Home / Chroniques / The BRICS+: economic alliance or future private club of raw materials?
tribune09_Nouvel-or-noir_EN
π Geopolitics π Economics

The BRICS+: economic alliance or future private club of raw materials?

Emmanuel Hache
Emmanuel Hache
Assistant and Economist-Prospector at IFP Énergies nouvelles and Research Director at IRIS
Candice Roche
Candice Roche
Research Fellow in Geopolitics of Metals and Ecological Transition at IFPEN
Key takeaways
  • The BRICS+ are a group of countries that are economically heterogeneous, but which are demonstrating their desire to become global powers.
  • The group has expanded with the entry of Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Ethiopia.
  • They have become major players in the oil and metals markets, challenging the dominance of the US dollar in world trade.
  • The group has become one of the pillars of global food security, producing 42% of the world’s wheat, 52% of its rice and 46% of its soya.
  • Despite their cross-investment and partnerships, the political and economic differences between the BRICS+ limit their unity as an ideological bloc.
  • Europe should be concerned about the risks of cartelisation of metals by the BRICS+, which underlines the need to develop its own extractive industries and strengthen its security of supply.

From the acronym BRIC, coined in 2001 by eco­nom­ist Jim O’Neill to describe the eco­nom­ic poten­tial of Brazil, Rus­sia, India and China, to its evol­u­tion into BRICS with the addi­tion of South Africa in 2011, and then to its recent trans­form­a­tion into BRICS+ in August 2023, the group has come a long way! This group, which is highly het­ero­gen­eous in eco­nom­ic terms (growth dynam­ics, demo­graph­ics, level of indus­tri­al­isa­tion, sec­tor­al spe­cial­isa­tion, etc.), has above all demon­strated its abil­ity to forge closer polit­ic­al ties and this shared (but also com­pet­ing) desire to become glob­al powers.

The evol­u­tion of the BRICS into BRICS+, with the addi­tion of Saudi Ara­bia, Iran, the United Arab Emir­ates (UAE), Egypt and Ethiopia in 20241, is reflec­ted in their lar­ger share of the world’s pop­u­la­tion (46%) and inter­na­tion­al GDP in dol­lars (29%). The main changes are likely to be seen in energy and met­al com­mod­it­ies. Indeed, by includ­ing some of the biggest export­ers or hold­ers of reserves on the hydro­car­bon mar­kets (oil and gas) and mem­bers of the Organ­isa­tion of Pet­ro­leum Export­ing Coun­tries (OPEC), the BRICS+ are pos­i­tion­ing them­selves as genu­ine poten­tial com­pet­it­ors to the dol­lar on the oil mar­kets, and there­fore to the United States. In the metals sec­tor, the sheer weight of Brazil, China, Rus­sia and South Africa makes the BRICS major play­ers on the mar­kets. And that’s not count­ing Saudi Ara­bia, a future min­ing power and the pos­sible future integ­ra­tion of Indone­sia, the Demo­crat­ic Repub­lic of Congo (DRC) and Chile.

Con­trolling the key raw mater­i­als sec­tors is now fun­da­ment­al in the con­text of glob­al decar­bon­isa­tion. Metals have become increas­ingly import­ant due to their grow­ing use in many low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies such as photo­vol­ta­ic pan­els (alu­mini­um, sil­ver, cop­per, sil­ic­on), wind tur­bines (alu­mini­um, cop­per, nick­el) and elec­tric vehicles (cobalt, cop­per, lith­i­um, man­ganese, etc.). Are we there­fore in danger of see­ing the birth of a new alli­ance based on raw mater­i­als, which would use them as dip­lo­mat­ic lever­age in a world of cli­mat­ic, eco­nom­ic, and geo­pol­it­ic­al insecurity?

An increasingly important group in the global economy

What the BRICS+ have in com­mon is that their devel­op­ment has been under­pinned by state-build­ing and a prom­in­ent pub­lic sec­tor. Many of them are mem­bers of the WTO2 and have taken advant­age of the momentum of glob­al­isa­tion and trade to become involved in inter­na­tion­al trade through the sup­ply of raw or pro­cessed nat­ur­al resources. While the BRICS+ account for around 25% of glob­al exports, intra-BRICS+ exports rep­res­ent only 15% of the group’s exports: the G7 coun­tries remain the main part­ners of these dynam­ic eco­nom­ies3. Their eco­nom­ic mod­els are partly based on the exploit­a­tion of raw mater­i­als. In 2023, the BRICS group will account for around 30% of the world’s GDP and 46% of its pop­u­la­tion, while the G74 will account for 10% of the world’s pop­u­la­tion and 45% of its GDP. How­ever, if we look at world GDP in pur­chas­ing power par­ity (PPP)5, the BRICS account for 31% com­pared with 29% for the G7: a his­tor­ic over­take that under­lines the group’s dynam­ism. And the recent enlarge­ment of the BRICS con­firms the group’s eco­nom­ic and demo­graph­ic weight on the inter­na­tion­al stage, with 34.5% of world GDP in PPP6.

The BRICS+: GDP and pop­u­la­tion, Source: World Bank

Since 2011, the mem­bers of the BRICS (and now the BRICS+) have met annu­ally to dis­cuss cooper­a­tion between their mem­bers, with the stated aim of increas­ing their influ­ence in inter­na­tion­al nego­ti­ations. In 2014, the group cre­ated the New Devel­op­ment Bank, known as the BRICS Bank, with an ini­tial cap­it­al of 100 bil­lion dol­lars to encour­age invest­ment in infra­struc­ture in devel­op­ing coun­tries7. The coun­tries have also signed a frame­work agree­ment designed to sup­port mem­bers’ liquid­ity in the event of dif­fi­culties with their bal­ance of pay­ments. Eco­nom­ic and fin­an­cial agree­ments, part­ner­ships, joint invest­ments… The BRICS offer an altern­at­ive form of gov­ernance on the world eco­nom­ic stage. They also form a group that is cur­rently attract­ive to oth­er coun­tries, but whose mem­ber­ship cri­ter­ia remain unclear, with enlarge­ment requir­ing unanimity.

The entry of Saudi Ara­bia and the UAE has strengthened the group’s glob­al influ­ence in the energy sec­tor. The BRICS+ now account for 43.1% of oil pro­duc­tion and 44% of oil reserves8. As for gas, they account for 35.5% of glob­al pro­duc­tion and 53% of glob­al reserves9. The Chinese President’s sup­port for the entry of coun­tries such as Niger­ia and Kaza­kh­stan also sig­nals China’s desire to strengthen the BRICS+’s influ­ence in energy10. In terms of food com­mod­it­ies, the enlarged group cur­rently pro­duces 42% of the world’s wheat, 52% of its rice and 46% of its soya11. Along with Brazil and Rus­sia, its exports to world mar­kets make it one of the pil­lars of glob­al food secur­ity1213.

BRICS+, a leader in metals markets

At a time when metals are becom­ing cent­ral to the low-car­bon and digit­al trans­ition, the BRICS+ now occupy a dom­in­ant pos­i­tion in both the pro­duc­tion and glob­al reserves of cer­tain crit­ic­al metals such as plat­in­oids, rare earth ele­ments and copper.

BRICS+ energy and met­al resources, Source: USGS, BP Stat­ist­ics
BRICS+ min­ing pro­duc­tion (2023)(This cor­res­ponds to refined cop­per), Source: USGS 
BRICS+ met­al reserves (2023)(This cor­res­ponds to refined cop­per), source: USGS

By boost­ing their pro­duc­tion and devel­op­ing the min­er­al poten­tial of their sub­soil, each BRICS+ coun­try is seek­ing above all to secure its own met­al sup­plies and strengthen its pos­i­tion as a pro­du­cer of crit­ic­al raw mater­i­als. For China, this strategy of secur­ing sup­plies is aimed at ensur­ing the long-term viab­il­ity of its pro­duc­tion of low-car­bon tech­no­lo­gies such as elec­tric vehicles and sol­ar pan­els. Mem­ber coun­tries are also diver­si­fy­ing their invest­ments to strengthen their pos­i­tion in oth­er stra­tegic metals that they do not pro­duce. Saudi Ara­bia illus­trates this poly­morph­ous strategy for pre­par­ing for the post-oil era: devel­op­ing the domest­ic min­ing industry, stim­u­lat­ing for­eign invest­ment (FDI), launch­ing part­ner­ships and aim­ing to become a region­al hub for energy and met­al trade14. For instance, the Saudi mon­archy has announced that it is tak­ing a stake in the Brazili­an group Vale through its min­ing com­pany Man­ara in order to secure its lith­i­um and nick­el sup­plies15. At the end of 2010, it also launched pro­duc­tion of titani­um sponge, a key raw mater­i­al for the arms and aerospace sec­tors, with a pro­ject bring­ing togeth­er the Japan­ese com­pany Toho and the Saudi com­pany AMIC16. By 2022, the Saudi eco­nomy will be the world’s 16th largest export­er, accord­ing to the Obser­vatoire économique de la com­plex­ité17.

In addi­tion to their abund­ant resources, the group’s dom­in­ant pos­i­tion is also reflec­ted in their com­mon policy of restrict­ing exports of stra­tegic metals18. All the BRICS+ coun­tries have intro­duced dif­fer­ent restric­tions on the export of metals, ran­ging from export taxes to out­right bans and the non-auto­mat­ic alloc­a­tion of licences to com­pan­ies. For example, in Decem­ber 2023, China banned the export of tech­no­lo­gies needed to pro­cess and refine rare earths, in the name of nation­al secur­ity19. While China cur­rently extracts 60% of rare earth ele­ments, it pro­cesses 90% of the world’s pro­duc­tion. The aim of the ban is there­fore to secure China’s tech­no­lo­gic­al lead20 in these essen­tial metals, which are used in the man­u­fac­ture of per­man­ent mag­nets used in off-shore wind tech­no­logy, elec­tric vehicle engines and smart­phones. In the future, a coordin­ated approach to restrict­ive policies could under­mine the energy secur­ity of Europe and the United States, both in terms of sup­ply and technology.

Met­al export restric­tions in the BRICS+ coun­tries, Source: OECD, Export restric­tions on raw materials

A solid metal bloc?

The BRICS+ are strength­en­ing their ties through cross-invest­ments and part­ner­ships, which seems to be rein­for­cing a bloc logic, par­tic­u­larly in the metals and trans­ition tech­no­lo­gies sec­tors. The entry into the club of the UAE and Saudi Ara­bia, which have fin­an­cial capa­city, strengthens the group’s invest­ment cap­ab­il­it­ies. Saudi Ara­bia has launched part­ner­ships with Brazil (Vale), China (Human Hori­zons) and Egypt. Fur­ther­more, although the United States and China are both invest­ing in the BRICS+, the com­pos­i­tion of their FDI is very dif­fer­ent: Chinese FDI focuses on man­u­fac­tur­ing, con­struc­tion and elec­tri­fic­a­tion, while Amer­ic­an FDI is con­cen­trated in the ser­vices, R&D and ICT sec­tors21. China is there­fore seek­ing to gain great­er con­trol over the tech­no­lo­gic­al value chains at the heart of the low-car­bon trans­ition. The BRICS+ group there­fore seems to be partly struc­tured around fin­an­cial flows in stra­tegic mar­kets such as metals.

How­ever, to really devel­op a metals bloc, the BRICS+ need to integ­rate a few more coun­tries. The addi­tion of key mem­bers such as Chile, the Demo­crat­ic Repub­lic of Congo (DRC) and Indone­sia would rad­ic­ally increase the group’s dom­in­ance of the metals mar­ket. The DRC accounts for 74% of the world’s cobalt pro­duc­tion and 55% of its reserves, while Chile is a major pro­du­cer of cop­per and lith­i­um. While the DRC has expressed a desire to strengthen its ties with the BRICS+22, the oth­er two coun­tries do not cur­rently appear to be inter­ested in an alli­ance with the bloc. After hint­ing that it would join the BRICS+ fol­low­ing an invit­a­tion23, Indone­sia finally refused to join, ques­tion­ing the real eco­nom­ic gains behind this mem­ber­ship24. South­east Asia’s rising eco­nomy, which pro­duces 50% of the world’s nick­el, there­fore prefers to remain inde­pend­ent and non-aligned, as it has been in the past. 

These dis­cus­sions about wheth­er or not to join the BRICS+, des­pite the con­ver­gence of their eco­nom­ic interests, raise ques­tions about the unity of the bloc. The BRICS+ share a desire to com­pete with the major West­ern eco­nom­ies, to assert them­selves on the inter­na­tion­al stage and to reform the inter­na­tion­al mon­et­ary sys­tem, but the mem­bers are divided on sev­er­al issues. Het­ero­gen­eous polit­ic­al regimes, a lack of eco­nom­ic con­ver­gence, geo­pol­it­ic­al dis­agree­ments, oppos­ing alli­ances, not­ably with the United States, and region­al com­pet­i­tion between China and India or Indone­sia – all these factors hamper the unity of the bloc. It would appear that join­ing the BRICS+ is part of a strategy to diver­si­fy part­ner­ships, rather than the par­ti­cip­a­tion in a new ideo­lo­gic­al bloc. Today’s inter­na­tion­al rela­tions are based on multi-align­ment and trans­ac­tion­al logic: each play­er will forge an ad hoc and sec­tor­al alli­ance in line with its own interests. It is this logic that has enabled Saudi Ara­bia to renew its stra­tegic and secur­ity part­ner­ship with the United States while strength­en­ing its ties with China and join­ing the BRICS+. On the issue of metals, how­ever, the interests of the mem­bers are fairly con­ver­gent – con­trol over the pro­duc­tion of stra­tegic metals and there­fore con­trol over prices, a dom­in­ant pos­i­tion on trans­ition issues, a mono­poly on tech­no­lo­gies – which makes the devel­op­ment of a min­er­al bloc, or at the very least the coordin­a­tion of extract­ive and trade policies, credible.

What are the risks for Europe when faced with a metals bloc?

The risk of car­telisa­tion is for­cing oth­er play­ers, and Europe in par­tic­u­lar, to con­sider the place of metals in future inter­na­tion­al rela­tions and the risk this rep­res­ents for their own sup­plies25. Europeans have had a rude awaken­ing on the gas mar­kets fol­low­ing Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine26 and metals have become a cent­ral issue for Europe, as the costs of the eco­lo­gic­al trans­ition will depend heav­ily on the price of these raw mater­i­als. Aware of the stakes, in 2023 the European Com­mis­sion pub­lished a reg­u­la­tion, the Crit­ic­al Raw Mater­i­al Act, to ‘sup­port the devel­op­ment of domest­ic capa­cit­ies and strengthen the sus­tain­ab­il­ity and cir­cu­lar­ity of sup­ply chains27’ for crit­ic­al raw mater­i­als. How­ever, this is a sign of the grow­ing ten­sion in these mar­kets and a grow­ing aware­ness of the return of con­flict to their core. These ten­sions could ulti­mately provide an oppor­tun­ity for Europe to devel­op its own extract­ive indus­tries on its own soil, which would meet the sus­tain­ab­il­ity stand­ards that the Old Con­tin­ent has set itself, while export­ing its envir­on­ment­al stand­ards to the rest of the world. Coupled with a policy of sobri­ety and a major recyc­ling sys­tem, European mines would improve secur­ity of sup­ply by redu­cing our depend­ence on a poten­tial BRICS+ cartel.

1https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-invites-six-countries-including-saudi-arabia-iran-be-new-members-2023–08-24/ Argen­tina had ini­tially announced that it would join the group, but even­tu­ally retrac­ted fol­low­ing the elec­tion of Javi­er Milei.
2Brazil (1995), Egypt (1995), China (2001), India (1995), Saudi Ara­bia (2005), Rus­sia (2012), South Africa (1995), United Arab Emir­ates (1996).
3https://​www​.banque​-france​.fr/​e​n​/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​-​a​n​d​-​s​t​a​t​i​s​t​i​c​s​/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​e​x​p​a​n​s​i​o​n​-​b​r​i​c​s​-​w​h​a​t​-​a​r​e​-​p​o​t​e​n​t​i​a​l​-​c​o​n​s​e​q​u​e​n​c​e​s​-​g​l​o​b​a​l​-​e​c​onomy
4G7
5GDP in pur­chas­ing power par­ity (PPP) adjusts GDP to take account of dif­fer­ences in price levels between coun­tries, thus offer­ing a more accur­ate com­par­is­on of liv­ing stand­ards and pur­chas­ing power than GDP expressed solely in mon­et­ary terms.
6World Bank, 2022
7https://​www​.ndb​.int/​a​b​o​u​t​-ndb/
8https://lecourrier.vn/les-brics-representent-quatre-fois-la-population-du-g7-et-44-des-reserves-mondiales-de-petrole/1196675.html#:~:text=The%20Brics%20repr%C3%A9sent%20four%20times,of%20r%C3%A9global%20reserves%20of%20p%C3%A9oil
9https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Note-AFD-BRICS‑D%C3%A9cembre-2023.pdf
10https://​www​.intel​li​genceon​line​.com/​g​o​v​e​r​n​m​e​n​t​-​i​n​t​e​l​l​i​g​e​n​c​e​/​2​0​2​3​/​1​0​/​3​0​/​x​i​-​j​i​n​p​i​n​g​-​b​a​n​k​s​-​o​n​-​n​i​g​e​r​i​a​-​k​a​z​a​k​h​s​t​a​n​-​a​n​d​-​v​i​e​t​n​a​m​-​t​o​-​t​u​r​n​-​n​e​x​t​-​w​a​v​e​-​o​f​-​b​r​i​c​s​-​a​d​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​-​t​o​-​c​h​i​n​a​-​s​-​a​d​v​a​n​t​a​g​e​,​1​1​0​0​8​2​2​2​8-art
11FAO
12http://​bric​s2022​.mfa​.gov​.cn/​e​n​g​/​t​p​z​x​/​2​0​2​2​0​6​/​t​2​0​2​2​0​6​1​0​_​1​0​7​0​1​7​0​6​.html
13https://​www​.csis​.org/​a​n​a​l​y​s​i​s​/​s​i​x​-​n​e​w​-​b​r​i​c​s​-​i​m​p​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​-​e​n​e​r​g​y​-​trade
14https://​www​.poly​tech​nique​-insights​.com/​t​r​i​b​u​n​e​s​/​e​c​o​n​o​m​i​e​/​l​a​r​a​b​i​e​-​s​a​o​u​d​i​t​e​-​u​n​e​-​f​u​t​u​r​e​-​p​u​i​s​s​a​n​c​e​-​m​i​n​iere/
15https://​vale​.com/​f​r​/​w​/​v​a​l​e​-​a​n​n​o​u​n​c​e​s​-​s​t​r​a​t​e​g​i​c​-​p​a​r​t​n​e​r​s​h​i​p​-​w​i​t​h​-​m​a​n​a​r​a​-​m​i​n​e​r​a​l​s​-​a​n​d​-​e​n​g​i​n​e​-​n​o​-​1​-​t​o​-​a​c​c​e​l​e​r​a​t​e​-​g​r​o​w​t​h​-​o​f​-​e​n​e​r​g​y​-​t​r​a​n​s​i​t​i​o​n​-​m​e​t​a​l​s​-​b​u​s​iness
16https://www.ctci.com/e‑newsletter/EN/457/discover-reliable/article-01.html
17https://​oec​.world/​e​n​/​p​r​o​f​i​l​e​/​b​i​l​a​t​e​r​a​l​-​p​r​o​d​u​c​t​/​t​i​t​a​n​i​u​m​/​r​e​p​o​r​t​e​r/sau
18OECD, Export restric­tions on Indus­tri­al Raw Mater­i­als
19https://​www​.voanews​.com/​a​/​7​4​0​7​6​2​9​.html
20https://​www​.csis​.org/​a​n​a​l​y​s​i​s​/​w​h​a​t​-​c​h​i​n​a​s​-​b​a​n​-​r​a​r​e​-​e​a​r​t​h​s​-​p​r​o​c​e​s​s​i​n​g​-​t​e​c​h​n​o​l​o​g​y​-​e​x​p​o​r​t​s​-​means
21https://​www​.fdi​in​tel​li​gence​.com/​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​d​a​t​a​-​t​r​e​n​d​s​/​b​r​i​c​s​-​e​x​p​a​n​s​i​o​n​-​d​i​l​u​t​e​s​-​g​7​-​i​n​v​e​s​t​m​e​n​t​-​i​n​f​l​u​e​n​c​e​-​82922
22https://actualite.cd/2023/08/25/brics-invitee-en-tant-que-pays-ami-la-rdc-espere-obtenir-des-financements-pouraccelerer#:~:text=La%20R%C3%A9publique%20d%C3%A9mocratique%20du%20Congo,Afrique%20du%20Sud%2C%20pays%20h%C3%B4te.
23https://www.cointribune.com/les-brics-invitent-lindonesie-une-grande-revolution-se-prepare/#:~:text=The%20BRICS%20invite%20the%20C3%A9sia%20%C3%A0%20to%20join%20the%20coalition%2C%20one,the%20mon%C3%A9tary%20ambitions%20of%20the%20BRICS.
24https://​east​as​i​afor​um​.org/​2​0​2​3​/​1​0​/​2​5​/​w​h​y​-​i​n​d​o​n​e​s​i​a​-​c​h​o​s​e​-​a​u​t​o​n​o​m​y​-​o​v​e​r​-​b​r​i​c​s​-​m​e​m​b​e​r​ship/
25https://​www​.con​nais​san​cedesen​er​gies​.org/​t​r​i​b​u​n​e​-​a​c​t​u​a​l​i​t​e​-​e​n​e​r​g​i​e​s​/​m​e​t​a​u​x​-​s​t​r​a​t​e​g​i​q​u​e​s​-​e​t​-​s​i​-​l​e​s​-​p​a​y​s​-​p​r​o​d​u​c​t​e​u​r​s​-​s​e​-​r​e​g​r​o​u​p​a​i​e​n​t​-​e​n​-​c​a​r​t​e​l​-​d​u​-​t​y​p​e​-opep
26Grekou, C; Hache, E., Lantz, F., Mas­sol, O., Mignon, V., Rag­ot, L., (2022), ‘Guerre en Ukraine : bou­le­verse­ment et défis éner­gétiques en Europe’, Policy Brief CEPII. http://​www​.cepii​.fr/​C​E​P​I​I​/​f​r​/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​p​b​/​a​b​s​t​r​a​c​t​.​a​s​p​?​N​o​D​o​c​=​13355
27https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​c​o​m​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​/​p​r​e​s​s​c​o​r​n​e​r​/​d​e​t​a​i​l​/​f​r​/​i​p​_​2​3​_1661

Support accurate information rooted in the scientific method.

Donate