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Three keys to making good decisions

Patrice Georget
Patrice Georget
Lecturer in Psychosociology at the University School of Management IAE Caen

The World Health Orga­ni­sa­tion (WHO) recent­ly lis­ted kno­wing how to make deci­sions as one of the ten psy­cho­so­cial skills requi­red to respond effec­ti­ve­ly to the demands and chal­lenges of modern dai­ly life. Clas­si­cal­ly, neu­ros­cience dis­tin­guishes three stages in deci­sion making1 : defi­ni­tion of pre­fe­rences, exe­cu­tion and obser­va­tion of an action and final­ly expe­rience of the result. Here, I offer some of the pit­falls within each of these stages and offer sug­ges­tions of how to over­come them by loo­king at three major psy­cho­lo­gi­cal duels.

Duel #1 : heuristic vs. systematic

“Am making the right decision?”

The pro­cess of ‘deci­ding’ consists of mana­ging the conflict that occurs bet­ween the two speeds at which our thoughts occur. ‘Sys­tem 1’ is rapid, low effort, intui­tive and heu­ris­tic, com­pa­red to sys­tem 2 that is slow, sys­te­ma­tic, logi­cal, and deli­be­rate2. Both have their advan­tages (speed, ease, relia­bi­li­ty, rele­vance) and disad­van­tages (bias, noise, cost, fatigue), which are the source of much scien­ti­fic debate. None­the­less, the key to mana­ging this duel is found in pro­cess of inhi­bi­tion3 ; in other words, suc­cee­ding (when neces­sa­ry) in sus­pen­ding has­ty jud­ge­ment, rea­dy-made rou­tines, consen­sual ste­reo­types and cog­ni­tive biases – in other words, kno­wing when not to act.

Of course, it is more dif­fi­cult to inhi­bit rou­tines than it is fol­low pre-lear­ned pat­terns because it requires new infor­ma­tion to be lear­ned and prac­ti­sed. As such, applying strict selec­ti­vi­ty to a deci­sion consists of mea­su­ring and wei­ghing up the duel bet­ween the two speeds of the mind that drive our choices45, kno­wing that some­times intui­tive deci­sions may, in fact, prove to be more effec­tive6.

Appli­ca­tion #1

Here is an example of a deci­sion you could come across : “Play the lot­te­ry in such a way as to win the most money”. Take a minute to place five num­bers on a grid from 1 to 49 and think about the duel that is going on inside you – pro­ba­bly uncons­cious­ly. Gene­ral­ly, we mobi­lise sys­tem 1 to play the lot­te­ry. For example, using the avai­la­bi­li­ty of ‘lucky’ num­bers (such as bir­th­days) or the repre­sen­ta­tion bias of chance which leads us to spread out our num­bers, to “increase our chances”7 ! Howe­ver, as it turns out, eve­ryone tends to use the same methods and biases. So, when we observe the grids of lot­to players, we notice on the one hand that there is a satu­ra­tion of choices bet­ween 1 and 31 (dates of birth) and on the other hand that there are very few sequences. To res­pect the ini­tial task (opti­mise win­nings) you must do what the others don’t do. That means you should play num­bers above 31, and include sequences, because few other people do so. Thus, in the event of a suc­cess­ful draw you don’t have to share the win­ning ! As we can see in this example, “playing well” consists of inhi­bi­ting the natu­ral drive towards our super­sti­tions and biases the­re­fore trying to fight against one­self. This is true in most of our dai­ly decision-making.

Duel #2 : perseverance vs. persistence

“Did I do the right thing?”

The grea­ter the invest­ment in time, ener­gy, or resources (human, finan­cial, etc.), the stron­ger the will to legi­ti­mise the deci­sion taken. But how far can we per­se­vere to the point of no lon­ger being objec­tive, no lon­ger seeing the facts or hea­ring the argu­ments that clear­ly call into ques­tion the deci­sion we made ? While it is good and social­ly valued to be per­sistent, it is impor­tant to iden­ti­fy the almost obses­sive pur­suit of an action against all objec­tive rea­son89.

Once the deci­sion has been made, the impla­cable logic of ‘sunk costs’ sets in, with its share of well-known cog­ni­tive biases that are hard to shake off : hypo­the­sis confir­ma­tion (I look for argu­ments that confirm my deci­sion and only those argu­ments), sta­tus quo (if there is no rea­son to change, then why change ?), loss aver­sion (to risk losing because of a change is psy­cho­lo­gi­cal­ly unbea­rable).

It is dif­fi­cult to fight against this dilem­ma alone since we are often only dim­ly aware of our own cog­ni­tive biases. Hence, taking coun­ter­mea­sures can make it pos­sible to avoid these traps befo­re­hand. For example, ensu­ring that the people who make deci­sions are not the same as those who eva­luate the effects and the­re­fore the conti­nua­tion of the deci­sion taken. This is why, for example, new pre­si­dents who come to power can more easi­ly stop pro­cesses that were star­ted 20 years ago and which eve­ryone knew were ineffective…

Appli­ca­tion #2

the Mon­ty Hall dilem­ma10 illus­trates this deci­sion-making trap well. Ima­gine you have three opaque cups A, B and C in front of you. Under one of them you have hid­den, for example, a €50 note, under the other two nothing. You must choose a cup with the objec­tive of win­ning the €50. For example, you choose A. The host then turns over one of the two remai­ning cups that he is sure does not contain the €50 – B, for example. You are then offe­red ano­ther choice : keep the ori­gi­nal choice (A) or take the remai­ning one (C). What do you do ? The overw­hel­ming majo­ri­ty of par­ti­ci­pants decide to stay with the ini­tial choice (A), belie­ving that there is no rea­son to change. Howe­ver, to maxi­mise the gain, it is neces­sa­ry to change because the remai­ning cup (C) has the same pro­ba­bi­li­ty as the retur­ned cup (B). It is remar­kable to car­ry out this expe­riment in a group and to note on the one hand to what extent the argu­ments of the par­ti­ci­pants reflect the above-men­tio­ned cog­ni­tive biases, and on the other hand to what extent the divergent mino­ri­ty posi­tions (chan­ging the cup) are obs­cu­red from the debate by the majo­ri­ty who fier­ce­ly main­tain that chan­ging is irrelevant.

Duel #3 : investigator or lawyer ?

“Was I right?”

Our minds are par­ti­cu­lar­ly adept at recons­truc­ting past sequences by attri­bu­ting inter­nal causes (skill, effort) to our suc­cesses and exter­nal causes (dif­fi­cul­ty, envi­ron­ment) to our fai­lures. Hind­sight bias is the ene­my of reliable debrie­fing and feed­back, since once the effects of a deci­sion are known, its func­tion is to give us the fee­ling that we always knew befo­re­hand what was going to hap­pen. It acts as a control of uncer­tain­ty : “it was obvious, I knew it would work”. In a way, one becomes a lawyer who seeks to exo­ne­rate or incri­mi­nate those accu­sed of a bad deci­sion, which results in a search for those guil­ty and res­pon­sible who “knew but said nothing”. The cur­rent health cri­sis shows that the witch-hunt can rapid­ly take hold. To avoid this trap, both for one­self and for others, it is impor­tant to record the maxi­mum amount of infor­ma­tion avai­lable at the time deci­sions are made. This enables us to car­ry out a real inves­ti­ga­tion after­wards, with the aim of impro­ving our future deci­sion-making and to avoid the lawyer in us construc­ting a “fake news fic­tion” sto­ry­line, after the fact11.

1Phi­lippe Allain (2013). La prise de déci­sion : aspects théo­riques, neu­ro-ana­to­mie et éva­lua­tion. Revue de neu­ro­psy­cho­lo­gie, 5(2), 69–81
2Daniel Kah­ne­man (2012). Sys­tème 1 Sys­tème 2. Les deux vitesses de la pen­sée. Paris, Flam­ma­rion
3Alain Ber­thoz (2020). L’inhibition créa­trice. Paris, Odile Jacob
4Shane Fre­de­rick (2005). Cog­ni­tive reflec­tion and deci­sion making. Jour­nal of Eco­no­mic Pers­pec­tives, 19 (4), 25–42
5Oli­vier Hou­dé & Gré­goire Borst (2018). Le cer­veau et les appren­tis­sages. Paris, Nathan
6Gerd Gige­ren­zer (2009). Le génie de l’intuition. Paris, Bel­fond
7Mar­cus Du Sau­toy (2014). Le mys­tère des nombres. Folio Essai
8Bar­ry Staw (1976). « Knee-deep in the big mud­dy : A stu­dy of esca­la­ting com­mit­ment to a cho­sen course of action », Orga­ni­za­tio­nal Beha­vior and Human Per­for­mance, 16 (1), pp. 27–44
9Ansel, D. (2005). Incer­ti­tude et esca­lade d’en­ga­ge­ment. Quand coopé­rer devient ris­qué. Les Cahiers Inter­na­tio­naux de Psy­cho­lo­gie Sociale, 65, 3–12
10Gérald Bron­ner (2007). L’empire de l’erreur. Elé­ments de socio­lo­gie cog­ni­tive. Paris, PUF
11Lio­nel Nac­cache (2020). Le ciné­ma inté­rieur. Pro­jec­tion pri­vée au cœur de la conscience. Paris, Odile Jacob

Contributors

Patrice Georget

Patrice Georget

Lecturer in Psychosociology at the University School of Management IAE Caen

Patrice Georget is a lecturer and researcher in psycho-sociology at the IAE Caen University school of management, which he directed from 2015 to 2020. He has been an industry consultant in diversity management and risk prevention. He has been an expert for the APM (Association Progrès du Management) since 2009 and a GERME speaker.

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