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Three keys to making good decisions

Patrice Georget
Patrice Georget
Lecturer in Psychosociology at the University School of Management IAE Caen

The World Health Organ­isa­tion (WHO) recently lis­ted know­ing how to make decisions as one of the ten psychoso­cial skills required to respond effect­ively to the demands and chal­lenges of mod­ern daily life. Clas­sic­ally, neur­os­cience dis­tin­guishes three stages in decision mak­ing1: defin­i­tion of pref­er­ences, exe­cu­tion and obser­va­tion of an action and finally exper­i­ence of the res­ult. Here, I offer some of the pit­falls with­in each of these stages and offer sug­ges­tions of how to over­come them by look­ing at three major psy­cho­lo­gic­al duels.

Duel #1: heuristic vs. systematic

“Am making the right decision?”

The pro­cess of ‘decid­ing’ con­sists of man­aging the con­flict that occurs between the two speeds at which our thoughts occur. ‘Sys­tem 1’ is rap­id, low effort, intu­it­ive and heur­ist­ic, com­pared to sys­tem 2 that is slow, sys­tem­at­ic, logic­al, and delib­er­ate2. Both have their advant­ages (speed, ease, reli­ab­il­ity, rel­ev­ance) and dis­ad­vant­ages (bias, noise, cost, fatigue), which are the source of much sci­entif­ic debate. Non­ethe­less, the key to man­aging this duel is found in pro­cess of inhib­i­tion3; in oth­er words, suc­ceed­ing (when neces­sary) in sus­pend­ing hasty judge­ment, ready-made routines, con­sen­su­al ste­reo­types and cog­nit­ive biases – in oth­er words, know­ing when not to act.

Of course, it is more dif­fi­cult to inhib­it routines than it is fol­low pre-learned pat­terns because it requires new inform­a­tion to be learned and prac­tised. As such, apply­ing strict selectiv­ity to a decision con­sists of meas­ur­ing and weigh­ing up the duel between the two speeds of the mind that drive our choices45, know­ing that some­times intu­it­ive decisions may, in fact, prove to be more effect­ive6.

Applic­a­tion #1

Here is an example of a decision you could come across: “Play the lot­tery in such a way as to win the most money”. Take a minute to place five num­bers on a grid from 1 to 49 and think about the duel that is going on inside you – prob­ably uncon­sciously. Gen­er­ally, we mobil­ise sys­tem 1 to play the lot­tery. For example, using the avail­ab­il­ity of ‘lucky’ num­bers (such as birth­days) or the rep­res­ent­a­tion bias of chance which leads us to spread out our num­bers, to “increase our chances”7! How­ever, as it turns out, every­one tends to use the same meth­ods and biases. So, when we observe the grids of lotto play­ers, we notice on the one hand that there is a sat­ur­a­tion of choices between 1 and 31 (dates of birth) and on the oth­er hand that there are very few sequences. To respect the ini­tial task (optim­ise win­nings) you must do what the oth­ers don’t do. That means you should play num­bers above 31, and include sequences, because few oth­er people do so. Thus, in the event of a suc­cess­ful draw you don’t have to share the win­ning! As we can see in this example, “play­ing well” con­sists of inhib­it­ing the nat­ur­al drive towards our super­sti­tions and biases there­fore try­ing to fight against one­self. This is true in most of our daily decision-making.

Duel #2: perseverance vs. persistence

“Did I do the right thing?”

The great­er the invest­ment in time, energy, or resources (human, fin­an­cial, etc.), the stronger the will to legit­im­ise the decision taken. But how far can we per­severe to the point of no longer being object­ive, no longer see­ing the facts or hear­ing the argu­ments that clearly call into ques­tion the decision we made? While it is good and socially val­ued to be per­sist­ent, it is import­ant to identi­fy the almost obsess­ive pur­suit of an action against all object­ive reas­on89.

Once the decision has been made, the implac­able logic of ‘sunk costs’ sets in, with its share of well-known cog­nit­ive biases that are hard to shake off: hypo­thes­is con­firm­a­tion (I look for argu­ments that con­firm my decision and only those argu­ments), status quo (if there is no reas­on to change, then why change?), loss aver­sion (to risk los­ing because of a change is psy­cho­lo­gic­ally unbear­able).

It is dif­fi­cult to fight against this dilemma alone since we are often only dimly aware of our own cog­nit­ive biases. Hence, tak­ing coun­ter­meas­ures can make it pos­sible to avoid these traps before­hand. For example, ensur­ing that the people who make decisions are not the same as those who eval­u­ate the effects and there­fore the con­tinu­ation of the decision taken. This is why, for example, new pres­id­ents who come to power can more eas­ily stop pro­cesses that were star­ted 20 years ago and which every­one knew were ineffective…

Applic­a­tion #2

the Monty Hall dilemma10 illus­trates this decision-mak­ing trap well. Ima­gine you have three opaque cups A, B and C in front of you. Under one of them you have hid­den, for example, a €50 note, under the oth­er two noth­ing. You must choose a cup with the object­ive of win­ning the €50. For example, you choose A. The host then turns over one of the two remain­ing cups that he is sure does not con­tain the €50 – B, for example. You are then offered anoth­er choice: keep the ori­gin­al choice (A) or take the remain­ing one (C). What do you do? The over­whelm­ing major­ity of par­ti­cipants decide to stay with the ini­tial choice (A), believ­ing that there is no reas­on to change. How­ever, to max­im­ise the gain, it is neces­sary to change because the remain­ing cup (C) has the same prob­ab­il­ity as the returned cup (B). It is remark­able to carry out this exper­i­ment in a group and to note on the one hand to what extent the argu­ments of the par­ti­cipants reflect the above-men­tioned cog­nit­ive biases, and on the oth­er hand to what extent the diver­gent minor­ity pos­i­tions (chan­ging the cup) are obscured from the debate by the major­ity who fiercely main­tain that chan­ging is irrelevant.

Duel #3: investigator or lawyer?

“Was I right?”

Our minds are par­tic­u­larly adept at recon­struct­ing past sequences by attrib­ut­ing intern­al causes (skill, effort) to our suc­cesses and extern­al causes (dif­fi­culty, envir­on­ment) to our fail­ures. Hind­sight bias is the enemy of reli­able debrief­ing and feed­back, since once the effects of a decision are known, its func­tion is to give us the feel­ing that we always knew before­hand what was going to hap­pen. It acts as a con­trol of uncer­tainty: “it was obvi­ous, I knew it would work”. In a way, one becomes a law­yer who seeks to exon­er­ate or incrim­in­ate those accused of a bad decision, which res­ults in a search for those guilty and respons­ible who “knew but said noth­ing”. The cur­rent health crisis shows that the witch-hunt can rap­idly take hold. To avoid this trap, both for one­self and for oth­ers, it is import­ant to record the max­im­um amount of inform­a­tion avail­able at the time decisions are made. This enables us to carry out a real invest­ig­a­tion after­wards, with the aim of improv­ing our future decision-mak­ing and to avoid the law­yer in us con­struct­ing a “fake news fic­tion” storyline, after the fact11.

1Phil­ippe Allain (2013). La prise de décision : aspects théoriques, neuro-ana­tomie et évalu­ation. Revue de neuro­psy­cho­lo­gie, 5(2), 69–81
2Daniel Kahne­man (2012). Sys­tème 1 Sys­tème 2. Les deux vit­esses de la pensée. Par­is, Flam­mari­on
3Alain Ber­thoz (2020). L’inhibition créatrice. Par­is, Odile Jac­ob
4Shane Fre­d­er­ick (2005). Cog­nit­ive reflec­tion and decision mak­ing. Journ­al of Eco­nom­ic Per­spect­ives, 19 (4), 25–42
5Olivi­er Houdé & Grégoire Borst (2018). Le cerveau et les appren­tis­sages. Par­is, Nath­an
6Gerd Giger­en­zer (2009). Le génie de l’intuition. Par­is, Belf­ond
7Mar­cus Du Sautoy (2014). Le mys­tère des nombres. Folio Essai
8Barry Staw (1976). « Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escal­at­ing com­mit­ment to a chosen course of action », Organ­iz­a­tion­al Beha­vi­or and Human Per­form­ance, 16 (1), pp. 27–44
9Ansel, D. (2005). Incer­ti­tude et escal­ade d’en­gage­ment. Quand coopérer devi­ent risqué. Les Cahiers Inter­na­tionaux de Psy­cho­lo­gie Sociale, 65, 3–12
10Gérald Bron­ner (2007). L’empire de l’erreur. Elé­ments de soci­olo­gie cog­nit­ive. Par­is, PUF
11Lionel Nac­cache (2020). Le cinéma intérieur. Pro­jec­tion privée au cœur de la con­science. Par­is, Odile Jac­ob

Contributors

Patrice Georget

Patrice Georget

Lecturer in Psychosociology at the University School of Management IAE Caen

Patrice Georget is a lecturer and researcher in psycho-sociology at the IAE Caen University school of management, which he directed from 2015 to 2020. He has been an industry consultant in diversity management and risk prevention. He has been an expert for the APM (Association Progrès du Management) since 2009 and a GERME speaker.

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