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“The climate challenge is an opportunity for capitalism”

Pierre Dockès
Pierre Dockès
Honorary Professor of Economic History at the University of Lyon 2

Cap­it­al­ism has been the sub­ject of severe cri­ti­cism, from its ori­gins and through­out its his­tory. What is the secret to its survival?

To under­stand the his­tory of cap­it­al­ism, we must aban­don the idea that it is a sin­gu­lar term; it can­not be locked into a single descrip­tion. There are sev­er­al dif­fer­ent ways of see­ing it, and this is the secret of its resi­li­ence. Look at China, where we observe a very dif­fer­ent ver­sion of cap­it­al­ism than that which we know in Europe or America. 

If you define it as an eco­nom­ic sys­tem based on free­dom of ideas, a mar­ket, private prop­erty, you miss much of the point. Rather, cap­it­al­ist sys­tems are marked by the very strong pres­ence of a reg­u­lat­ory, inter­ven­tion­ist and even author­it­ari­an state.

In the same way, a Marxi­an defin­i­tion, insist­ing on the rela­tion­ship between pro­duc­tion and the “wage-earner”, only cap­tures some of the pos­sib­il­it­ies (i.e., the first and second indus­tri­al revolu­tions). Some forms of cap­it­al­ism developed using slaves or enslaved pop­u­la­tions, while oth­ers, yes­ter­day or today, mobil­ise semi-depend­ent workers.

A Schum­peter-like defin­i­tion, emphas­ising the ‘enter­prise’ and the fig­ure of the entre­pren­eur, also misses part of the point. That only appeared at a late stage.

The unity and his­tor­ic­al coher­ence of cap­it­al­ism is the dom­in­a­tion of money and of the class of hold­ers with fin­an­cial means – in brief, the bour­geois­ie. When it emerged in the 16th cen­tury, this new mod­el was at first mar­gin­al with­in an eco­nomy still not very mon­et­ar­ised and dom­in­ated by agri­cul­tur­al pro­duc­tion. What ensured its suc­cess and led it to con­trol, and then absorb, a grow­ing share of pro­duc­tion and trade was its capa­city for innov­a­tion or, bet­ter still: ‘cre­at­ive destruc­tion’, as Schum­peter put it, but which had already been hailed in the Com­mun­ist Manifesto.

So, the innov­at­ive power of cap­it­al­ism has enabled it to respond to the chal­lenges it has faced? 

Yes, and it is not lim­ited to tech­no­logy. In the 19th cen­tury, the indus­tri­al revolu­tion gave rise to the “social ques­tion” because of the increase in the num­ber of work­ers and the dra­mat­ic liv­ing con­di­tions that the free labour mar­ket imposed on them. As early as the 1880s, Bis­mar­ck cre­ated the first social insur­ance schemes. In the 1930s and post-1945, driv­en by social and polit­ic­al protest, a “great trans­form­a­tion” (in the sense of Karl Pola­nyi) took place in response to this chal­lenge, regen­er­at­ing capitalism.

State inter­ven­tion, the fight against inequal­ity and trans­fers con­sti­tutes a return of polit­ic­al con­trol over the eco­nomy (the ‘re-integ­ra­tion’ of which Pola­nyi speaks) that cor­rects the destruct­ive con­sequences of self-reg­u­lat­ing mar­kets. And what is remark­able is the way cap­it­al­ism has trans­formed these con­straints into a power­ful engine.

Ford­ism is one form of this meta­morph­os­is. It was not to sell cars that Henry Ford paid his work­ers more, rather it was to solve the prob­lem of turnover asso­ci­ated with low wages. This response to an intern­al com­pany prob­lem became, under the lead­er­ship of the state, the par­agon of a new age of cap­it­al­ism. Mass con­sump­tion and pro­duc­tion, the explo­sion of pro­ductiv­ity, the rise of the urb­an middle classes, the leis­ure eco­nomy, the devel­op­ment of ser­vices, etc., cor­res­pon­ded to the excep­tion­al growth of the Glor­i­ous Thirty. 

The his­tory of cap­it­al­ism  can be char­ac­ter­ised by its rhythms, major crises – eco­nom­ic, social, polit­ic­al – and its rebound phases.

Chal­lenges and upheavals thus mark the his­tory of cap­it­al­ism, a his­tory that can be char­ac­ter­ised by its rhythms, major crises – eco­nom­ic, social, polit­ic­al – and its rebound phases: the some­times-viol­ent emer­gence of a prob­lem (wars play a major role), response and trans­form­a­tion of the sys­tem, new prob­lem (some­times res­ult­ing from the response), new response… And it goes on! 

Thus, it was from the crisis of Ford­ism, which could no longer raise its pro­ductiv­ity, that the revolu­tion of the 1970s and 1980s was born, embod­ied by Thatch­er and Reagan. A new ‘great trans­form­a­tion’, this time neo-lib­er­al, in which fin­ance is omni­present, based on the third indus­tri­al revolu­tion, revived the innov­a­tion machine, hence the growth of 1994–2006 (the fab­ulous dec­ade). But it has again gen­er­ated the con­di­tions for the great fin­an­cial crisis that broke out in 2008, and the exhaus­tion of pro­ductiv­ity gains.

In your book on Cap­it­al­ism and its rhythms (Garni­er, two volumes, 2017 and 2019), you insist on the endo­gen­ous char­ac­ter of these crises, and on the fact that cap­it­al­ism always pushes its lim­its. This is a mark of its dynam­ism, but isn’t it also its weakness?

Cap­it­al­ism is marked by an accu­mu­lat­ive logic, which rad­ic­ally dis­tin­guishes it from pre­vi­ous eco­nom­ic sys­tems (ancient, feud­al etc.). “Accu­mu­late, accu­mu­late,” said Marx in Book I of Cap­it­al, “this is the law and the proph­ets. This unlim­ited accu­mu­la­tion leads cap­it­al­ism to deep contradictions.”

It is in this that crises are endo­gen­ous, and I am not just talk­ing about fin­an­cial crises. It cre­ated the social ques­tion, but also, at the turn of the 20th cen­tury, the ques­tion of mono­pol­ies, hence the response of anti­trust in the United States, of Ger­man decar­telisa­tion after 1945, etc. In the same way, this regime of pred­a­tion on nature has cre­ated the envir­on­ment­al issue that is today a major challenge.

The cli­mate and envir­on­ment­al chal­lenge is throw­ing the com­passes out of kil­ter. With col­lapso­logy, we are see­ing the reappear­ance of apo­ca­lyptic think­ing: we will be pun­ished for our sins against nature, as we were yes­ter­day against God! But it has helped to make people under­stand the import­ance of the chal­lenge, for politi­cians and for eco­nom­ic agents, house­holds and busi­nesses, who are now play­ing a lead­ing role in devel­op­ing a response.

Like its pre­de­cessors, this new chal­lenge will have its answer. Changes in men­tal­it­ies and beha­viours, and the reg­u­lat­ory push will pro­duce tech­no­lo­gic­al and social innov­a­tions in which cap­it­al­ism, once again reg­u­lated by the state and its indus­tri­al policies, will be a stake­hold­er. The new alli­ance between cap­it­al and the state will act­ively par­ti­cip­ate in the devel­op­ment of the next world, a world of clean energy where the envir­on­ment­al foot­print of each addi­tion­al point of GDP will be ever smal­ler, an evol­u­tion that has already begun.

I will go fur­ther: the cli­mate chal­lenge is per­haps an oppor­tun­ity for cap­it­al­ism. It is an oppor­tun­ity to respond to anoth­er chal­lenge: that of “sec­u­lar stag­na­tion”, an old con­cern that was revived in 2013 by Larry Sum­mers, former chair­man of Barack Obama’s Nation­al Eco­nom­ic Council. 

Sum­mers, along with oth­ers such as Robert Gor­don, has observed the decline in pro­ductiv­ity gains over the past thirty years. He explains it by a grow­ing defi­cit of invest­ment oppor­tun­it­ies. A crisis of lan­guish­ing demand, a crisis of matur­ity: the happy days of easy growth are behind us.

It is per­fectly pos­sible that the envir­on­ment­al chal­lenge will provide an answer to this lan­guish­ing demand. The envir­on­ment­al trans­ition is a huge under­tak­ing. With the end of coal and oil, the rise in energy prices prom­ises prof­it­able invest­ments. It also offers a wel­come return of infla­tion, which has deser­ted the goods mar­kets to con­cen­trate on real estate and fin­an­cial assets alone. It is also an oppor­tun­ity to elim­in­ate waste and unne­ces­sary production.

Of course, one can dis­cuss the neg­at­ive effects of high­er energy prices, espe­cially for areas like Europe that will be lead­ers in this trans­ition. There is a price to pay in terms of com­pet­it­ive­ness, and unless we want to be the butt of the joke, we will need a car­bon tax at the bor­ders. There is a prob­lem of inter­na­tion­al coordin­a­tion here, which is no small mat­ter since the eco­lo­gic­al trans­ition must be glob­al. But the new con­straints also prom­ise a rebound. The “cap­it­al­ist machine”, sup­por­ted by the old, but inter­mit­tent, accom­plice, the state, may find in the cli­mate chal­lenge an oppor­tun­ity to bounce back again.

Interview by Richard Robert

Contributors

Pierre Dockès

Pierre Dockès

Honorary Professor of Economic History at the University of Lyon 2

Pierre Dockès specialises in historical economics (Le Sucre et les Larmes, Descartes, 2009), the history of economic ideas (the Complete Works of A. and L. Walras (ed.); Hobbes. Economie, terreur et politique, Economica, 2008). He is particularly interested in the globalisation of capitalism (Le Sucre et les Larmes, Descartes, 2009), its evolution and its crises (Le capitalisme et ses rythmes, 2 volumes, Classiques Garnier 2017-2019).

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