Knowledge as power: the role of research in modern intelligence methods
- Intelligence Studies generate scientific knowledge about intelligence, its practices, its organisations and how they evolve.
- Over the past ten years, France has significantly strengthened its capacity to reflect on intelligence, to open up certain aspects of it to research and to foster dialogue with technology stakeholders.
- The DGSE has a bold ambition: to facilitate the exchange of challenges, knowledge and perspectives between a secret service and its wider environment.
- The Intelligence Campus, inaugurated in Creil in March 2017, harbours a comparable ambition in the technological sphere. The initial vision is that of a continuum: understanding, designing, experimenting and equipping.
- •From 2023–2024 onwards, another framework becomes feasible: facilitating the convergence of the three forms of capital – operational, scientific and industrial.
Over the past ten years, France has significantly strengthened its capacity to analyse intelligence, to open up certain aspects of it to research, and to foster dialogue with technology stakeholders. This progress has also made it possible to distinguish more clearly between three functions that initial enthusiasm tended to conflate: producing scientific knowledge on intelligence; transforming an operational need into a testable problem; and developing, industrialising and maintaining the resulting systems. These functions must cooperate, but they do not draw on the same skills, the same timeframes or the same standards of evidence.
Intelligence Studies occupy the first of these paths. Holeindre and Oudet point out that researchers and practitioners have ‘two distinct vocations’ and must not be conflated. Journals, seminars, accredited training programmes and networks have gradually established intelligence as a cross-disciplinary field of scientific study. Following a long period of British and American influence, French research now possesses sufficient critical mass to test the imported categories against the backdrop of its own institutions.
The strategic question is therefore no longer whether intelligence studies exist. It is to determine how a sovereign organisation can experiment with science and industry without conflating knowledge production, operational transformation and the development of capability.
2016–2018: openness gives rise to a scientific field
The creation of Interaxions in 2016 marks a telling starting point. Presented as the DGSE’s think tank, the initiative heralds an interface with civil society as a whole, extending beyond the academic world alone. The ambition is bold: to facilitate the exchange of problems, knowledge and perceptions between a secret service and its wider environment.
From 2017 onwards, Interaxions’ public activities gradually focused on the production and circulation of knowledge. The publications catalogued in 2018 focused in particular on the post-ISIS era, African Islam and the Western Balkans. In March 2019, a workshop devoted to the manipulation of information built on the questions raised by the 2017 presidential election. Disinformation and cognitive vulnerabilities thus entered a structured research framework at a very early stage.
This trajectory reveals a classic institutional mechanism. Among several initial objectives, the one that already benefits from an established community, validation rules and publication platforms tends to stabilise more quickly. The interface becomes primarily academic. However, this success produces a separating effect: scientific study gains its autonomy, whilst methodological translation and operational development fail to find such a clearly identified common ground.
2017–2025: from the sought-after continuum to specialised interfaces
The Intelligence Campus, inaugurated in Creil in March 2017, harbours a comparable ambition in the technological sphere. Military personnel, researchers, industry representatives and start-ups are expected to contribute to data processing and innovation within the Military Intelligence Directorate. The initial vision is that of a continuum: understanding, designing, experimenting and equipping.
In a striking parallel with Interaxions’ trajectory, roles are rapidly becoming specialised. The agreement with the CNRS facilitates collaboration between researchers and operational staff; industrial partnerships clarify requirements and facilitate procurement. Appearing before the National Assembly’s Defence Committee in March 2021, the Director of the DRM described the Campus as a ‘unit for gathering knowledge and monitoring technological building blocks’ and specified that the DRM generally acquires ‘software building blocks’. The decree of 16th January 2025 maintains the Campus’s support for innovation, but does not assign it a role combining strategy, scientific authority and industrial development. Its role is therefore primarily that of a one-stop shop for identification, commissioning and networking.
The partnership with Inria, in turn, sheds light on this specialisation. Established in 2020, the Security and Defence Mission organises expertise, research and technology transfer for the benefit of the Ministries of the Armed Forces and the Interior. Developed in collaboration with the DRM, IntelLab is presented as a platform for simulation, training and awareness-raising that replicates a cycle of multi-source strategic information processing.
IntelLab thus helps to make intelligence a shareable scientific and technical discipline. Scenarios, ad hoc data, game design and debriefing make a generic cycle visible. In their 2023 article, Crück and Assonion present the similarity between simulated experience and real-world activity as a hypothesis yet to be validated. The published work therefore establishes significant achievements in terms of acculturation, formalisation and knowledge. It establishes neither a new operational method nor any measurable gains in terms of time, accuracy or analytical robustness. The distinction is crucial: raising awareness, demonstrating and transforming a practice are three distinct levels.
2019–2024: why the accumulation of capital remains fragile
The creation of the Defence Innovation Agency in September 2018 makes this distinction even clearer. Strategic research and intelligence studies have their own channels; innovation prioritises application, demonstrators and scaling up. Between the two lies a transformative function which Didier Bazalgette – drawing on nearly thirty years of coordination between R&D, the DGA, the European Defence Agency and industry – proposes to organise under the name ‘operational sciences and development’.
This function requires the accumulation of three forms of capital. The first is operational, at a strategic and methodological level: understanding a service’s strategic direction, its trade-offs, its doctrines and its security constraints. The second is scientific: knowing how to formulate a testable problem, organise a programme, supervise research and assess the robustness of a result. The third is industrial and entrepreneurial: transforming evidence into a product that is maintainable, fundable and integrable. Seniority alone does not guarantee any of these transitions; hybridity requires a sustained ability to switch between different languages, methods and criteria for success.
Such a model can produce results, but it cannot be scaled up when it relies on just a few individuals.
Such a model can produce results, but it cannot be scaled up when it relies on just a few individuals. Research on boundary spanners and role conflicts shows that each domain demands its own proofs of competence. Maintaining operational access, scientific credibility and industrial results simultaneously requires not only continuous legitimisation, but also the ongoing maintenance of three networks, three languages and three forms of authority. The organisation thus places upon the holder of the role not only the cost of coordination, but also the burden of maintaining and renewing each of these forms of capital. One-off initiatives become possible; their continuity remains dependent on the availability of a single individual. The model is therefore exceptional by design and cannot be replicated by any organisation.
An additional difficulty stems from administrative categorisations. As soon as an activity involves a thesis, a method or a laboratory, it tends to be equated with research. The criterion for success then shifts towards publication, leaving operational development without a clearly designated owner. However, assessing the value of a result is not enough to transform it into capacity.
The Court of Auditors describes integration into rigid programme cycles as ‘complex and costly’; the Senate explicitly identifies the disconnect between experimentation and scaling up. Standing between proof of concept and operational implementation are the budget, the contract, intellectual property, architecture, security, doctrine, training and maintenance. Research establishes ownership of the result; it creates neither the system into which it is integrated nor the support for it. In 2024, the continuation of this function can therefore no longer depend on a few exceptionally hybrid individual career paths.
2023–2026: simulation as an infrastructure for transformation
From 2023–2024 onwards, a different architecture becomes conceivable: no longer attempting to institutionalise rare profiles, but rather facilitating the convergence of the three forms of capital – operational, scientific and industrial. In 2026, Bazalgette and Janin denounce ‘the illusion of preparedness’ arising from the confusion between narrative frameworks and operational competence: foresight demonstrates through meaning; experimentation, through data. Time constraints, endogenous feedback and measurement make simulation a space in which doctrine, behaviour, scientific models and technical solutions can be tested together.
Simulation does not magically recreate the continuum envisaged in 2016, nor does it replace the three forms of capital. It can, however, provide them with a shared infrastructure. The operator becomes a co-designer: their tacit knowledge is translated into variables, constraints and performance criteria. The researcher constructs falsifiable models. The industrial partner develops the engine, interfaces, security, maintenance and the conditions for scaling up. A protected core can contain sensitive data, rules and metrics, whilst shareable sub-models make it possible to draw on civilian expertise without exposing the entire problem.
This architecture also meets legal and organisational requirements. National defence secrecy necessitates compartmentalisation and a ‘need-to-know’ approach; public procurement regulates relations with companies. A modular platform does not override any of these rules: it can provide a technical implementation of them. It enables access levels to be segregated, contributions to be traced and dual-use components to be integrated within a controlled environment. Civil society no longer merely provides ideas; it participates in a governed development chain.
A governance decision
The assessment of the past decade is instructive because it clears up an ambiguity. France now possesses a robust, legitimate and scientifically autonomous field of Intelligence Studies. It also has academic and technological interfaces that are useful to the intelligence services. However, successive attempts have failed to stabilise the transformative function combining intelligence strategy, scientific method and industrial development.
For decision-makers, the lesson is simple. It does not lie in better selecting, appointing or protecting a handful of hybrid profiles. Ten years of repeated failures to stabilise this function – in research, operational organisations and industrial support – reveal the systemic limitations of the model. The combination of operational, scientific and industrial capital is too complex to implement to be replicated at will; maintaining all three simultaneously places the burden of safeguarding access, skills, networks and operational continuity on just a few individuals. An organisation based on such an exception quickly becomes unsustainable.
The challenge is therefore to shift the unit of governance: no longer seeking to institutionalise the role that combines all three forms of capital, but to organise their interconnection in a sustainable manner.
The challenge is therefore to shift the unit of governance: no longer seeking to institutionalise the role that combines all three forms of capital, but to organise their interconnection in a sustainable manner. In 2026, simulation offers the most credible framework for this transformation: not a fourth community, but a shared infrastructure in which the three strands remain autonomous whilst collectively producing observable capabilities. After ten years of openness, the next step forward will not be a new circle. It will be the capacity to experiment, measure and industrialise.

