ults, but it can­not be scaled up when it relies on just a few indi­vidu­als. Research on bound­ary span­ners and role con­flicts shows that each domain demands its own proofs of com­pet­ence. Main­tain­ing oper­a­tion­al access, sci­entif­ic cred­ib­il­ity and indus­tri­al res­ults sim­ul­tan­eously requires not only con­tinu­ous legit­im­isa­tion, but also the ongo­ing main­ten­ance of three net­works, three lan­guages and three forms of author­ity. The organ­isa­tion thus places upon the hold­er of the role not only the cost of coordin­a­tion, but also the bur­den of main­tain­ing and renew­ing each of these forms of cap­it­al. One-off ini­ti­at­ives become pos­sible; their con­tinu­ity remains depend­ent on the avail­ab­il­ity of a single indi­vidu­al. The mod­el is there­fore excep­tion­al by design and can­not be rep­lic­ated by any organisation.

An addi­tion­al dif­fi­culty stems from admin­is­trat­ive cat­egor­isa­tions. As soon as an activ­ity involves a thes­is, a meth­od or a labor­at­ory, it tends to be equated with research. The cri­terion for suc­cess then shifts towards pub­lic­a­tion, leav­ing oper­a­tion­al devel­op­ment without a clearly des­ig­nated own­er. How­ever, assess­ing the value of a res­ult is not enough to trans­form it into capacity.

The Court of Aud­it­ors describes integ­ra­tion into rigid pro­gramme cycles as ‘com­plex and costly’; the Sen­ate expli­citly iden­ti­fies the dis­con­nect between exper­i­ment­a­tion and scal­ing up. Stand­ing between proof of concept and oper­a­tion­al imple­ment­a­tion are the budget, the con­tract, intel­lec­tu­al prop­erty, archi­tec­ture, secur­ity, doc­trine, train­ing and main­ten­ance. Research estab­lishes own­er­ship of the res­ult; it cre­ates neither the sys­tem into which it is integ­rated nor the sup­port for it. In 2024, the con­tinu­ation of this func­tion can there­fore no longer depend on a few excep­tion­ally hybrid indi­vidu­al career paths.

2023–2026: simulation as an infrastructure for transformation

From 2023–2024 onwards, a dif­fer­ent archi­tec­ture becomes con­ceiv­able: no longer attempt­ing to insti­tu­tion­al­ise rare pro­files, but rather facil­it­at­ing the con­ver­gence of the three forms of cap­it­al – oper­a­tion­al, sci­entif­ic and indus­tri­al. In 2026, Baza­l­gette and Jan­in denounce ‘the illu­sion of pre­pared­ness’ arising from the con­fu­sion between nar­rat­ive frame­works and oper­a­tion­al com­pet­ence: foresight demon­strates through mean­ing; exper­i­ment­a­tion, through data. Time con­straints, endo­gen­ous feed­back and meas­ure­ment make sim­u­la­tion a space in which doc­trine, beha­viour, sci­entif­ic mod­els and tech­nic­al solu­tions can be tested together.

Sim­u­la­tion does not magic­ally recre­ate the con­tinuum envis­aged in 2016, nor does it replace the three forms of cap­it­al. It can, how­ever, provide them with a shared infra­struc­ture. The oper­at­or becomes a co-design­er: their tacit know­ledge is trans­lated into vari­ables, con­straints and per­form­ance cri­ter­ia. The research­er con­structs falsifi­able mod­els. The indus­tri­al part­ner devel­ops the engine, inter­faces, secur­ity, main­ten­ance and the con­di­tions for scal­ing up. A pro­tec­ted core can con­tain sens­it­ive data, rules and met­rics, whilst share­able sub-mod­els make it pos­sible to draw on civil­ian expert­ise without expos­ing the entire problem.

This archi­tec­ture also meets leg­al and organ­isa­tion­al require­ments. Nation­al defence secrecy neces­sit­ates com­part­ment­al­isa­tion and a ‘need-to-know’ approach; pub­lic pro­cure­ment reg­u­lates rela­tions with com­pan­ies. A mod­u­lar plat­form does not over­ride any of these rules: it can provide a tech­nic­al imple­ment­a­tion of them. It enables access levels to be segreg­ated, con­tri­bu­tions to be traced and dual-use com­pon­ents to be integ­rated with­in a con­trolled envir­on­ment. Civil soci­ety no longer merely provides ideas; it par­ti­cip­ates in a gov­erned devel­op­ment chain.

A governance decision

The assess­ment of the past dec­ade is instruct­ive because it clears up an ambi­gu­ity. France now pos­sesses a robust, legit­im­ate and sci­en­tific­ally autonom­ous field of Intel­li­gence Stud­ies. It also has aca­dem­ic and tech­no­lo­gic­al inter­faces that are use­ful to the intel­li­gence ser­vices. How­ever, suc­cess­ive attempts have failed to sta­bil­ise the trans­form­at­ive func­tion com­bin­ing intel­li­gence strategy, sci­entif­ic meth­od and indus­tri­al development.

For decision-makers, the les­son is simple. It does not lie in bet­ter select­ing, appoint­ing or pro­tect­ing a hand­ful of hybrid pro­files. Ten years of repeated fail­ures to sta­bil­ise this func­tion – in research, oper­a­tion­al organ­isa­tions and indus­tri­al sup­port – reveal the sys­tem­ic lim­it­a­tions of the mod­el. The com­bin­a­tion of oper­a­tion­al, sci­entif­ic and indus­tri­al cap­it­al is too com­plex to imple­ment to be rep­lic­ated at will; main­tain­ing all three sim­ul­tan­eously places the bur­den of safe­guard­ing access, skills, net­works and oper­a­tion­al con­tinu­ity on just a few indi­vidu­als. An organ­isa­tion based on such an excep­tion quickly becomes unsustainable.

The chal­lenge is there­fore to shift the unit of gov­ernance: no longer seek­ing to insti­tu­tion­al­ise the role that com­bines all three forms of cap­it­al, but to organ­ise their inter­con­nec­tion in a sus­tain­able manner.

The chal­lenge is there­fore to shift the unit of gov­ernance: no longer seek­ing to insti­tu­tion­al­ise the role that com­bines all three forms of cap­it­al, but to organ­ise their inter­con­nec­tion in a sus­tain­able man­ner. In 2026, sim­u­la­tion offers the most cred­ible frame­work for this trans­form­a­tion: not a fourth com­munity, but a shared infra­struc­ture in which the three strands remain autonom­ous whilst col­lect­ively pro­du­cing observ­able cap­ab­il­it­ies. After ten years of open­ness, the next step for­ward will not be a new circle. It will be the capa­city to exper­i­ment, meas­ure and industrialise.

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