3_chineSuprematieTechno
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The technology war between China and the USA

China and the race for technological supremacy

with Richard Robert, Journalist and Author
On March 23rd, 2022 |
5min reading time
Nigel Inkster
Nigel Inkster
Senior Advisor to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and former director of operations and intelligence for the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
Key takeaways
  • At the end of the Cultural Revolution, when China began to reform, a large cohort of educated young people who had been sent to the countryside returned to the cities and became entrepreneurs.
  • The Chinese Communist Party then simply let the enterprises flourish before taking over in the so-called “surveillance capitalism” regime.
  • In becoming a technological power, China has set itself the goal of making its technological standards world standards to dominate the field of industry.
  • The United States is therefore facing the rise of China, creating an existential competition between capitalism and communism.

China’s rise to the top over the last ten years has been spec­ta­cu­lar, espe­cial­ly with regards to tech­no­lo­gy. In many indus­tries, it would appear they are aiming for tech­no­lo­gi­cal supre­ma­cy. Is this part of a grand stra­te­gy ? Was it predictable ?

On more than one occa­sion, the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty has been sur­pri­sed by the conse­quences of their own poli­cies. At the end of the Cultu­ral Revo­lu­tion, when Chi­na star­ted its eco­no­mic reform, the coun­try didn’t take into account the impact of a large cohort of edu­ca­ted youth who had been sent down to the coun­try­side and came back to the cities. Because of their “bad” class back­grounds, they couldn’t get govern­ment jobs. Many became entre­pre­neurs. Nobo­dy had fac­to­red this in, but over time we saw this entre­pre­neur­ship taking hold.

China’s tech­no­lo­gi­cal deve­lop­ment was part­ly a hapha­zard pro­cess, which the autho­ri­ties tried, if not to control, to manage. With ICT, the Chi­nese lea­der­ship pro­ved to be very good, with a top-down view that crea­ting a free-mar­ket envi­ron­ment would enable experimentation. 

The Par­ty sim­ply sat back and wat­ched as com­pa­nies fought among­st each other, with the most suc­cess­ful ones making it to the top, before pro­gres­si­ve­ly moving in to exer­cise control over these enti­ties. The tech giants behave in a way simi­lar to what Sho­sha­na Zuboff cal­led “sur­veillance capi­ta­lism”: anti-com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness, abuse of consu­mer data. The Par­ty is now wor­king on regu­la­ting these com­pa­nies, for­cing them to leave space for new entrants and to stop exploi­ting their cus­to­mers digi­tal surplus.

There is a get out clause : the state can access all of this data whe­ne­ver it wants. Chi­na is also col­lec­ting large volumes of Wes­tern data, sto­red in digi­tal ware­houses around the coun­try, and pri­vate sec­tor com­pa­nies are pushed to sift through them to find infor­ma­tion that could help the Party.

Wes­tern govern­ments are still imbued with the idea that not all infor­ma­tion needs to be pro­tec­ted. We are only begin­ning to rea­lise that, aggre­ga­ted toge­ther with other data­sets and ana­ly­sed throu­ghout the fil­ter of arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, data which in and of them­selves would appear inno­cuous can be very revea­ling – in ways that we might not want them to be.

What kind of supre­ma­cy is Chi­na wor­king to achieve ?

As Chi­na became a more confi­dent tech­no­lo­gi­cal power, it began to rea­lise that it could use its gro­wing capa­bi­li­ties to shape the inter­na­tio­nal are­na. In areas of cyber-gover­nance and cyber­se­cu­ri­ty, Chi­na has rea­li­sed that if they can esta­blish their tech­no­lo­gy stan­dards as the glo­bal ones, they can then use their overw­hel­ming manu­fac­tu­ring power and eco­no­mic reach to become glo­bal­ly domi­nant in key areas. This is what the USA did during 20th Cen­tu­ry and what we the Bri­tish did in the 19th Cen­tu­ry with tele­gra­phy. When you wire the world, it gives you a lot of influence and power.

A key objec­tive is to enhance the inter­na­tio­nal accep­tance of China’s poli­ti­cal and value sys­tems, hence pro­vi­ding secu­ri­ty for a Com­mu­nist Par­ty that lives in constant para­noia. There is also the mili­ta­ry dimen­sion. Chi­na has been wor­king hard to become a cre­dible com­pe­ti­tor to the USA and is on its way to achie­ving this goal. It is indeed ahead in some areas of mili­ta­ry tech­no­lo­gy such as hyper­so­nics. There is also a huge advan­tage for Chi­na in terms of intel­li­gence as it rolls out its digi­tal “Silk Road,” which is a sub­set of a much wider glo­bal strategy. 

While Rus­sia has consi­de­rable cyber strengths, nobo­dy is going to buy a Rus­sian ope­ra­ting sys­tem or a Rus­sian com­pu­ter. Though Rus­sia has been acti­ve­ly thin­king about issues of cyber secu­ri­ty and cyber gover­nance, it is Chi­na that, through its domi­na­tion and abi­li­ty to com­mer­cia­lise this tech­no­lo­gy, is much bet­ter pla­ced to make the wea­ther in these areas.

How is the West reacting ?

It is now an article of faith among­st the Chi­nese lea­der­ship that the USA is bent on pre­ven­ting China’s rise. This is a dan­ge­rous situa­tion. Mark Twain said, “his­to­ry doesn’t repeat itself, but some­times it rhymes”. If you look at Impe­rial Japan in the 1930s, there are simi­la­ri­ties. Put blunt­ly, if Chi­na is backed into a cor­ner and has no other option, it may lash out.

Com­mer­cial inte­gra­tion used to be a fac­tor of peace. But this trend has rever­sed. There has been an over­con­cen­tra­tion in the manu­fac­ture of stra­te­gic com­mo­di­ties in Chi­na. Before the Covid-19 cri­sis the pri­vate sec­tor was alrea­dy star­ting to diver­si­fy its sources. This move­ment is gai­ning momen­tum. The gol­den era where Chi­na was the world’s fac­to­ry is coming to an end. 

Ear­lier this year Chi­nese Forei­gn Minis­ter Wang Yi said the big ques­tion is whe­ther the USA is willing to coexist with a coun­try with a very dif­ferent culture, values and stage of deve­lop­ment. Its exter­nal dis­course is about coexis­tence. Howe­ver, the inter­nal mes­sa­ging is one of exis­ten­tial com­pe­ti­tion bet­ween capi­ta­lism and socialism.

The ques­tion is : is there any room for Euro­peans in this glo­bal contest ? The EU and the UK lack a basic cor­pus of exper­tise and unders­tan­ding of Chi­na. They have great scho­lars, but their know­ledge doesn’t feed through into poli­ti­cal awa­re­ness. Besides, poli­ti­cal and com­mer­cial inter­est might diverge, both at natio­nal level or within the EU bet­ween net expor­ters and net importers.

China’s pre­fe­rence would be to deal with Europe as a single, pre­dic­table block. Whe­reas, in rea­li­ty, it is a kalei­do­scope of 27 states, each with very dif­ferent objec­tives. The temp­ta­tion to divide and rule is overwhelming.

Does tech­no­lo­gy rein­force these trends ? So far, it has been uni­fying the world, but it might become a bar­rier bet­ween two sepa­rate worlds in the near future. 

I always sug­gest my Chi­nese friends to read Karl Pop­per on the pover­ty of his­to­ri­cism. They won’t read Pop­per because he’s very rude about com­mu­nism. But his basic point is that you can’t pre­dict the future because you can’t pre­dict how tech­no­lo­gy will evolve.

Tech­no­lo­gy can be an empo­we­ring force for all coun­tries, not just Chi­na and the USA. Take the example of the cheap Tur­kish drones that were able to alter the mili­ta­ry balance in Nagor­no Kara­bakh. Europe can shape its own des­ti­ny if it gets the fun­da­men­tals right. We need to create an enabling envi­ron­ment for Euro­pean tech­no­lo­gy, and then deve­lop appli­ca­tions of exis­ting tech­no­lo­gies that would add value and give the Euro­peans some leverage.

In quan­tum com­pu­ting, Europe has a few cham­pions. How do you keep these com­pa­nies afloat long enough ?  In the USA such start-ups would be taken over by one of the big tech com­pa­nies : in Chi­na they would receive gene­rous state sub­si­dies. Can Europe find a way to sub­si­dise its tech start-ups until they can com­mer­cia­lise their research ?

5G is stal­led at the moment, just deli­ve­ring fas­ter down­load times for video. It will stay that way unless we deve­lop the actual appli­ca­tions. If you don’t invest in auto­no­mous vehicles or in robo­tics, if you don’t autho­rise adven­tu­rous appli­ca­tions for arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence, 5G will not ful­fill its potential.

Europe should also start to move away from the pre­cau­tio­na­ry prin­ciple and catch up with tech­no­lo­gy lea­ders in fields like AI, bio­tech and robo­tics. Data pri­va­cy is also an issue : there is a balance bet­ween pri­va­cy and innovation.

Emer­ging tech­no­lo­gies can serve mankind’s inter­ests if used pro­per­ly. Maybe in eve­ry govern­ment com­mit­tee dedi­ca­ted to these topics, there should be a couple of career cri­mi­nals, to be able to anti­ci­pate how mali­gn actor might abuse these tech­no­lo­gies and hence pre-empt abuse. In any case we need various competencies. 

As such, tech­no­lo­gy issues should be at the very centre of the poli­ti­cal agen­da. Last year the Chi­nese Polit­bu­ro spent two days loo­king at blo­ck­chain tech­no­lo­gy. This is how you do it if you want to unders­tand, and to shape, the future.

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