When markets feed on limits: tariffs, monopolies, and the logic of scarcity
- Capitalism in the age of finitude is based on the idea that the pie cannot grow for everyone.
- The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook, emphasised that rising tariff barriers and the unpredictability of trade policies were likely to weigh on growth in both the short and long term.
- In periods of finitude capitalism, large monopolies emerge that perform both economic functions and exercise sovereign prerogatives.
- China’s emergence as a systemic rival and the imperial ambitions of other powers make it impossible to maintain the same model used in the 1990s and 2000s.
- It is becoming very difficult to preserve current levels of consumption whilst avoiding the destruction of ecosystems.
In April 2025, the World Trade Organisation significantly downgraded its forecasts for international trade. According to its baseline scenario, the volume of global merchandise trade is expected to contract by 0.2% in 2025, a difference of nearly three percentage points compared with a scenario of low tariffs. The WTO also noted that an escalation of trade tensions could exacerbate this decline, potentially bringing it to 1.5%1. In its World Economic Outlook published the same month, the IMF, emphasised that the increase in tariff barriers and the unpredictability of trade policies were likely to weigh on growth in both the short and long term2.
These projections come at a time when protectionism no longer appears to be a one-off measure, but rather a structural feature. Tariffs, export restrictions, industrial subsidies, as well as strategies to secure supplies and access to critical raw materials, now occupy a central place in the conduct of economic policy. In the spring of 2026, for example, the European Union accelerated the implementation of the agreement with Mercosur, against a backdrop of trade friction with the United States and the search for alternative markets3. Shortly afterwards, Washington announced an increase in tariffs on European cars and lorries, from 15% to 25%, illustrating the persistence of transatlantic tensions4.
It is within this analytical framework that Arnaud Orain situates the concept of “finitude capitalism” (“capitalisme de la finitude”). An economist, historian, and research director at EHESS attached to the Centre de recherches historiques (Centre for Historical Research), his work focuses on the intellectual history of economics and the historical configurations of mercantilism5. In his book Le Monde confisqué. Essai sur le capitalisme de la finitude6 (The Confiscated World: An Essay on finitude capitalism), he examines several historical periods during which states and large corporations structured access to resources, transport networks and infrastructure within an environment perceived as finite.
You use the concept of “finitude capitalism” to describe our era; what fundamentally distinguishes it from traditional capitalism, which is theoretically based on the idea of the indefinite expansion of markets, growth and the potential abundance of resources?
I have sought to characterise our era, as well as other past eras, by broadening what is generally referred to as “mercantilism”. My aim has been to theorise a form of mercantilism that extends beyond the period to which it is usually confined, between the 16th and 18th centuries. The idea is, in fact, to contrast two forms of capitalism.
On the one hand, there is a liberal form of capitalism based on the idea that the wealth pie can grow for everyone—individuals, businesses and states—provided that the principle of competition and David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage are respected. Everyone specialises where they are most efficient, trade flourishes and everyone benefits. This implies limiting customs duties, combating monopolies, cartels and abuses of dominant market positions, and avoiding the granting of privileges to certain firms. It also implies freedom of movement, particularly maritime freedom, guaranteed by a hegemonic power capable of ensuring the security of trade within a relatively peaceful environment.
Conversely, finitude capitalism is based on the idea that the pie cannot grow for everyone. In this case, one must seize the share belonging to others. This involves measures contrary to the principle of competition, such as high tariffs, the relocation of value chains, the creation of powerful monopolies capable of negotiating from a position of strength, and the use of formal or informal colonisation to seize land and resources. It also involves cartelisation, trusts and a form of militarised predation with a strong intertwining of the civilian and military spheres. Trade is then organised not on a multilateral basis, but within what I call imperial silos, favouring close partners, allies or dependent states.
The practical drivers of “finitude capitalism”: towards a resource- and flow-constrained management model:
- An increase in bilateral agreements on access to critical raw materials.
- The reorganisation of value chains according to geopolitical criteria.
- The roll-out of targeted industrial policies in strategic sectors.
- The introduction of restrictions on certain technology exports.
These developments reflect a partial restructuring of international trade around security concerns.
You show that this form of capitalism re-emerges in major historical phases (the mercantilist era of the 16th–18th centuries, the imperial phase from 1880 to 1945, and then the period that began in the 2010s); what does this recurrence reveal about capitalism’s internal contradictions?
Capitalism first emerged in the form of finitude capitalism, with mercantilism. It did not arise at all from liberal ideology, but through instruments of coercion and within a context where the wealth pie was perceived as limited. This system quickly generated rivalries between powers of comparable strength, such as the United Provinces, France and Great Britain. The conflict between France and Great Britain in the 18th century resulted in a British victory, which subsequently imposed the Pax Britannica in the 19th century, with freedom of the seas and the promotion of free trade.
But liberal capitalism in turn produces its own contradictions. It allows the emergence of new systemic rivals who take advantage of this openness to develop, such as Germany in the 19th century or China at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. These rising powers use the rules of free trade to strengthen their industry, their maritime power and their foreign markets.
At a certain point, this becomes problematic for the dominant power. We then move from a situation of complementarity to one of rivalry. This is what is happening today with China, which has become a systemic rival to the United States. It now produces in high-tech sectors and at lower costs, which challenges America’s dominant position. We are thus returning to a form of finitude capitalism, with the return of tariffs, subsidies, monopolies, relocations and control over value chains. Free trade no longer suits yesterday’s winners, who are seeking to change the rules of the game.
The cycles of finitude capitalism: a historical perspective on power rivalries:
- The mercantilist period (16th–18th centuries).
- Industrial and imperial rivalries (late 19th–mid-20th centuries).
- Contemporary reconfigurations since the 2010s.
In these phases, competition between powers tends to shape economic relations in a lasting way.
In your analysis, we are moving from a form of capitalism centred on production and open markets to one based on restricting access, whether to sea routes, raw materials, land or strategic infrastructure. At what point in history did this predatory logic become more defining than that of expansion?
The shift occurs when powers of comparable strength enter into direct competition. In this situation, it becomes difficult to continue trading within a multilateral framework based on comparative advantages. States then seek to directly appropriate trade routes, markets and resources. They attempt to establish or re-establish imperial silos by controlling straits, infrastructure, territories or countries. This may involve investment, as in the case of China’s New Silk Roads, with the construction of ports, bilateral agreements or loans. But it can also involve much more coercive predation, as in the case of the United States with the Panama Canal, Venezuela, Iran, and perhaps Greenland in the future. The aim is to secure dependencies and structure a closed economic space around oneself.
You emphasise the role of major private powers endowed with quasi-sovereign prerogatives (in the past, colonial companies such as the British East India Company; today, certain firms in the digital, logistics, energy or even space sectors); where do you draw the line between private economic power and the actual exercise of political sovereignty?
In periods of “capitalism of finitude”, large monopolies emerge that exercise both economic functions and sovereign prerogatives. Historically, this was the case with the East India Company, which could wage war, sign treaties, levy taxes or administer territories. Today, we see a comparable phenomenon with certain large corporations, such as those in the digital or space sectors. They maintain close ties with states, notably by securing public contracts, which partially integrates them into state sovereignty. But they also develop their own power base. Some see themselves as quasi-states, possessing strategic infrastructure such as satellites, undersea cables or digital platforms that shape the public sphere. They can intervene in areas traditionally reserved for the state, such as conflicts or global communications. This creates a situation of both complementarity and rivalry with states. Like the East India Company in the past, these companies participate in the exercise of sovereignty whilst pursuing their own interests, which sometimes conflict with those of the governments to which they are linked.
Private actors and infrastructure: the new drivers of power in finitude capitalism:
- Critical infrastructure operated by private actors (data networks, cloud services, submarine cables, satellite constellations).
- Intervention in sensitive contexts (provision of communications, imagery or technical services in areas of tension or conflict).
- Influence over technical norms and standards (involvement in defining digital architectures, protocols or technological ecosystems).
These capabilities help to shift some of the levers of power beyond the strictly state-controlled sphere.
Does the return of tariffs and industrial policies pose a lasting threat to open globalisation, or is this merely a temporary blip?
It is a structural phenomenon. We will not return to so-called “happy” globalisation. China’s emergence as a systemic rival and the imperial ambitions of other powers make it impossible to maintain the model of the 1990s and 2000s. The world taking shape is one of tariffs, imperial silos, monopolies and competition for access to resources. This dynamic is likely to continue in the years and decades to come, with a permanent state of “neither war nor peace” that is incompatible with the previous principles of globalisation.
What credible political response would allow us to break free from this logic without simply redistributing dominance among the players?
There is no easy answer. The first step is to protect oneself against the major imperial powers, and this is particularly true for the European Union, by being able to stand up to them. This requires the rapid decarbonisation of the economy. But it also entails a reduction in certain forms of production and consumption, particularly energy-related, to limit the exploitation of resources and territories, especially in the Global South. The problem is that the quest for sovereignty can lead to the relocation of extractive activities back to Europe, with significant environmental consequences. It then becomes very difficult to maintain current levels of consumption whilst avoiding the destruction of ecosystems. The political challenge therefore lies in striking a balance between the need to protect oneself in a context of imperial rivalries and the need not to reproduce these very dynamics of domination and exploitation oneself.
