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Foresight: understanding the methodology

The scenario method: an aid to strategic planning

with Benjamin Cabanes, Lecturer at Mines Paris - PSL & at the MIE department of École Polytechnique (IP Paris), Orso Roger, Research Engineer at Institut des Hautes Etudes pour l'Innovation et l'Entrepreneuriat (IHEIE/PSL) and Liliana Doganova, Researcher at Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation at Ecole des Mines de Paris
On October 25th, 2023 |
5 min reading time
CABANES_Benjamin
Benjamin Cabanes
Lecturer at Mines Paris - PSL & at the MIE department of École Polytechnique (IP Paris)
Orso Roger
Orso Roger
Research Engineer at Institut des Hautes Etudes pour l'Innovation et l'Entrepreneuriat (IHEIE/PSL)
Liliana Doganova
Liliana Doganova
Researcher at Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation at Ecole des Mines de Paris
Key takeaways
  • The scenario method is a planning tool that can be used to design long-term objectives while the future remains undecided and uncertain.
  • There are three main categories of scenario: predictive scenarios, exploratory scenarios, and normative scenarios.
  • Scenario design is based on four distinct stages: construction of the basis, development of images of future situations, verification of the quality of the scenarios produced, and study of the consequences of these scenarios.
  • There are three main scenario methods: Intuitive Logics, Probabilistic Modified Trends and Foresight.

Stra­tegic plan­ning con­sists of determ­in­ing the set of decisions that will enable us to access the activ­it­ies con­sidered to be the most sig­ni­fic­ant. In the imme­di­ate post-war peri­od, plan­ning was based on busi­ness fore­cast­ing meth­ods that made it pos­sible to eval­u­ate the future on the basis of simple, reasoned extra­pol­a­tions of past trends1. Essen­tially pro­ject­ive, plan­ning began with an invent­ory of ini­tial resources and means and ended, a pos­teri­ori, with the determ­in­a­tion of short- and medi­um-term object­ives. In the 50s and 60s, the emer­gence of foresight led to a renew­al of plan­ning approaches, par­tic­u­larly in terms of devis­ing long-term object­ives while the future remained unde­cided and uncer­tain. Unlike tra­di­tion­al plan­ning, foresight plan­ning focuses on long-term object­ives and goals, and then pro­gress­ively looks at goals, strategies, and resources in rela­tion to an increas­ingly dis­tant time hori­zon. For­ward plan­ning is based on a range of het­ero­gen­eous tools and prac­tices2, the best known of which is the scen­ario method.

Scenario-based forward planning

Scen­ario-based for­ward plan­ning involves pro­ject­ing into the future changes in issues, rules of the game, strategies and capa­cit­ies, as well as dis­tor­tions in the beha­viour of stake­hold­ers and in the polit­ic­al, eco­nom­ic and soci­et­al con­text3. This meth­od of plan­ning keeps stake­hold­ers in a state of per­man­ent dis­com­fort, as it con­stantly requires them to rethink object­ives, strategies, organ­isa­tions and resources in an ever-chan­ging envir­on­ment where the future remains unpre­dict­able4. The aim is not to pre­dict the future to bet­ter anti­cip­ate it. Rather, the aim is to ima­gine a pos­sible future, or to use Her­man Kahn’s phrase, to “think the unthink­able”5. For Her­man Kahn6, scen­ari­os are an “aid to the ima­gin­a­tion” and con­sist of a list of hypo­thet­ic­al events designed to encour­age reflec­tion on their causes and the con­di­tions for their realisation.

More gen­er­ally, scen­ari­os can be defined as spe­cif­ic rep­res­ent­a­tions of the future that stim­u­late reflec­tion on the pos­sible con­sequences of dif­fer­ent events and facil­it­ate the design of action plans. How­ever, this image of the future may be more or less prob­able, plaus­ible, pos­sible or even desir­able. For example, the Inter­gov­ern­ment­al Pan­el on Cli­mate Change (IPCC) has defined a scen­ario as “a plaus­ible and often sim­pli­fied descrip­tion of how the future might evolve, based on a coher­ent and intern­ally con­sist­ent set of assump­tions about key driv­ing forces and rela­tion­ships”7. In con­trast, ADE­ME’s scen­ari­os8 of a car­bon-neut­ral France in 20509 are spec­u­lat­ive descrip­tions of sev­er­al pos­sible futures, which may be more or less desir­able depend­ing on the indi­vidu­al (Fig­ure 1).

Fig­ure 1: ADE­ME’s 4 scen­ari­os for achiev­ing car­bon neut­ral­ity by 2050

Different categories of scenario

Because the pos­sib­il­it­ies for rep­res­ent­ing the future are so var­ied, foresight plan­ning can be based on a wide range of dif­fer­ent types of scen­ari­os. Depend­ing on the com­plex­ity and uncer­tainty of the sub­ject to be explored, the time hori­zon chosen and the resources avail­able, the pro­duc­tion of scen­ari­os can be based to a great­er or less­er extent on fac­tu­al inform­a­tion, weak sig­nals, major trends or spec­u­lat­ive fic­tions. These choices will have a dir­ect impact on the nature of the futures pro­duced, which may be more or less prob­able, plaus­ible or pos­sible (Fig­ure 2).

Fig­ure 2: Dif­fer­ent approaches to design­ing scen­ari­os10

There are gen­er­ally three main cat­egor­ies of scen­ari­os, which dif­fer accord­ing to the plan­ning object­ives11:

  • pre­dict­ive scen­ari­os, which use past and present know­ledge to estim­ate prob­able future situations;
  • explor­at­ory scen­ari­os, which use the real­it­ies, know­ledge, and major trends of the present to estim­ate the plaus­ible con­tinu­ation of these trends in the future;
  • norm­at­ive scen­ari­os, which sketch out a par­tic­u­lar vis­ion of the future, gen­er­ally desir­able, and then go back in time to identi­fy the paths to fol­low to reach that future.

This clas­si­fic­a­tion is not uni­ver­sal, how­ever, and it is pos­sible to spe­cify and refine cer­tain typo­lo­gies12. For example, two types of explor­at­ory scen­ario can be dis­tin­guished: trend scen­ari­os, which favour the con­tinu­ation of major trends, and fram­ing scen­ari­os, which aim to delim­it the space of pos­sible futures by rad­ic­ally vary­ing the hypo­theses on the evol­u­tion of present trends. Finally, the norm­at­ive scen­ari­os can be situ­ated more or less at the fron­ti­er of the space of possibilities.

Fig­ure 3: Four types of scen­ario13

Scenario design

The aca­dem­ic lit­er­at­ure14 gen­er­ally dis­tin­guishes three main classes of scen­ario meth­ods in foresight: the “Intu­it­ive Logics” meth­od15, ini­tially developed at the Rand Cor­por­a­tion in the 1970s, then per­fec­ted by the Hud­son Insti­tute, Roy­al Dutch/Shell, the Stan­ford Research Insti­tute and the Glob­al Busi­ness Net­work; the “Proba­lilist­ic Mod­i­fied Trends” meth­od16 also developed at the Rand Cor­por­a­tion in the 1970s; and finally, “La Pro­spect­ive”17 developed by the French foresight school. Although dif­fer­ent in terms of object­ives and tech­niques used, these three meth­ods essen­tially share four main stages in scen­ario design.

If the present can be con­sidered as the start­ing point (explor­at­ory scen­ari­os) or the end point (norm­at­ive scen­ari­os), struc­tur­ing it always forms the basis of the scen­ario meth­od. The first step is to describe the cur­rent situ­ation, i.e. to con­struct the basis18 by high­light­ing the vari­ables which char­ac­ter­ise the phe­nomen­on under study in its envir­on­ment, and by identi­fy­ing the play­ers involved, their rela­tion­ships and their motiv­a­tions. This descrip­tion can be based on a wide range of tools and tech­niques. For example, the clas­sic tools of stra­tegic ana­lys­is (PESTEL, SWOT, Port­er­’s 5 forces, etc.), the DELPHI meth­od, or struc­tur­al ana­lys­is, which involves organ­ising a col­lect­ive dis­cus­sion to describe a sys­tem using a mat­rix of relationships.

The second stage con­sists of devel­op­ing scen­ari­os. Based on the image of the present, the iden­ti­fic­a­tion of trends, “weak sig­nals”19, “facts about the future” and the strategies of the play­ers, the object­ive is to design sets of hypo­theses in order to con­struct images of the future, i.e. scen­ari­os. Depend­ing on the vari­ables selec­ted and the set of hypo­theses, it is pos­sible to obtain a wide range of scen­ari­os. A selec­tion will then have to be made in order to pro­pose a reas­on­able num­ber of scen­ari­os, gen­er­ally a ref­er­ence scen­ario and a few scen­ari­os present­ing con­trast­ing images of the future. Depend­ing on the object­ives, these images may be more or less plaus­ible or pos­sible, explor­at­ory or norm­at­ive. This stage can also draw on a wide range of tools and tech­niques, for example, mor­pho­lo­gic­al ana­lys­is20 (for “foresight”), the 2x2 mat­rix tech­nique21 (for “Intu­it­ive Logics”), cross-impact ana­lys­is22 or trend-impact ana­lys­is23 (for “Prob­ab­il­ist­ic Mod­i­fied Trends”).

The third step is to check the qual­ity of the scen­ari­os pro­duced. The qual­ity of a scen­ario is meas­ured by its level of coher­ence24.This means assess­ing the sequence of ele­ments link­ing the present situ­ation to images of the future, and vice versa. This sequence must con­tain a cer­tain degree of logic­al and empir­ic­al cor­res­pond­ence. In addi­tion, all the ele­ments and hypo­theses of a scen­ario must remain com­pat­ible with each oth­er. How­ever, such a quest for jus­ti­fic­a­tion may tend to priv­ilege the issues of plaus­ib­il­ity and per­cep­tion of com­plex­ity to the det­ri­ment of the ori­gin­al­ity and vari­ety of the paths envis­aged25.

The final step is to study the con­sequences of these scen­ari­os for the prob­lem under study. This is a vitally import­ant stage, as it involves determ­in­ing the devel­op­ment strategies, cla­ri­fy­ing the action plan, and defin­ing and jus­ti­fy­ing the decisions to be taken. For this stage to be effect­ive, how­ever, the scen­ario meth­od must not be con­fined to an epis­od­ic activ­ity26. On the con­trary, it must be integ­rated into organ­isa­tion­al pro­cesses and routines such as strategy devel­op­ment, risk man­age­ment, innov­a­tion, and pub­lic affairs27.

1Zagamé, P. (1993). Plani­fic­a­tion straté­gique : Quelques réflex­ions pour une trans­pos­i­tion à la plani­fic­a­tion nationale. Revue économique, 13–55
2Cabanes, B., Roger, O. & Dogan­ova, L. (2023). Com­ment les démarches de pro­spect­ive per­mettent-elle de penser le futur ? Poly­tech­nique Insights.
3Roube­lat, F. (2016). Mouvement, plani­fic­a­tion par scén­ari­os et capa­cités d’action Enjeux et pro­pos­i­tions méthod­o­lo­giques. Straté­gique, 113, 169–188.
4Ramírez, R., & Selin, C. (2014). Plaus­ib­il­ity and prob­ab­il­ity in scen­ario plan­ning. Foresight, 16(1), 54–74.
5Kahn, H. (1962). Think­ing about the Unthink­able. New York: Hori­zon Press.
6Phys­i­cien et futur­o­logue améri­cain de la Rand Cor­por­a­tion et fond­ateur du Hud­son Insti­tute, Her­man Kahn est con­sidéré comme le père fond­ateur de l’analyse par scén­ari­os. Il est not­am­ment l’auteur des ouv­rages suivants : On Ther­mo­nuc­lear War (1960), Think­ing about the Unthink­able (1962), The Year 2000: a frame­work for spec­u­la­tion on the next thirty-three years (1967), Things to come: think­ing about the sev­en­ties and eighties (1972), The next 200 years: a scen­ario for Amer­ica and the world (1976).
7Inter­gov­ern­ment­al Pan­el on Cli­mate Change (IPCC). (2007). Syn­thes­is Report. Con­tri­bu­tion of Work­ing Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assess­ment Report of the Inter­gov­ern­ment­al Pan­el on Cli­mate Change. Geneva: IPCC, p. 86.
8Agence de l’en­viron­nement et de la maîtrise de l’én­er­gie.
9ADEME. (2021). Transition(s) 2050. Choisir main­ten­ant. Agir pour le cli­mat. Col­lec­tion Hori­zon, ADEME. 650 p.
10D’après Wiebe, K., et al. (2018). Scen­ario devel­op­ment and foresight ana­lys­is: explor­ing options to inform choices. Annu­al Review of Envir­on­ment and Resources, 43, 545–570.
11Börjeson, L., Höjer, M., Dre­borg, K. H., Ekvall, T., & Fin­nveden, G. (2006). Scen­ario types and tech­niques: towards a user­’s guide. Futures, 38(7), 723–739.
12Ramírez, R., & Selin, C. (2014). Plaus­ib­il­ity and prob­ab­il­ity in scen­ario plan­ning. Foresight, 16(1), 54–74.
13D’après Juli­en, P. A., Lamonde, P., & Latouche, D. (1975). La méthode des scén­ari­os en pro­spect­ive. L’Ac­tu­al­ité économique, 51(2), 253–281.
14Amer, M., Daim, T. U., & Jet­ter, A. (2013). A review of scen­ario plan­ning. Futures, 46, 23–40; Huss, W. R., & Hon­ton, E. J. (1987).
15Scen­ario planning—what style should you use?. Long range plan­ning, 20(4), 21–29.
16Brad­field, Ron, et al. « The ori­gins and evol­u­tion of scen­ario tech­niques in long range busi­ness plan­ning. » Futures 37.8 (2005): 795–812
17MacK­ay, R. B., & McKi­ernan, P. (2018). Scen­ario think­ing: A his­tor­ic­al evol­u­tion of stra­tegic foresight. Cam­bridge Uni­ver­sity Press;
18Godet, M. (1983). Méthode des scén­ari­os. Futuribles, 71(110–120).
19Schoe­maker, P. J., Day, G. S., & Snyder, S. A. (2013). Integ­rat­ing organ­iz­a­tion­al net­works, weak sig­nals, stra­tegic radars and scen­ario plan­ning. Tech­no­lo­gic­al Fore­cast­ing and Social Change, 80(4), 815–824.
20Feuil­lade, M. (2023). Quelles vis­ions d’avenir pour la santé visuelle ? Poly­tech­nique Insights.
21Spa­ni­ol, M. J., & Row­land, N. J. (2019). Defin­ing scen­ario. Futures & Foresight Sci­ence, 1(1), e3.
22Bañuls, V. A., & Tur­off, M. (2011). Scen­ario con­struc­tion via Delphi and cross-impact ana­lys­is. Tech­no­lo­gic­al Fore­cast­ing and Social Change, 78(9), 1579–1602.
23Agami, N. M. E., Omran, A. M. A., Saleh, M. M., & El-Shish­iny, H. E. E. D. (2008). An enhanced approach for trend impact ana­lys­is. Tech­no­lo­gic­al fore­cast­ing and social change, 75(9), 1439–1450.
24Har­ries, C. (2003). Cor­res­pond­ence to what? Coher­ence to what? What is good scen­ario-based decision mak­ing?. Tech­no­lo­gic­al Fore­cast­ing and Social Change, 70(8), 797–817.
25Roger, O., Dogan­ova, L., & Cabanes, B. (2023). Scen­ari­os as instru­ments of future-mak­ing: A prac­tice-ori­ented ana­lys­is of RAND Europe scen­ari­os. 39th EGOS Col­loqui­um.
26Schoe­maker, P.J.H. and van der Heijden, C.A.J.M. (1992). Integ­rat­ing scen­ari­os into stra­tegic plan­ning at Roy­al Dutch/Shell. Plan­ning Review, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 41–46.
27Cabanes, B., Roger, O. & Dogan­ova, L. (2023). Com­ment l’entreprise Shell a‑t-elle anti­cipé le premi­er choc pétro­lier de 1973 ? Poly­tech­nique Insights.

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