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Foresight: understanding the methodology

The scenario method : an aid to strategic planning

with Benjamin Cabanes, Lecturer at Mines Paris - PSL & at the MIE department of École Polytechnique (IP Paris), Orso Roger, Research Engineer at Institut des Hautes Etudes pour l'Innovation et l'Entrepreneuriat (IHEIE/PSL) and Liliana Doganova, Researcher at Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation at Ecole des Mines de Paris
On October 25th, 2023 |
5 min reading time
CABANES_Benjamin
Benjamin Cabanes
Lecturer at Mines Paris - PSL & at the MIE department of École Polytechnique (IP Paris)
Orso Roger
Orso Roger
Research Engineer at Institut des Hautes Etudes pour l'Innovation et l'Entrepreneuriat (IHEIE/PSL)
Liliana Doganova
Liliana Doganova
Researcher at Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation at Ecole des Mines de Paris
Key takeaways
  • The scenario method is a planning tool that can be used to design long-term objectives while the future remains undecided and uncertain.
  • There are three main categories of scenario: predictive scenarios, exploratory scenarios, and normative scenarios.
  • Scenario design is based on four distinct stages: construction of the basis, development of images of future situations, verification of the quality of the scenarios produced, and study of the consequences of these scenarios.
  • There are three main scenario methods: Intuitive Logics, Probabilistic Modified Trends and Foresight.

Stra­te­gic plan­ning consists of deter­mi­ning the set of deci­sions that will enable us to access the acti­vi­ties consi­de­red to be the most signi­fi­cant. In the imme­diate post-war per­iod, plan­ning was based on busi­ness fore­cas­ting methods that made it pos­sible to eva­luate the future on the basis of simple, rea­so­ned extra­po­la­tions of past trends1. Essen­tial­ly pro­jec­tive, plan­ning began with an inven­to­ry of ini­tial resources and means and ended, a pos­te­rio­ri, with the deter­mi­na­tion of short- and medium-term objec­tives. In the 50s and 60s, the emer­gence of fore­sight led to a rene­wal of plan­ning approaches, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in terms of devi­sing long-term objec­tives while the future remai­ned unde­ci­ded and uncer­tain. Unlike tra­di­tio­nal plan­ning, fore­sight plan­ning focuses on long-term objec­tives and goals, and then pro­gres­si­ve­ly looks at goals, stra­te­gies, and resources in rela­tion to an increa­sin­gly dis­tant time hori­zon. For­ward plan­ning is based on a range of hete­ro­ge­neous tools and prac­tices2, the best known of which is the sce­na­rio method.

Scenario-based forward planning

Sce­na­rio-based for­ward plan­ning involves pro­jec­ting into the future changes in issues, rules of the game, stra­te­gies and capa­ci­ties, as well as dis­tor­tions in the beha­viour of sta­ke­hol­ders and in the poli­ti­cal, eco­no­mic and socie­tal context3. This method of plan­ning keeps sta­ke­hol­ders in a state of per­ma­nent dis­com­fort, as it constant­ly requires them to rethink objec­tives, stra­te­gies, orga­ni­sa­tions and resources in an ever-chan­ging envi­ron­ment where the future remains unpre­dic­table4. The aim is not to pre­dict the future to bet­ter anti­ci­pate it. Rather, the aim is to ima­gine a pos­sible future, or to use Her­man Kahn’s phrase, to “think the unthin­kable”5. For Her­man Kahn6, sce­na­rios are an “aid to the ima­gi­na­tion” and consist of a list of hypo­the­ti­cal events desi­gned to encou­rage reflec­tion on their causes and the condi­tions for their realisation.

More gene­ral­ly, sce­na­rios can be defi­ned as spe­ci­fic repre­sen­ta­tions of the future that sti­mu­late reflec­tion on the pos­sible conse­quences of dif­ferent events and faci­li­tate the desi­gn of action plans. Howe­ver, this image of the future may be more or less pro­bable, plau­sible, pos­sible or even desi­rable. For example, the Inter­go­vern­men­tal Panel on Cli­mate Change (IPCC) has defi­ned a sce­na­rio as “a plau­sible and often sim­pli­fied des­crip­tion of how the future might evolve, based on a coherent and inter­nal­ly consistent set of assump­tions about key dri­ving forces and rela­tion­ships”7. In contrast, ADE­ME’s sce­na­rios8 of a car­bon-neu­tral France in 20509 are spe­cu­la­tive des­crip­tions of seve­ral pos­sible futures, which may be more or less desi­rable depen­ding on the indi­vi­dual (Figure 1).

Figure 1 : ADE­ME’s 4 sce­na­rios for achie­ving car­bon neu­tra­li­ty by 2050

Different categories of scenario

Because the pos­si­bi­li­ties for repre­sen­ting the future are so varied, fore­sight plan­ning can be based on a wide range of dif­ferent types of sce­na­rios. Depen­ding on the com­plexi­ty and uncer­tain­ty of the sub­ject to be explo­red, the time hori­zon cho­sen and the resources avai­lable, the pro­duc­tion of sce­na­rios can be based to a grea­ter or les­ser extent on fac­tual infor­ma­tion, weak signals, major trends or spe­cu­la­tive fic­tions. These choices will have a direct impact on the nature of the futures pro­du­ced, which may be more or less pro­bable, plau­sible or pos­sible (Figure 2).

Figure 2 : Dif­ferent approaches to desi­gning sce­na­rios10

There are gene­ral­ly three main cate­go­ries of sce­na­rios, which dif­fer accor­ding to the plan­ning objec­tives11 :

  • pre­dic­tive sce­na­rios, which use past and present know­ledge to esti­mate pro­bable future situations ;
  • explo­ra­to­ry sce­na­rios, which use the rea­li­ties, know­ledge, and major trends of the present to esti­mate the plau­sible conti­nua­tion of these trends in the future ;
  • nor­ma­tive sce­na­rios, which sketch out a par­ti­cu­lar vision of the future, gene­ral­ly desi­rable, and then go back in time to iden­ti­fy the paths to fol­low to reach that future.

This clas­si­fi­ca­tion is not uni­ver­sal, howe­ver, and it is pos­sible to spe­ci­fy and refine cer­tain typo­lo­gies12. For example, two types of explo­ra­to­ry sce­na­rio can be dis­tin­gui­shed : trend sce­na­rios, which favour the conti­nua­tion of major trends, and fra­ming sce­na­rios, which aim to deli­mit the space of pos­sible futures by radi­cal­ly varying the hypo­theses on the evo­lu­tion of present trends. Final­ly, the nor­ma­tive sce­na­rios can be situa­ted more or less at the fron­tier of the space of possibilities.

Figure 3 : Four types of sce­na­rio13

Scenario design

The aca­de­mic lite­ra­ture14 gene­ral­ly dis­tin­guishes three main classes of sce­na­rio methods in fore­sight : the “Intui­tive Logics” method15, ini­tial­ly deve­lo­ped at the Rand Cor­po­ra­tion in the 1970s, then per­fec­ted by the Hud­son Ins­ti­tute, Royal Dutch/Shell, the Stan­ford Research Ins­ti­tute and the Glo­bal Busi­ness Net­work ; the “Pro­ba­li­lis­tic Modi­fied Trends” method16 also deve­lo­ped at the Rand Cor­po­ra­tion in the 1970s ; and final­ly, “La Pros­pec­tive”17 deve­lo­ped by the French fore­sight school. Although dif­ferent in terms of objec­tives and tech­niques used, these three methods essen­tial­ly share four main stages in sce­na­rio design.

If the present can be consi­de­red as the star­ting point (explo­ra­to­ry sce­na­rios) or the end point (nor­ma­tive sce­na­rios), struc­tu­ring it always forms the basis of the sce­na­rio method. The first step is to des­cribe the cur­rent situa­tion, i.e. to construct the basis18 by high­ligh­ting the variables which cha­rac­te­rise the phe­no­me­non under stu­dy in its envi­ron­ment, and by iden­ti­fying the players invol­ved, their rela­tion­ships and their moti­va­tions. This des­crip­tion can be based on a wide range of tools and tech­niques. For example, the clas­sic tools of stra­te­gic ana­ly­sis (PESTEL, SWOT, Por­ter’s 5 forces, etc.), the DELPHI method, or struc­tu­ral ana­ly­sis, which involves orga­ni­sing a col­lec­tive dis­cus­sion to des­cribe a sys­tem using a matrix of relationships.

The second stage consists of deve­lo­ping sce­na­rios. Based on the image of the present, the iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of trends, “weak signals”19, “facts about the future” and the stra­te­gies of the players, the objec­tive is to desi­gn sets of hypo­theses in order to construct images of the future, i.e. sce­na­rios. Depen­ding on the variables selec­ted and the set of hypo­theses, it is pos­sible to obtain a wide range of sce­na­rios. A selec­tion will then have to be made in order to pro­pose a rea­so­nable num­ber of sce­na­rios, gene­ral­ly a refe­rence sce­na­rio and a few sce­na­rios pre­sen­ting contras­ting images of the future. Depen­ding on the objec­tives, these images may be more or less plau­sible or pos­sible, explo­ra­to­ry or nor­ma­tive. This stage can also draw on a wide range of tools and tech­niques, for example, mor­pho­lo­gi­cal ana­ly­sis20 (for “fore­sight”), the 2x2 matrix tech­nique21 (for “Intui­tive Logics”), cross-impact ana­ly­sis22 or trend-impact ana­ly­sis23 (for “Pro­ba­bi­lis­tic Modi­fied Trends”).

The third step is to check the qua­li­ty of the sce­na­rios pro­du­ced. The qua­li­ty of a sce­na­rio is mea­su­red by its level of cohe­rence24.This means asses­sing the sequence of ele­ments lin­king the present situa­tion to images of the future, and vice ver­sa. This sequence must contain a cer­tain degree of logi­cal and empi­ri­cal cor­res­pon­dence. In addi­tion, all the ele­ments and hypo­theses of a sce­na­rio must remain com­pa­tible with each other. Howe­ver, such a quest for jus­ti­fi­ca­tion may tend to pri­vi­lege the issues of plau­si­bi­li­ty and per­cep­tion of com­plexi­ty to the detriment of the ori­gi­na­li­ty and varie­ty of the paths envi­sa­ged25.

The final step is to stu­dy the conse­quences of these sce­na­rios for the pro­blem under stu­dy. This is a vital­ly impor­tant stage, as it involves deter­mi­ning the deve­lop­ment stra­te­gies, cla­ri­fying the action plan, and defi­ning and jus­ti­fying the deci­sions to be taken. For this stage to be effec­tive, howe­ver, the sce­na­rio method must not be confi­ned to an epi­so­dic acti­vi­ty26. On the contra­ry, it must be inte­gra­ted into orga­ni­sa­tio­nal pro­cesses and rou­tines such as stra­te­gy deve­lop­ment, risk mana­ge­ment, inno­va­tion, and public affairs27.

1Zaga­mé, P. (1993). Pla­ni­fi­ca­tion stra­té­gique : Quelques réflexions pour une trans­po­si­tion à la pla­ni­fi­ca­tion natio­nale. Revue éco­no­mique, 13–55
2Cabanes, B., Roger, O. & Doga­no­va, L. (2023). Com­ment les démarches de pros­pec­tive per­mettent-elle de pen­ser le futur ? Poly­tech­nique Insights.
3Rou­be­lat, F. (2016). Mou­ve­ment, pla­ni­fi­ca­tion par scé­na­rios et capa­ci­tés d’action Enjeux et pro­po­si­tions métho­do­lo­giques. Stra­té­gique, 113, 169–188.
4Ramí­rez, R., & Selin, C. (2014). Plau­si­bi­li­ty and pro­ba­bi­li­ty in sce­na­rio plan­ning. Fore­sight, 16(1), 54–74.
5Kahn, H. (1962). Thin­king about the Unthin­kable. New York : Hori­zon Press.
6Phy­si­cien et futu­ro­logue amé­ri­cain de la Rand Cor­po­ra­tion et fon­da­teur du Hud­son Ins­ti­tute, Her­man Kahn est consi­dé­ré comme le père fon­da­teur de l’analyse par scé­na­rios. Il est notam­ment l’auteur des ouvrages sui­vants : On Ther­mo­nu­clear War (1960), Thin­king about the Unthin­kable (1962), The Year 2000 : a fra­me­work for spe­cu­la­tion on the next thir­ty-three years (1967), Things to come : thin­king about the seven­ties and eigh­ties (1972), The next 200 years : a sce­na­rio for Ame­ri­ca and the world (1976).
7Inter­go­vern­men­tal Panel on Cli­mate Change (IPCC). (2007). Syn­the­sis Report. Contri­bu­tion of Wor­king Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assess­ment Report of the Inter­go­vern­men­tal Panel on Cli­mate Change. Gene­va : IPCC, p. 86.
8Agence de l’en­vi­ron­ne­ment et de la maî­trise de l’éner­gie.
9ADEME. (2021). Transition(s) 2050. Choi­sir main­te­nant. Agir pour le cli­mat. Col­lec­tion Hori­zon, ADEME. 650 p.
10D’après Wiebe, K., et al. (2018). Sce­na­rio deve­lop­ment and fore­sight ana­ly­sis : explo­ring options to inform choices. Annual Review of Envi­ron­ment and Resources, 43, 545–570.
11Bör­je­son, L., Höjer, M., Dre­borg, K. H., Ekvall, T., & Finn­ve­den, G. (2006). Sce­na­rio types and tech­niques : towards a user’s guide. Futures, 38(7), 723–739.
12Ramí­rez, R., & Selin, C. (2014). Plau­si­bi­li­ty and pro­ba­bi­li­ty in sce­na­rio plan­ning. Fore­sight, 16(1), 54–74.
13D’après Julien, P. A., Lamonde, P., & Latouche, D. (1975). La méthode des scé­na­rios en pros­pec­tive. L’Ac­tua­li­té éco­no­mique, 51(2), 253–281.
14Amer, M., Daim, T. U., & Jet­ter, A. (2013). A review of sce­na­rio plan­ning. Futures, 46, 23–40 ; Huss, W. R., & Hon­ton, E. J. (1987).
15Sce­na­rio planning—what style should you use?. Long range plan­ning, 20(4), 21–29.
16Brad­field, Ron, et al. « The ori­gins and evo­lu­tion of sce­na­rio tech­niques in long range busi­ness plan­ning. » Futures 37.8 (2005): 795–812
17Mac­Kay, R. B., & McKier­nan, P. (2018). Sce­na­rio thin­king : A his­to­ri­cal evo­lu­tion of stra­te­gic fore­sight. Cam­bridge Uni­ver­si­ty Press ;
18Godet, M. (1983). Méthode des scé­na­rios. Futu­ribles, 71(110–120).
19Schoe­ma­ker, P. J., Day, G. S., & Sny­der, S. A. (2013). Inte­gra­ting orga­ni­za­tio­nal net­works, weak signals, stra­te­gic radars and sce­na­rio plan­ning. Tech­no­lo­gi­cal Fore­cas­ting and Social Change, 80(4), 815–824.
20Feuillade, M. (2023). Quelles visions d’avenir pour la san­té visuelle ? Poly­tech­nique Insights.
21Spa­niol, M. J., & Row­land, N. J. (2019). Defi­ning sce­na­rio. Futures & Fore­sight Science, 1(1), e3.
22Bañuls, V. A., & Turoff, M. (2011). Sce­na­rio construc­tion via Del­phi and cross-impact ana­ly­sis. Tech­no­lo­gi­cal Fore­cas­ting and Social Change, 78(9), 1579–1602.
23Aga­mi, N. M. E., Omran, A. M. A., Saleh, M. M., & El-Shi­shi­ny, H. E. E. D. (2008). An enhan­ced approach for trend impact ana­ly­sis. Tech­no­lo­gi­cal fore­cas­ting and social change, 75(9), 1439–1450.
24Har­ries, C. (2003). Cor­res­pon­dence to what ? Cohe­rence to what ? What is good sce­na­rio-based deci­sion making?. Tech­no­lo­gi­cal Fore­cas­ting and Social Change, 70(8), 797–817.
25Roger, O., Doga­no­va, L., & Cabanes, B. (2023). Sce­na­rios as ins­tru­ments of future-making : A prac­tice-orien­ted ana­ly­sis of RAND Europe sce­na­rios. 39th EGOS Col­lo­quium.
26Schoe­ma­ker, P.J.H. and van der Hei­j­den, C.A.J.M. (1992). Inte­gra­ting sce­na­rios into stra­te­gic plan­ning at Royal Dutch/Shell. Plan­ning Review, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 41–46.
27Cabanes, B., Roger, O. & Doga­no­va, L. (2023). Com­ment l’entreprise Shell a‑t-elle anti­ci­pé le pre­mier choc pétro­lier de 1973 ? Poly­tech­nique Insights.

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