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π Space π Geopolitics

Private property and militarisation : the new frontiers of space law

Lucien Rapp_VF
Lucien Rapp
Professor at Université Toulouse-Capitole and HEC Paris
Key takeaways
  • In total, five conventions and their principles currently constitute a solid legal foundation, accepted by all and whose authority is so far undisputed.
  • The Outer Space Treaty prohibits sovereignty claims by a State, but it says nothing about private property.
  • The Artemis Accords are a legal instrument whose signature conditions the cooperation of States with the United States and sets forth a set of new principles among which private property in space is inscribed.
  • The adoption of international technical standards is essential to the development of space activities and equipment interoperability.
  • Officially, space is not a ground for hostilities although it is already heavily militarised – particularly with surveillance satellites.

Far above our heads, satel­lite constel­la­tions are mul­ti­plying at a stag­ge­ring rate. The most consi­de­rable of which are constant­ly expan­ding their net­works even fur­ther – name­ly Star­link by Spa­ceX for the Uni­ted States and Qian­fan by Shan­ghai Spa­ce­com Satel­lite Tech­no­lo­gy (SSST) for Chi­na. These equip­ment deploy­ments, as well as on a lar­ger scale the deve­lop­ment of space pro­jects, raise cru­cial legal ques­tions. In the event of a col­li­sion bet­ween satel­lites, for example, who is at fault ? But also, can an enti­ty lay claim to mine­ral resources on the Moon or Mars ? Or how do we regu­late the ambi­tions of pri­vate actors and those of cer­tain States ? To ans­wer these ques­tions, Lucien Rapp, spe­cia­list in space law and pro­fes­sor at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Tou­louse-Capi­tole, as well as at HEC Paris, shares his expertise.

#1 There is an international space law

TRUE

Today space acti­vi­ties are also inclu­ded in this legis­la­tion. This inter­na­tio­nal law is based on seve­ral foun­ding legal texts, the prin­ci­pal one being the Outer Space Trea­ty of 19671. These pro­vi­sions were cer­tain­ly mar­ked by the context of the Cold War, but they remain very cur­rent. This trea­ty, signed by all the major space powers of the time – France, the US, the USSR and the UK – esta­blishes a set of rules in the explo­ra­tion and use of space.

First, it pre­serves outer space [Edi­tor’s note : the zone beyond Ear­th’s atmos­phere] as a sanc­tua­ry by oppo­sing any claim of sove­rei­gn­ty and kee­ping it free of nuclear acti­vi­ty. It invites States to orga­nise acti­vi­ties that fall under their juris­dic­tion and control. It makes them res­pon­sible for their ope­ra­tions and those of their natio­nals in space and on Earth. In addi­tion, it pro­tects astro­nauts by making them “envoys of Huma­ni­ty.” This trea­ty is not alone, as it is accom­pa­nied by four other trea­ties nego­tia­ted bet­ween the end of the 1960s and the mid-1970s.

In total, these five conven­tions and their prin­ciples consti­tute a solid legal foun­da­tion, accep­ted by all and whose autho­ri­ty is yet undisputed.

#2 Space belongs to no one. It is somewhat of a “sanctuary”, which implies that States are politically and legally responsible

TRUE

The Outer Space Trea­ty opens with three sta­te­ments : the com­mit­ment of signa­to­ry states to explore and use space inclu­ding the Moon and other celes­tial bodies “for the bene­fit and in the inter­ests of all coun­tries, regard­less of their stage of eco­no­mic or scien­ti­fic deve­lop­ment”; the somew­hat contra­dic­to­ry pro­cla­ma­tion of the free­dom to do so for States that have the means to do so, and the pro­hi­bi­tion of any natio­nal appro­pria­tion by pro­cla­ma­tion of sove­rei­gn­ty. The text adds “nei­ther by use nor occu­pa­tion, nor by any other means,” as if it were “the pre­ro­ga­tive of all man­kind” (in the French version).

The Outer Space Trea­ty is struc­tu­red around states, each of which is dee­med poli­ti­cal­ly and legal­ly responsible.

And if we remem­ber Neil Arm­strong’s beau­ti­ful words during the Apol­lo 11 mis­sion (“that’s one small step for [a] man, one giant leap for man­kind”), these prin­ciples never­the­less strike a dis­cor­dant note in the cur­rent cli­mate, where there is regu­lar talk of the pos­si­bi­li­ty of pri­vate appro­pria­tion of mine­ral resources extrac­ted from space, the ins­tal­la­tion of nuclear power sta­tions on the Moon, and the esta­blish­ment of safe­ty zones around space objects.

The Outer Space Trea­ty is gene­ral­ly des­cri­bed as a “state-cen­tred” trea­ty, mea­ning that it is struc­tu­red around states. Under the Trea­ty, each state in the space club is consi­de­red res­pon­sible in two senses of the term : poli­ti­cal­ly, because it must orga­nise its acti­vi­ties and those of its natio­nals ; and legal­ly, because it under­takes to bear the conse­quences of its actions and those of its natio­nals. This explains why, with the deve­lop­ment of pri­vate acti­vi­ties in the space sec­tor and the num­ber of states in the space club, we have seen an increase in the num­ber of space laws. In France, Par­lia­ment adop­ted the Space Ope­ra­tions Act of 3rd  June 2008, the LOS, which now serves as an inter­na­tio­nal refe­rence for many states.

#3 One can freely exploit the mineral resources of the Moon or Mars

UNCERTAIN

In the absence of a spe­ci­fic ban, there is no objec­tive rea­son to oppose it, and we must accept that the rules will evolve to defi­ni­ti­ve­ly regu­late the sta­tus of this type of acti­vi­ty. The real ques­tion that needs to be asked of the experts is what these resources are, whe­ther they are of eco­no­mic inter­est and for what uses, at what cost and with what tech­no­lo­gies they can be extrac­ted, sto­red, refi­ned, trans­por­ted, etc. These ques­tions appear to be enti­re­ly open.

#4 According to these rules, the Outer Space Treaty therefore prohibits private property

FALSE

Sove­rei­gn­ty and owner­ship are often confu­sed. The trea­ty pro­hi­bits claims of sove­rei­gn­ty by a state but says nothing about pri­vate owner­ship other than the cryp­tic phrase as men­tio­ned above : “nei­ther by use or occu­pa­tion, nor by any other means.” It is this loo­phole that the Uni­ted States, with the Arte­mis Accords, and other spa­ce­fa­ring states after it, have rushed to exploit to set a pre­cedent and esta­blish a cus­to­ma­ry rule.

During the Sum­mer, this issue retur­ned to the inter­na­tio­nal spot­light with Ame­ri­can and Sino-Rus­sian plans to ins­tall nuclear reac­tors on the Moon to gene­rate elec­tri­ci­ty for future resi­dents. This ins­tal­la­tion defies both the let­ter and the spi­rit of the Outer Space Trea­ty and, even more so, the inter­na­tio­nal conven­tion that pro­tects the Moon. Add to this that the sen­si­tive nature of the ener­gy source used requires the esta­blish­ment of safe­ty zones, which amounts to the appro­pria­tion of por­tions of outer space by the States concer­ned or their nationals.

#5 The Artemis Accords establish private property in space

UNCERTAIN

The Arte­mis Accords are an inno­va­tive legal ins­tru­ment desi­gned by the US autho­ri­ties, NASA in par­ti­cu­lar, and whose signa­ture is a pre­re­qui­site for other states to coope­rate with the Uni­ted States on the Arte­mis pro­gramme and, more gene­ral­ly, on the pea­ce­ful explo­ra­tion of space. They take the form of a uni­la­te­ral, appa­rent­ly non-nego­tiable text set­ting out a set of new prin­ciples, some of which signi­fi­cant­ly sup­ple­ment or modi­fy the inter­na­tio­nal regime for space acti­vi­ties as defi­ned by the Outer Space Trea­ty. Among these prin­ciples is that of pri­vate pro­per­ty in space.

Howe­ver, the Arte­mis Accords spe­ci­fy that they are consistent with gene­ral inter­na­tio­nal law and inter­na­tio­nal space law and that the com­mit­ments they cover are not bin­ding, which leaves some doubt as to their true legal scope.

#6 Space is denuclearized but already militarised

TRUE

Yes, this is one of the cur­rent chal­lenges facing inter­na­tio­nal space law. Space acti­vi­ty is inhe­rent­ly dual use, ser­ving both mili­ta­ry and civi­lian pur­poses. This is true of the tech­no­lo­gies, it is true of the indus­try, and it is also true of the uses to which they are put.

Hence the export controls to prevent the pro­li­fe­ra­tion of wea­pons, the gra­dual ban on anti-satel­lite mis­siles, and the efforts cur­rent­ly being made to com­bat cyber threats, from jam­ming broad­casts to spy satel­lites. The NIS2 direc­tive, which is cur­rent­ly being trans­po­sed in France through a bill known as the ‘Resi­lience’ bill, is a step in this direc­tion, as is the EU Space Act.

#7 Space will become a terrain where armed hostilities take place

UNCERTAIN

Space is not offi­cial­ly a theatre of hos­ti­li­ties, but it is alrea­dy hea­vi­ly mili­ta­ri­sed. Civi­lian and mili­ta­ry satel­lites coexist there, with the lat­ter’s acti­vi­ties obvious­ly being any­thing but pea­ce­ful.  It is to be hoped that this situa­tion will remain unchan­ged and that it will not change in the near future. It seems that most states are aware of this.

#8 The International Court of Justice settles space conflicts, including private ones

FALSE

We have an inter­na­tio­nal judge, the Inter­na­tio­nal Court of Jus­tice. But this judge only set­tles bor­der dis­putes bet­ween states ; outer space, by its very nature, can­not give rise to this type of dis­pute. As such, I am not aware of any deci­sions that have been made in this regard.

Howe­ver, we can­not rule out the pos­si­bi­li­ty that dif­fi­cul­ties may one day arise, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in the mana­ge­ment of the fre­quen­cy spec­trum or orbi­tal posi­tions, which are beco­ming increa­sin­gly contes­ted and whose inter­na­tio­nal regime involves deli­cate coor­di­na­tion pro­ce­dures. Although not sub­ject to inter­na­tio­nal liti­ga­tion before the Inter­na­tio­nal Court of Jus­tice, this type of dis­pute bet­ween States, bet­ween States and ope­ra­tors, or bet­ween ope­ra­tors may be sub­ject to inter­na­tio­nal arbitration.

#9 The boundary between airspace and outer space is clear

FALSE

We know how to define airs­pace both in the part reser­ved for air traf­fic (as esta­bli­shed by the ICAO) and in the part cor­res­pon­ding to upper airs­pace, where sophis­ti­ca­ted bal­loons or drones, known as HAPS, cur­rent­ly ope­rate. Howe­ver, none of the rele­vant trea­ties, name­ly the Chi­ca­go Conven­tion on Inter­na­tio­nal Air Trans­port and the Outer Space Trea­ty, have esta­bli­shed any boundaries.

This is all the more pro­ble­ma­tic given that the Chi­ca­go Conven­tion esta­blishes the prin­ciple of com­plete and exclu­sive sove­rei­gn­ty of States over their airs­pace, whe­reas, as I have poin­ted out, the Outer Space Trea­ty pro­hi­bits any pro­cla­ma­tion of sove­rei­gn­ty by States. Arbi­tra­ri­ly, the famous Von Kar­man line, at 100 km, is used as a conve­nient boundary.

#10 Satellites must be registered

TRUE

Like air­craft or ships, they depend on the sove­rei­gn­ty of a State and are atta­ched to it. And it is because they are atta­ched to it through regis­tra­tion that the ‘laun­ching’ State can exer­cise juris­dic­tion and control over them and agrees to assume inter­na­tio­nal res­pon­si­bi­li­ty for them with regards third par­ties and other States. All of this is very consistent.

I men­tio­ned ear­lier the pro­hi­bi­tion of any appro­pria­tion. Space objects (arti­fi­cial bodies in outer space) are an excep­tion to this rule because they are atta­ched to the juris­dic­tion of a State. The ques­tion remains, howe­ver, whe­ther all laun­ched space objects – many of which are still ope­ra­tio­nal – are actual­ly regis­te­red. Unfor­tu­na­te­ly, this is not the case. The future Euro­pean regu­la­tion (EU Space Act), the text of which was made public on 25 June 2025, esta­blishes a Euro­pean regis­ter of space objects, the URSO, which will list all objects laun­ched by Euro­pean ope­ra­tors as well as by non-Euro­pean ope­ra­tors pur­suing acti­vi­ties on the ter­ri­to­ry of the Union.

#11 Contracts and technical standards are important in space law

TRUE

Contracts bet­ween ope­ra­tors and natio­nal space agen­cies, as well as bet­ween ope­ra­tors them­selves, are now an inde­pendent and impor­tant source of legal rules. For many, they some­times conve­nient­ly fill gaps left by natio­nal or inter­na­tio­nal legislation.

The adop­tion of inter­na­tio­nal tech­ni­cal stan­dards is essen­tial for the deve­lop­ment of space activities.

A text­book example is the contracts conclu­ded bet­ween ope­ra­tors for ser­vices pro­vi­ded in space, such as refuel­ling or, more gene­ral­ly, main­te­nance of ope­ra­tio­nal satel­lites. To pro­vide its ser­vices, the satel­lite invol­ved must dock with the satel­lite on which the inter­ven­tion is requi­red. Once docked, do these two satel­lites form a single space object or do they remain sepa­rate ? The ques­tion that arises and that the contract must cover is obvious­ly that of lia­bi­li­ty in the event of an acci­dent cau­sed to ano­ther satel­lite or to a third party.

The adop­tion of inter­na­tio­nal tech­ni­cal stan­dards is essen­tial for the deve­lop­ment of space acti­vi­ties. This is because satel­lite com­mu­ni­ca­tions account for most of the space acti­vi­ties mar­ket, but also because the space indus­try is based on assem­bly pro­cesses. All of this requires equip­ment to be inter­ope­rable. It is the­re­fore impor­tant to have a har­mo­ni­sed set of inter­na­tio­nal tech­ni­cal standards.

#12 The international governance of space is stable

UNCERTAIN

The Outer Space Trea­ty and its sup­ple­men­ta­ry conven­tions lay a solid foun­da­tion. Although they date back to the ear­ly days of space explo­ra­tion, they remain a use­ful refe­rence that no spa­ce­fa­ring nation serious­ly consi­ders chal­len­ging. Since then, space has become a mar­ket that needs to be regu­la­ted. The amount of debris accu­mu­la­ted in near-Earth space raises the risk of conges­tion that could make access impos­sible ; it must the­re­fore be managed.

Inno­va­tion rei­gns supreme in the space sec­tor, and tech­no­lo­gi­cal deve­lop­ments are undoub­ted­ly out­pa­cing legal deve­lop­ments. We need to rethink space gover­nance to take this into account, consi­der giving outer space and its poten­tial com­mer­cial exploi­ta­tion a legal regime ins­pi­red by that of the high seas, and ensure the effec­tive coexis­tence of a ful­ly-fled­ged inter­na­tio­nal orga­ni­sa­tion, the ICAO, and an inter­na­tio­nal asso­cia­tion, IATA, which exists in the avia­tion sec­tor, and rede­fine the role of exis­ting UN ins­ti­tu­tions : COPUOS and the Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA).

Per­iods of great uphea­val, such as the one we are cur­rent­ly expe­rien­cing, main­ly in the space sec­tor, are gene­ral­ly condu­cive to the major deve­lop­ments that fol­low them. We can the­re­fore remain confident.

Interview by Marie Varasson
1https://​www​.unoo​sa​.org/​p​d​f​/​g​a​r​e​s​/​A​R​E​S​_​2​1​_​2​2​2​2​F.pdf

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