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Can green finance weather the Trump storm ?

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Peter Tankov
Professor of Quantitative Finance at ENSAE (IP Paris)
David Zerbib
Olivier David Zerbib
Researcher at CREST and Assistant Professor at ENSAE (IP Paris)
Key takeaways
  • Green finance, understood as the allocation of capital for the environmental transition, is being called into question for political motives.
  • In addition, the funding allocated to the transition falls far short of what is needed to keep global temperatures within acceptable limits.
  • Beyond necessary government interventions, promoting training, information sharing, investor coalitions, and open access to environmental data would help engage a wide range of actors in sustainable finance and strengthen support for the ecological transition.
  • Academic research highlights the growing environmental risks, the financial relevance of which could help convince hesitant investors and public authorities, while moving beyond the notion of ESG to focus more on impact investing.

Green finance, defi­ned as the allo­ca­tion of capi­tal to sup­port the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion, is under­going a tur­bu­lent per­iod. It is being cal­led into ques­tion for poli­ti­cal rea­sons, par­ti­cu­lar­ly since Donald Trump’s return to power in ear­ly 2025, and because it has become less pro­fi­table since the ener­gy shock and the rise in inter­est rates fol­lo­wing the war in Ukraine. Yet, there is a com­pel­ling need for finance to go green : among other things, the cli­mate emer­gen­cy is inten­si­fying, and the need for finan­cing to limit glo­bal war­ming to a rea­so­nable level remains signi­fi­cant. There are rea­sons for hope, howe­ver : recent research in green finance has given us a bet­ter unders­tan­ding of the mecha­nisms inves­tors can use to pres­sure com­pa­nies to go green and has iden­ti­fied tools that could signi­fi­cant­ly bend the emis­sions curve. Never­the­less, this will require a strong and concer­ted effort from civil socie­ty, aca­de­mia, and green inves­tors, who will need to play a grea­ter role to com­pen­sate for the lack of ambi­tion dis­played by public authorities.

A US-led backlash against a backdrop of unfavourable global macro-political conditions

Since Donald Trump’s first pre­si­den­tial term, invest­ment incor­po­ra­ting envi­ron­men­tal, social, and gover­nance (ESG) cri­te­ria has been at the heart of poli­ti­cal debates in the Uni­ted States. Some US poli­ti­cians, such as Florida’s Repu­bli­can gover­nor Ron DeSan­tis, des­cri­bed these prac­tices as “woke invest­ment,” that is, poli­ti­cal­ly moti­va­ted ini­tia­tives that are dee­med exces­si­ve­ly pro­gres­sive. Over the past few years, states such as Texas and Flo­ri­da have res­tric­ted the use of ESG cri­te­ria in the mana­ge­ment of public funds. In addi­tion, fol­lo­wing mas­sive with­dra­wals of public capi­tal from their ESG funds, seve­ral major US asset mana­gers have rele­ga­ted ESG consi­de­ra­tions to the back­ground to limit poli­ti­cal and repu­ta­tio­nal risks. As a result, faced with poli­ti­cal pres­sure in the Uni­ted States and threats of defec­tion from US finan­cial orga­ni­sa­tions, the Net Zero alliances of finan­cial ins­ti­tu­tions (NZIA, GFANZ, NZAM) have been dis­sol­ved, have announ­ced a down­ward revi­sion, or even the remo­val of their cli­mate targets.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025 has cemen­ted this back­lash in regu­la­tion. For example, the Secu­ri­ties and Exchange Com­mis­sion (SEC) has stop­ped defen­ding its Cli­mate Dis­clo­sure rule, and the US Depart­ment of Labor is consi­de­ring repea­ling the Invest­ment Duties rule, which allo­wed pen­sion funds to use ESG cri­te­ria. In terms of cor­po­rate gover­nance, the SEC has reins­ta­ted very per­mis­sive stan­dards for rejec­ting sha­re­hol­der reso­lu­tions on cli­mate issues. With regard to the deve­lop­ment of “green” infra­struc­ture, sub­si­dies for pro­jects contri­bu­ting to green­house gas reduc­tion have been can­cel­led, and new wind tur­bine per­mits have been suspended.

This poli­ti­cal back­lash in the US is com­poun­ded by an unfa­vou­rable glo­bal macro-finan­cial envi­ron­ment. The eco­no­mic slow­down, com­bi­ned with per­sistent infla­tion fuel­led by higher tariffs, has brought many ener­gy tran­si­tion invest­ment pro­jects to a halt. Fur­ther­more, the increase in armed conflicts and the expan­sio­nist ambi­tions of cer­tain coun­tries are ham­pe­ring the deve­lop­ment of green finance, which is suf­fe­ring from increa­sed mili­ta­ry spen­ding and redu­ced coope­ra­tion bet­ween coun­tries. As a result, faced with decli­ning returns on ESG assets, some inves­tors have tur­ned away from green inves­ting in search of finan­cial performance.

Inherent obstacles to the development of green finance

In addi­tion, the prac­tice of envi­ron­men­tal finance has not yet rea­ched matu­ri­ty. As far as inves­tors are concer­ned, although aca­de­mic research is star­ting to pro­vide a good unders­tan­ding of impact invest­ment mecha­nisms, the range of funds offe­ring this type of invest­ment remains insuf­fi­cient­ly deve­lo­ped com­pa­red with the offer of tra­di­tio­nal “green funds,” and impact mea­su­re­ment indi­ca­tors are not stan­dar­di­sed, par­ti­cu­lar­ly with regard to non-cli­mate impacts on nature.

Moreo­ver, regu­la­to­ry fra­me­works are frag­men­ted and still under deve­lop­ment in most coun­tries. In some cases, they are even being revi­sed to make them less res­tric­tive (see, in par­ti­cu­lar, the EU Omni­bus Act, which aims to reduce the ambi­tions of the Cor­po­rate Sus­tai­na­bi­li­ty Repor­ting Direc­tive [CSRD]), due to fears of incom­pa­ti­bi­li­ty bet­ween the socio-envi­ron­men­tal objec­tives of sus­tai­nable finance and the per­cei­ved or real risks of losing com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness. This lack of ambi­tion is also reflec­ted in public poli­cies where, for example, sup­port for the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion still coexists with fos­sil fuel sub­si­dies in many countries.

As for civil socie­ty, it is still insuf­fi­cient­ly invol­ved in sup­por­ting sus­tai­nable invest­ment. This is due to a lack of infor­ma­tion on the pres­sures exer­ted by human acti­vi­ty on cli­mate and bio­lo­gi­cal equi­li­bria, and on the levers for action that sus­tai­nable finance could offer. Addi­tio­nal­ly, green­wa­shing by many com­pa­nies, albeit to varying degrees, is under­mi­ning inves­tor confi­dence and commitment.

As a result, the fun­ding allo­ca­ted to the tran­si­tion is still well below the level nee­ded to keep glo­bal tem­pe­ra­tures at a rea­so­nable level, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in emer­ging coun­tries. Accor­ding to the Cli­mate Poli­cy Ini­tia­tive, annual cli­mate finance flows would need to increase five­fold by 2030 – from $1.46 tril­lion to $7.4 tril­lion – to stay on track for a 1.5°C glo­bal tem­pe­ra­ture rise.

Positive signs and reasons for hope

Yet, there are good rea­sons to keep hope alive, as the glo­bal momen­tum for sus­tai­nable finance and deve­lop­ments in research on this topic are favou­rable. Indeed, green inves­ting is gai­ning momen­tum and acqui­ring inno­va­tive tools. In 2024, it accoun­ted for $2 tril­lion, twice as much as invest­ments in fos­sil fuels1, contri­bu­ting to the dee­pe­ning of green mar­kets (e.g., the stock of green and sus­tai­nable bonds accoun­ted for $5.4 tril­lion in Q3 20242). In terms of pri­cing, com­pa­nies with the lar­gest envi­ron­men­tal foot­prints finance their debt at a higher cost than the others via a “brown pre­mium3.” In addi­tion, col­lec­tive ini­tia­tives conti­nue to flou­rish : for example, the Just Ener­gy Tran­si­tion Part­ner­ships are expan­ding (e.g., in Sene­gal with €2.5 bil­lion) and crea­ting a blen­ded finance model to phase out coal in emer­ging mar­kets4. All this is rein­for­ced by the deve­lop­ment of tran­si­tion plans to assess com­pa­nies’ ali­gn­ment with the Paris Agree­ment tar­gets. In 2023, one in four com­pa­nies asses­sed by the Car­bon Dis­clo­sure Pro­ject had a tran­si­tion plan com­pa­tible with a 1.5°C sce­na­rio, up 44% from the pre­vious year5.

The favou­rable momen­tum of green finance is also obser­ved in the indus­trial sec­tor. Seve­ral indus­tries are gree­ning qui­ck­ly : for example, in the trans­port indus­try, more than one in five cars sold in 2024 was elec­tric6, up 25% from the pre­vious year7. In addi­tion, inno­va­tion in green tech­no­lo­gy is acce­le­ra­ting : for example, the cost of a bat­te­ry pack fell by 20% bet­ween 2023 and 2024, ope­ning up pro­mi­sing pros­pects for mas­sive deve­lop­ment of ener­gy sto­rage8.

Final­ly, from a research pers­pec­tive, signi­fi­cant pro­gress is being made in unders­tan­ding the mecha­nisms through which inves­tors can incen­ti­vise com­pa­nies to become gree­ner. In terms of ESG invest­ment screens, seve­ral recent stu­dies9 show how neces­sa­ry it is to build a port­fo­lio that takes into account the exter­na­li­ties and finan­cing needs of all com­pa­nies in the eco­no­my – not just those in the invest­ment port­fo­lio – to maxi­mise the addi­tio­na­li­ty of the invest­ment rela­tive to a coun­ter­fac­tual state. Moreo­ver, the signi­fi­cant bene­fits of sha­re­hol­der enga­ge­ment have been docu­men­ted by seve­ral ear­ly empi­ri­cal works10.

Levers for action by governments, society, and researchers

So, what levers can be used to har­ness finance for an ambi­tious eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion in this chao­tic envi­ron­ment ? Ideal­ly, govern­ments should rein­force the favou­rable dyna­mics of green invest­ment by, among others : streng­the­ning fun­ding from public agen­cies and mul­ti­la­te­ral deve­lop­ment banks to increase the num­ber of pro­jects finan­ced, the­re­by increa­sing the sup­ply of green finan­cial assets ; sup­por­ting blen­ded finance pro­jects to reduce the cost of capi­tal for com­pa­nies contri­bu­ting to the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion and cata­lyse an increase in pri­vate invest­ment ; making the com­mit­ments made under the Net Zero alliances legal­ly bin­ding ; har­mo­ni­sing stan­dards and taxo­no­mies on an inter­na­tio­nal scale ; com­ba­ting green­wa­shing (through the deve­lop­ment of labels, rein­for­ced moni­to­ring, and even the intro­duc­tion of legal lia­bi­li­ty); sup­por­ting green R&D ; and repea­ling fos­sil fuel sub­si­dy policies.

Howe­ver, the poli­ti­cal and geo­po­li­ti­cal envi­ron­ments lead us to ack­now­ledge that these ambi­tious bin­ding mea­sures are unli­ke­ly to be imple­men­ted in the near future. In this context, what room for manoeuvre do civil socie­ty, busi­nesses, and inves­tors have to com­pen­sate for govern­ment inaction ?

A first lever for action is to enable as many players as pos­sible (uni­ver­si­ties, com­pa­nies, muni­ci­pa­li­ties, admi­nis­tra­tions, asso­cia­tions, etc.) to deve­lop trai­ning and awa­re­ness-rai­sing pro­grammes on envi­ron­men­tal issues and the avai­lable sus­tai­nable finance ins­tru­ments. Sup­port should also be given to the deve­lop­ment of ini­tia­tives pro­mo­ting inves­tor coa­li­tions. This could streng­then sha­re­hol­der acti­vism on envi­ron­men­tal issues and ini­tia­tives to dis­se­mi­nate infor­ma­tion wide­ly to sta­ke­hol­ders. Fur­ther­more, the deve­lop­ment of free, open-source data plat­forms on com­pa­nies’ envi­ron­men­tal foot­prints would give retail and small ins­ti­tu­tio­nal inves­tors easy access to key metrics. In addi­tion, sup­port for the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion, which includes increa­sing the num­ber of impact funds offe­red by asset mana­gers, would also bene­fit from the rise of envi­ron­men­tal­ly-focu­sed crowd­fun­ding platforms.

Final­ly, aca­de­mic research has an impor­tant role to play. It is essen­tial to sup­port resear­chers and research pro­jects on envi­ron­men­tal issues whose acti­vi­ties are com­pro­mi­sed in their home coun­try. Empha­si­sing envi­ron­men­tal risks, which are beco­ming increa­sin­gly threa­te­ning, and whose finan­cial mate­ria­li­ty is not in ques­tion, could enable green finance to regain the confi­dence of the most reluc­tant inves­tors and public autho­ri­ties. Howe­ver, beyond these unde­niable risks, research needs to fur­ther ana­lyse the condi­tions under which invest­ment can most effec­ti­ve­ly sup­port the eco­lo­gi­cal tran­si­tion. In par­ti­cu­lar, the focus should shift from ESG inves­ting to impact inves­ting, as ESG is a concept that encom­passes hete­ro­ge­neous and some­times contra­dic­to­ry dimen­sions, expo­sing it to cri­ti­cism and faci­li­ta­ting green­wa­shing prac­tices. This is all the more impor­tant given that the com­mon ESG stra­te­gies are not the most effec­tive in spur­ring com­pa­nies to green their busi­ness models.

Conclusion

At the dawn of Donald Trump’s second term, green finance is stal­ling poli­ti­cal­ly and facing sys­te­mic chal­lenges. Yet, recent advances in both tech­no­lo­gy and aca­de­mia offer grounds for opti­mism. By mobi­li­sing resear­chers, inves­tors, and civil socie­ty, it is still pos­sible to har­ness finance to achieve a path com­pa­tible with ambi­tious cli­mate objec­tives. While the urgen­cy is obvious, the ins­tru­ments are avai­lable. What is nee­ded now is the poli­ti­cal and col­lec­tive will to mobi­lise them !

Refe­rences :

  • Bol­ton, P., Kac­perc­zyk, M. T., 2021. Do inves­tors care about car­bon risk ? Jour­nal of Finan­cial Eco­no­mics 142, 517–549.
  • Green, D., Roth, B., 2024. The allo­ca­tion of social­ly res­pon­sible capi­tal. Jour­nal of Finance, For­th­co­ming Paper.
  • Heeb, F., Köl­bel, J., 2024. The impact of cli­mate enga­ge­ment : A field expe­riment. Wor­king Paper.
  • Hsu, P., Li, K., Tsou, C., 2023. The Pol­lu­tion Pre­mium. Jour­nal of Finance 78, 1343–1392.
  • Oehmke, M., Opp, M. M., 2025. A Theo­ry of Social­ly Res­pon­sible Invest­ment. The Review of Eco­no­mic Stu­dies 92, 1193–1225.
  • van der Kroft, B., Pala­cios, J., Rigo­bon, R., Zheng, S., 2025. Timing sus­tai­nable sha­re­hol­der pro­po­sals in real asset invest­ments. Wor­king Paper.
  • Zer­bib, O. D., 2022. A Sus­tai­nable Capi­tal Asset Pri­cing Model (S‑CAPM): Evi­dence from Envi­ron­men­tal Inte­gra­tion and Sin Stock Exclu­sion. Review of Finance 26, 1345–1388.
1https://​www​.iea​.org/​n​e​w​s​/​i​n​v​e​s​t​m​e​n​t​-​i​n​-​c​l​e​a​n​-​e​n​e​r​g​y​-​t​h​i​s​-​y​e​a​r​-​i​s​-​s​e​t​-​t​o​-​b​e​-​t​w​i​c​e​-​t​h​e​-​a​m​o​u​n​t​-​g​o​i​n​g​-​t​o​-​f​o​s​s​i​l​-​fuels
2https://​www​.cli​ma​te​bonds​.net/​r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​s​/​p​r​e​s​s​-​r​e​l​e​a​s​e​s​/​2​0​2​4​/​1​1​/​g​l​o​b​a​l​-​g​s​s​-​m​a​r​k​e​t​-​s​u​r​g​e​s​-​u​s​d​-​5​4​-​t​r​i​l​l​i​on-q3
3Bol­ton and Kac­perc­zyk, 2021 ; Zer­bib, 2022 ; Hsu, Li, and Tsou, 2023
4https://​www​.ener​gy​po​li​cy​.colum​bia​.edu/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​r​e​a​l​i​z​i​n​g​-​t​h​e​-​p​o​t​e​n​t​i​a​l​-​o​f​-​j​u​s​t​-​e​n​e​r​g​y​-​t​r​a​n​s​i​t​i​o​n​-​p​a​r​t​n​e​r​s​h​i​p​s​-​i​n​-​t​h​e​-​c​u​r​r​e​n​t​-​g​e​o​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​a​l​-​e​n​v​i​r​o​n​ment/
5https://​www​.cdp​.net/​e​n​/​c​l​i​m​a​t​e​-​t​r​a​n​s​i​t​i​o​n​-​plans
6https://​www​.iea​.org/​r​e​p​o​r​t​s​/​g​l​o​b​a​l​-​e​v​-​o​u​t​l​o​o​k​-​2​0​2​4​/​e​x​e​c​u​t​i​v​e​-​s​u​mmary
7https://​rho​mo​tion​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​o​v​e​r​-​1​7​-​m​i​l​l​i​o​n​-​e​v​s​-​s​o​l​d​-​i​n​-​2​0​2​4​-​r​e​c​o​r​d​-​year/
8https://​about​.bnef​.com/​b​l​o​g​/​l​i​t​h​i​u​m​-​i​o​n​-​b​a​t​t​e​r​y​-​p​a​c​k​-​p​r​i​c​e​s​-​s​e​e​-​l​a​r​g​e​s​t​-​d​r​o​p​-​s​i​n​c​e​-​2​0​1​7​-​f​a​l​l​i​n​g​-​t​o​-​1​1​5​-​p​e​r​-​k​i​l​o​w​a​t​t​-​h​o​u​r​-​b​l​o​o​m​b​e​r​gnef/
9https://​www​.iea​.org/​n​e​w​s​/​i​n​v​e​s​t​m​e​n​t​-​i​n​-​c​l​e​a​n​-​e​n​e​r​g​y​-​t​h​i​s​-​y​e​a​r​-​i​s​-​s​e​t​-​t​o​-​b​e​-​t​w​i​c​e​-​t​h​e​-​a​m​o​u​n​t​-​g​o​i​n​g​-​t​o​-​f​o​s​s​i​l​-​fuels
10https://​www​.cli​ma​te​bonds​.net/​r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​s​/​p​r​e​s​s​-​r​e​l​e​a​s​e​s​/​2​0​2​4​/​1​1​/​g​l​o​b​a​l​-​g​s​s​-​m​a​r​k​e​t​-​s​u​r​g​e​s​-​u​s​d​-​5​4​-​t​r​i​l​l​i​on-q3

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