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Covid-19: why there will be no baby boom

Sander Wagner
Sander Wagner
Research Associate at the Leverhulme Centre for Demographic Science at Oxford University and an Affiliated Researcher at ENSAE/CREST (IP Paris)
Felix Tropf
Felix Tropf
Assistant Professor in Social Science Genetics at CREST/ENSAE (IP Paris)

Early on in the pan­dem­ic, as gov­ern­ments were start­ing to real­ise the mag­nitude of the Cov­id-19 crisis and the first wave of stay-at-home orders with busi­ness and school clos­ures were being imple­men­ted, news stor­ies about what this new situ­ation would mean for the fer­til­ity rate star­ted appear­ing. Vis­ibly, as the vir­us was run­ning wild, so was our fantasy. 

These early news stor­ies almost entirely focused on the pos­it­ive effects of stay-at-home orders on couples’ inter­course. As such, a com­ing baby boom was being hailed, fuelled by widely cir­cu­lat­ing stor­ies of increased births that fol­lowed 9 months after stay-at-home orders dur­ing hur­ricanes or snowstorms. Some news­pa­pers went so far as to christen this nov­el gen­er­a­tion of expec­ted chil­dren the “Coro­ni­als”.

Myth or reality?

Most experts, how­ever, were scep­tic­al of this nar­rat­ive. In fact, the research we have on past sud­den stay-at-home orders is much more tim­id in its con­clu­sions than the pop­u­lar myths that took hold. A rig­or­ous study of the great 1965 New York elec­tri­city black­out found no effect on the fer­til­ity rate 1and, while light storm warn­ings lead to a 2.1% uptick in births 9 months later, strong hur­ricane warn­ings lead to a ~2.2% decrease in the num­ber of new­borns nine months later2

Moreover, there already exists a sub­stan­tial body of research on how human fer­til­ity rates tend to play out dur­ing and after pan­dem­ics; the find­ings of which sug­gest that what was still being excitedly claimed on after­noon tele­vi­sion by couples’ coun­cil­lors was unequi­voc­ally false. His­tory tells us that pan­dem­ics do not drive baby booms. Rather, it is the oppos­ite: most of the time they res­ult in a severe baby bust

Lessons from Spanish Flu

The closest his­tor­ic­al ana­logy we can look back to is the 1918 Span­ish Flu, anoth­er truly glob­al pan­dem­ic – although it should be noted that it was con­sid­er­ably more deadly for young people than Cov­id-19, with the major­ity of excess mor­tal­ity in 1918 hap­pen­ing among the 20–40 year old pop­u­la­tion 3.  The fer­til­ity les­sons from the Span­ish flu are clear: wheth­er you look in France, the United States or Sweden 4, birth rates in all coun­tries stud­ied dropped sub­stan­tially, by about 13% in the US and by about 8% in Sweden as soon as the pan­dem­ic broke out. 

Data from the Span­ish flu show drops in birth rate 9 months after pan­dem­ic peaks. The drop was par­tic­u­larly strong in cit­ies that imple­men­ted only weak shut­downs to curb the vir­us (black line) © Sander Wagner

Shortly after the first lock­down orders were giv­en in France, we decided to look at how U.S. cit­ies that imple­men­ted non-phar­ma­ceut­ic­al inter­ven­tions, such as stay-at-home orders, busi­ness, and school clos­ures dur­ing the 1918 pan­dem­ic fared in terms of fer­til­ity 5. As could be expec­ted, fer­til­ity plummeted by an aver­age of 10–15% due to Span­ish Flu in the cit­ies we stud­ied. How­ever, the drop was less pro­nounced in cit­ies that imple­men­ted longer last­ing and stricter measures. 

As such, we con­sidered the pos­sib­il­ity that maybe there was some­thing to the much-her­al­ded link between stay­ing at home and increased inter­course after all? How­ever, anoth­er strik­ing char­ac­ter­ist­ic of cit­ies that imple­men­ted longer lock­downs was that they had con­sid­er­ably less severe pan­dem­ic out­breaks with much lower num­bers of mortality. 

There­fore, anoth­er pos­sible explan­a­tion was that lock­downs only increased birth rates because they reduced the neg­at­ive effects that a strong pan­dem­ic out­break had on people’s decision to have babies. To con­trol for that we con­sidered the strength of pan­dem­ic out­break in our stat­ist­ic­al mod­els. After doing so, the net effect of lock­downs on fer­til­ity rate was neg­at­ive – mean­ing less babies were born as a dir­ect con­sequence of lock­downs, bey­ond their effects on pan­dem­ic strength. 

Covid-babies 

Com­ing back to the cur­rent pan­dem­ic, the first data-based insights on what to expect come from sur­veys and from google search data. Sur­veys con­duc­ted in March and April of 2020 in France, Ger­many, Spain, Italy, and the UK showed that people aged 18–34 were increas­ingly plan­ning to post­pone or aban­don their child­bear­ing plans for 2020. In Italy, where the out­break was par­tic­u­larly strong, only 26% of indi­vidu­als that planned to get preg­nant in 2020 said they still had those plans, with 37% plan­ning to post­pone and 37% say­ing they had aban­doned their child plans. In France only 14% repor­ted abandon­ing the child plans but 51% did report that they would post­pone them if pos­sible. 6

Data from INSEE show that the num­ber of deaths in France (yel­low line) have greatly increased where­as births have decreased (blue line). © Bil­an Démo­graph­ique 2020

Anoth­er approach was to use Google Searches. It is pos­sible to pre­dict fer­til­ity rates based on the fre­quency of com­mon search terms, such as “ovu­la­tion”, “preg­nancy test” and “morn­ing sick­ness” amongst oth­ers. When this ana­lys­is was applied to the United States, this type of mod­el fore­sees a fer­til­ity drop of 15% for the com­ing months. 7.

Finally, we are also start­ing to get a first glance at fer­til­ity data from 2020 and, in doing so, we see that they sup­port the baby bust hypo­thes­is. In France there was a fer­til­ity drop of 2% for the year and in the U.S. one of 3.8%, which how­ever was 8% for the month of Decem­ber, when the pan­dem­ic effects star­ted to really show 8.

Many ques­tions remain. Did stay-at-home orders and school clos­ures have an addi­tion­al effect that was inde­pend­ent of the pan­dem­ic this time around? Did eco­nom­ic aid, in the places where it was avail­able, reas­sure people to con­tin­ue their fam­ily plan­ning and thereby cush­ion the fer­til­ity drop? Will the pre­dicted eco­nom­ic boom fol­low­ing the Cov­id crisis lead to catch­up fer­til­ity, mak­ing up for the fore­gone births? As research­ers con­tin­ue to eval­u­ate these ques­tions, for the short-term we must con­tend with a world in which less babies are one of the many con­sequences the vir­us has had on our lives.

1Richard Evans & Yingyao Hu & Zhong Zhao, 2010. « The fer­til­ity effect of cata­strophe: U.S. hur­ricane births, » Journ­al of Pop­u­la­tion Eco­nom­ics, Spring­er; European Soci­ety for Pop­u­la­tion Eco­nom­ics, vol. 23(1), pages 1–36, Janu­ary
2Udry JR. The effect of the great black­out of 1965 on births in New York City. Demo­graphy. 1970 Aug;7(3):325–7. PMID: 5524637
3Aass­ve A, Cavalli N, Men­car­ini L, Plach S, Livi Bacci M. The COVID-19 pan­dem­ic and human fer­til­ity. Sci­ence. 2020 Jul 24;369(6502):370–371. doi: 10.1126/science.abc9520. PMID: 32703862.
4Gav­rilova NS, Gav­rilov LA. Pat­terns of mor­tal­ity dur­ing pan­dem­ic: An example of Span­ish flu pan­dem­ic of 1918. Popul Econ. 2020;4(2):56–64. doi:10.3897/popecon.4.e53492
5Wag­n­er, S., Tropf, F. C., Cavalli, N., & Mills, M. C. (2020, Novem­ber 24). Pan­dem­ics, Pub­lic Health Inter­ven­tions and Fer­til­ity: Evid­ence from the 1918 Influ­enza. https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​3​1​2​3​5​/​o​s​f​.​i​o​/​f3hv8
6LUPPI, F., Arpino, B., & Ros­ina, A. (2020, May 22). The impact of COVID-19 on fer­til­ity plans in Italy, Ger­many, France, Spain and UK. https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​3​1​2​3​5​/​o​s​f​.​i​o​/​wr9jb
7Joshua Wilde & Wei Chen & Soph­ie Lohmann, 2020. « COVID-19 and the future of US fer­til­ity: what can we learn from Google?, » MPIDR Work­ing Papers WP-2020–034, Max Planck Insti­tute for Demo­graph­ic Research, Rostock, Ger­many.
8Cohen, P. N. (2021, March 17). Baby Bust: Fall­ing Fer­til­ity in US Counties Is Asso­ci­ated with COVID-19 Pre­val­ence and Mobil­ity Reduc­tions. https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​3​1​2​3​5​/​o​s​f​.​i​o​/​qwxz3

Contributors

Sander Wagner

Sander Wagner

Research Associate at the Leverhulme Centre for Demographic Science at Oxford University and an Affiliated Researcher at ENSAE/CREST (IP Paris)

Sander Wagner is a Research Associate at the Leverhulme Centre for Demographic Science at Oxford University and an Affiliated Researcher at ENSAE/CREST. His research interest include demography, motherhood, social stratification, intergenerational mobility and wealth.

Felix Tropf

Felix Tropf

Assistant Professor in Social Science Genetics at CREST/ENSAE (IP Paris)

Felix Tropf is a sociologist and with interests in social demography, genetics, and the life course. He is Assistant Professor in Social Science Genetics at CREST/ENSAE, an Associate Member of Nuffield College in Oxford, and a Visiting Scientist at the Queensland Institute for Medical Research (QIMR) in Australia. He received the European Demography Award for best PhD Thesis.

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